成唯識論演祕 5.451

5.451

詳曰：釋猶未盡，理亦難詳。經云：本末無數之見入六十二，豈我、我所見、戒取等而非邪見，是何不明？又云：此論於邊見中說全常等，此亦不然。觀彼經中：四遍常等亦依邊見，何得唯斷論依「邊」說？今為二釋：一云：六十二外，餘邊、邪見依前後際，以六十二而起執者，亦皆攝入六十二中，如四全常。經等但約依定等起，亦有不依等至起執，雖依尋、伺復多差別，此等皆入四全常中，餘准此知。經據此理名攝餘見，此即少分一切之義。亦如四諦攝一切法，苦稱眾苦，餘諦亦然。言攝餘見，亦據同類相攝說也。二、依品類以輕從重，名攝一切，餘見是彼六十二見，見類同故。同類見中，復有同異。我見即是邊見之類，邊依起故；邪見計彼自在常，等常邊之類，雖非我後而計，於常，常相似故。餘准可知。二取隨執何見法等即是彼類，由此二取及我、我所，應皆攝入六十二中。亦如五見總名邪見，邪見類故。又輕從重，如言王臣，臣亦名王，經作法中但據重說。

We examine this: The explanation is not yet exhaustive, and its principle is also difficult to accept. The sūtra states that the innumerable views of the past and future enter into the sixty-two; how could the view of self, the view of what belongs to self, attachment to precepts, etc., not be wrong views, and why would this not be clear? Furthermore, [the claim that] this treatise speaks of the partly eternal views and so forth under the extreme views is also incorrect. Looking at that sūtra, the four entirely eternal views and so forth are also based on extreme views; how could one conclusively decide that the treatise speaks solely on the basis of 'extreme' views? Now we provide two explanations: First, outside the sixty-two, other extreme and wrong views that grasp the past and future through the sixty-two are all subsumed under the sixty-two, just like the four partly eternal views. The sūtras and treatises only discuss arising based on meditative concentration and so forth, but there are also those who develop clinging without relying on meditative attainments; although based on reasoning and investigation there are further multiple distinctions, all of these enter into the four partly eternal views, and the rest should be understood accordingly. The sūtras refer to this principle when saying they subsume other views; this is the meaning of 'all' in the sense of a portion. It is also like the four truths subsuming all phenomena, where suffering is called 'multiple sufferings,' and the other truths are likewise. Saying that they subsume other views is also spoken on the basis of mutual subsumption among the same category. Second, they are said to subsume all by following the heavier according to category, because the other views are of the same class of view as those sixty-two views. Among views of the same category, there are further similarities and differences: the view of self is of the category of extreme view, because extreme views arise based on it; the wrong view of conceiving Īśvara as permanent, etc., is of the category of the extreme of permanence, for although it is not conceived after [the view of] self, it is similar to permanence in conceiving permanence. The rest can be understood by analogy. The two attachments, whatever viewed phenomena they grasp, belong to that category; thus, the two attachments and [the views of] self and what belongs to self should all be subsumed under the sixty-two. This is also like the five views being collectively called wrong views because they belong to the category of wrong view. Moreover, the light follows the heavy, just as when one says 'king and ministers,' the ministers are also called the king; in the sūtra's formulation of the doctrine, it speaks only based on the primary.