成唯識論演祕 5.451

5.451

We examine this: The explanation is not yet exhaustive, and its principle is also difficult to accept. The sūtra states that the innumerable views of the past and future enter into the sixty-two; how could the view of self, the view of what belongs to self, attachment to precepts, etc., not be wrong views, and why would this not be clear? Furthermore, [the claim that] this treatise speaks of the partly eternal views and so forth under the extreme views is also incorrect. Looking at that sūtra, the four entirely eternal views and so forth are also based on extreme views; how could one conclusively decide that the treatise speaks solely on the basis of 'extreme' views? Now we provide two explanations: First, outside the sixty-two, other extreme and wrong views that grasp the past and future through the sixty-two are all subsumed under the sixty-two, just like the four partly eternal views. The sūtras and treatises only discuss arising based on meditative concentration and so forth, but there are also those who develop clinging without relying on meditative attainments; although based on reasoning and investigation there are further multiple distinctions, all of these enter into the four partly eternal views, and the rest should be understood accordingly. The sūtras refer to this principle when saying they subsume other views; this is the meaning of 'all' in the sense of a portion. It is also like the four truths subsuming all phenomena, where suffering is called 'multiple sufferings,' and the other truths are likewise. Saying that they subsume other views is also spoken on the basis of mutual subsumption among the same category. Second, they are said to subsume all by following the heavier according to category, because the other views are of the same class of view as those sixty-two views. Among views of the same category, there are further similarities and differences: the view of self is of the category of extreme view, because extreme views arise based on it; the wrong view of conceiving Īśvara as permanent, etc., is of the category of the extreme of permanence, for although it is not conceived after [the view of] self, it is similar to permanence in conceiving permanence. The rest can be understood by analogy. The two attachments, whatever viewed phenomena they grasp, belong to that category; thus, the two attachments and [the views of] self and what belongs to self should all be subsumed under the sixty-two. This is also like the five views being collectively called wrong views because they belong to the category of wrong view. Moreover, the light follows the heavy, just as when one says 'king and ministers,' the ministers are also called the king; in the sūtra's formulation of the doctrine, it speaks only based on the primary.