成唯識論演祕 5.570

5.570

有義問云：見、修道惑百二十八依何者說？有云：依別迷說，以總迷者體既是一，不可別配四諦異故；依麁相說，隨轉理門說身、邊見唯迷苦諦。委細說者亦迷三諦，雖不親迷，緣三諦惑為我、我所及斷、常故。惑可此依總迷者說，體雖是一，隨所迷境，四諦亦殊，故無有失。然《疏》說云：唯依數，總、別緣而說，此義不然。若別緣者，其數亦別，其數總者，緣亦非別。既無數總而別緣者，如何約此以明其數？又《疏》云：《對法》第七、《瑜伽》第八約總迷諦說十迷四，〈五十八〉約別迷諦，二唯迷苦，八通迷四，百二十八即是《對法》、《瑜伽》七、八，如何乃言約別緣說有爾所數？故所立文，自相違也。

An opinion asks: On what basis are the one hundred and twenty-eight afflictions of the path of seeing and the path of cultivation taught? Some say: They are taught on the basis of distinct delusion, because for total delusion the substance is singular, and it cannot be separately matched to the distinctions of the four truths; and it is taught on the basis of coarse characteristics, where in accordance with the method of progressive doctrine, identity-view and extreme-view are said to be deluded only regarding the truth of suffering. If explained in detail, they are also deluded regarding the three truths, for although not directly deluded, they take the afflictions regarding the three truths as self and belonging to self, and as annihilation and permanence. Can afflictions be spoken of here on the basis of total delusion? Although the substance is singular, in accordance with the objective realm that is deluded regarding, the four truths are also distinct, so there is no fault. However, the Commentary says that they are spoken of solely on the basis of number, taking general and distinct objects. This sense is not correct. If there are distinct objects, their number is also distinct; if their number is general, their objects are also not distinct. Since there is no such case where the number is general and yet takes distinct objects, how can one clarify their number based on this? Furthermore, the Commentary states: Chapter 7 of the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya and Fascicle 8 of the Yogācārabhūmi, relying on total delusion regarding the truths, speak of ten being deluded regarding four; chapter 58, relying on distinct delusion regarding the truths, states that two are deluded only regarding suffering and eight generally deluded regarding the four; the one hundred and twenty-eight are precisely those of the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya and Yogācārabhūmi chapters seven and eight—how then can one say that on the basis of distinct objects there is such a number? Therefore, the text established [by the Commentary] is self-contradictory.