成唯識論演祕 5.571

5.571

詳曰：若許別迷以為正者，所言別迷為據，數總行別，名「別」；為約數、行俱別，名「別」。若數總、行別即同《疏》明。一、何取捨愛、憎不等，若數、行別百二十八數何得有，又何須云委細麁相？若言約總亦無失者，豈二、三合緣非總耶？若是總者，百二十八數亦增減，若非是總，應在別收，即前別迷百二十八數還增減，進退有違，如何斷云別、總無失？又，若云別依十，各各別緣諦說言，總約十，通緣四諦，不據自餘總、別說者，理亦不然。前解與《疏》竟有何別？後說其數，但是假施，擯實取假，未見其可。又，彈《疏》說理亦未可，且諦各十，十數豈非總，各緣自諦何非行別？故《對法》云：欲界見苦所斷具十煩惱，如見苦所斷，集、滅、道所斷亦爾，此即明證，云何破言無有數總而別緣耶？又，破會違亦不得意云：《對法》等約總迷者，數總名「總」。〈五十八〉中據別迷者，數別名「別」，以此而言矛楯焉有枉見披剝。餘義如《燈》。

Examination says: If one accepts distinct delusion as correct, is the so-called 'distinct delusion' designated 'distinct' on the basis of the number being general while the ākāra is distinct, or designated 'distinct' based on both number and ākāra being distinct? If the number is general and the ākāra is distinct, it is identical to what the Commentary clarifies; in the first place, why make unequal preferences of like and dislike? If both number and ākāra are distinct, how could there be the number of one hundred and twenty-eight, and why would one need to speak of detailed versus coarse characteristics? If one says that taking it as general is also without fault, is not taking two or three together as an object also general? If it is general, the number of one hundred and twenty-eight would also increase or decrease; if it is not general, it should be subsumed under the distinct, which means that with the previous distinct delusion the number of one hundred and twenty-eight would still increase or decrease—in advancing and retreating there are contradictions, so how can one judge that both distinct and general are without fault? Furthermore, if one says that 'distinct' is stated based on the ten, each distinctly taking the truths as objects, while 'general' is stated based on the ten universally taking the four truths as objects, and does not depend on the other general and distinct, this reasoning is also incorrect. What difference is there ultimately between the former explanation and the Commentary? The later explanation of its number is merely a provisional designation; to cast aside the real and take the provisional cannot be seen as admissible. Furthermore, criticizing the Commentary's stated reasoning is also not admissible: each truth has ten, so how is the number ten not general, and how is each taking its own truth as object not a distinct ākāra? Thus the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya states: 'What is abandoned by seeing suffering in the desire realm possesses ten afflictions; as with what is abandoned by seeing suffering, so it is for what is abandoned by [seeing] origin, cessation, and the path.' This is clear proof; how can one refute it by saying there is no case where the number is general and yet takes distinct objects? Furthermore, refuting and harmonizing the contradiction is also missing the point, by saying: 'In the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya and so forth, it is on the basis of total delusion, where generality of number is called "general"; in chapter 58, it relies on distinct delusion, where distinction of number is called "distinct"'—speaking from this, where is there any contradiction that warrants such wrongful refutation? The remaining points are as in the Cheng weishi lun liaoyi deng.