成唯識論演祕 5.665

5.665

詳曰：若許上意引下眼等，二定上意尋、伺不有，如何得云顯多由起？又〈五十六〉不云出定更起下心，便證上心引下識者。此第二師而據何理云多由起？若云下地多由起者，此不為救，本通於上，不會下界。若云但遮《疏》云必定不障有時下識引者。若爾，云何引〈五十六〉不起下心以之為證？本會彼文云多由起，既以彼證不由下引，云何而能會彼文耶？復更何時而由起乎，設言餘時無異因故。又云：生下當用上定引五識者，引何五識？若引上地，便為自害返證他義；若引下識，下識自地串習可然。上身引下地既不同，何得相例？又菩薩例例亦未可法理合，然起下何過？豈起下識失自在義？如來事智不親證理，豈失如來遍智義乎？又《疏》且對所諍以明不言一切，未可即以菩薩為例。

The analysis states: If one allows that an upper mental consciousness induces the lower eye [consciousness] and so forth, then in the second dhyāna and above, mental vitarka and vicāra do not exist; how then could it be said that [the text] "shows that they mostly arise from them"? Furthermore, because Fascicle 56 does not say that upon emerging from concentration one further gives rise to a lower mind, to take that as proving that an upper mind induces a lower consciousness—on what principle does this second master rely to say that they "mostly arise from" [them]? If he says that in the lower stage they "mostly arise from" them, this does not salvage his position; the original issue was to resolve [the case of] the upper, not to resolve the lower realm. If he says that he merely refutes the Commentary's assertion that it is "definitely" [so], without precluding that at times a lower consciousness induces it—if so, why cite Fascicle 56's "not giving rise to a lower mind" to prove this? The original task was to reconcile that text's statement that they "mostly arise from [them]"; having used that to prove that it is not induced by the lower, how can he reconcile that text? Furthermore, at what other time would it arise from them? If one supposes another time, there is no different cause. Furthermore, he says: "When born below, one uses an upper concentration to induce the five consciousnesses." Which five consciousnesses does it induce? If it induces those of an upper stage, he harms his own position and conversely proves the other's thesis; if it induces lower consciousnesses, lower consciousnesses are habituated in their own stage, which may be permissible. But for an upper body to induce a lower stage is already not the same; how can they be compared? Furthermore, his comparison with bodhisattvas is also not admissible: in terms of doctrine it is appropriate, but what fault is there in giving rise to the lower? How would giving rise to a lower consciousness forfeit the meaning of mastery? The Tathāgata's kṛty-anuṣṭhāna-jñāna does not directly realize the principle; does it thereby forfeit the meaning of the Tathāgata's all-encompassing knowledge? Furthermore, the Commentary provisionally clarifies the disputed point without speaking of all cases; one should not immediately take bodhisattvas as a parallel.