成唯識論演祕 5.665

5.665

The analysis states: If one allows that an upper mental consciousness induces the lower eye [consciousness] and so forth, then in the second dhyāna and above, mental vitarka and vicāra do not exist; how then could it be said that [the text] "shows that they mostly arise from them"? Furthermore, because Fascicle 56 does not say that upon emerging from concentration one further gives rise to a lower mind, to take that as proving that an upper mind induces a lower consciousness—on what principle does this second master rely to say that they "mostly arise from" [them]? If he says that in the lower stage they "mostly arise from" them, this does not salvage his position; the original issue was to resolve [the case of] the upper, not to resolve the lower realm. If he says that he merely refutes the Commentary's assertion that it is "definitely" [so], without precluding that at times a lower consciousness induces it—if so, why cite Fascicle 56's "not giving rise to a lower mind" to prove this? The original task was to reconcile that text's statement that they "mostly arise from [them]"; having used that to prove that it is not induced by the lower, how can he reconcile that text? Furthermore, at what other time would it arise from them? If one supposes another time, there is no different cause. Furthermore, he says: "When born below, one uses an upper concentration to induce the five consciousnesses." Which five consciousnesses does it induce? If it induces those of an upper stage, he harms his own position and conversely proves the other's thesis; if it induces lower consciousnesses, lower consciousnesses are habituated in their own stage, which may be permissible. But for an upper body to induce a lower stage is already not the same; how can they be compared? Furthermore, his comparison with bodhisattvas is also not admissible: in terms of doctrine it is appropriate, but what fault is there in giving rise to the lower? How would giving rise to a lower consciousness forfeit the meaning of mastery? The Tathāgata's kṛty-anuṣṭhāna-jñāna does not directly realize the principle; does it thereby forfeit the meaning of the Tathāgata's all-encompassing knowledge? Furthermore, the Commentary provisionally clarifies the disputed point without speaking of all cases; one should not immediately take bodhisattvas as a parallel.