成唯識論演祕 3.185

3.185

This explanation should be sound, because it eliminates various errors. There is an opinion: It simply cognizes the substance of the seed, and whatever function it has, it can cognize all of it. Why is this? If the distinct functions of wholesome seeds were said not to be cognized because their natures are different, then the seeds perfumed by sāsrava wholesomeness and unwholesomeness would both have to partake of two natures: their substance being avyākṛta, and their function divided into wholesome and unwholesome. Since that is not the case, how could it be said that their substance is avyākṛta like the root consciousness and thus is an object of cognition, while their function partakes of wholesomeness, etc., and is not an object of cognition? If it is said that because the substance and function of a single seed are distinct, it partakes of two natures: if so, when the treatises say that cause and fruit are both wholesome, could that only be with reference to the function? Furthermore, the substance is not separate from the consciousness, and the substance of wholesome seeds, etc., is called avyākṛta; the function is not separate from the substance, and accords with the substance being avyākṛta; therefore, both the substance and function of the seed are objects cognized by the consciousness; both substance and function are produced by wholesomeness, etc., and capable of producing wholesomeness, etc., and are both subsumed under wholesomeness, etc.