成唯識論演祕 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

3.2

Regarding the Commentary's statement: 'Vasubandhu then applies universally', and so forth:

According to that Treatise, fascicle two: 'All seeds further have six characteristics. "Perishing in a kṣaṇa" means that both kinds of seeds perish and disintegrate immediately and definitively. Why is this? It is improper for an eternal dharma to be the substance of a seed, because at all times its nature would remain as it was originally, without any distinction.'

3.4

Explanation: 'Both kinds of seeds' refers to internal and external seeds. 'Coexisting' means not past or future, nor separated, so that they can serve as seeds. Why? Because when the seed exists at that very time, the fruit arises at that same time. 'Constantly accompanying' refers to the ālaya-vijñāna, up to the seeds of external dharmas cultivated for livelihood, up to the abiding of the roots, or up to maturation. 'Determinate' means that these seeds are individually determined; they do not arise all from all, but from the seed of this thing, this very thing is produced. 'Depending on conditions' means that these seeds depend on their own cluster of conditions to be able to produce fruit; they cannot produce everything at all times. If in such a place and at such a time they encounter their own cluster of conditions, then in this place and at this time their own fruit is produced. 'Leading only to their own fruit' means that their own seed leads only to its own fruit; just as the seed of the ālaya-vijñāna can only lead to the arising of the ālaya-vijñāna, and just as rice grain seeds can only lead to the arising of rice grain fruits and the like. As for the rest, the seeds of external dharmas are not mentioned because they are easy to understand. By raising the difficult, the opening statement of the text is illuminated, for it says "all seeds".'

3.5

Regarding the Commentary's statement: 'It also reveals that the Mahāsāṃghika', and so forth:

3.6

There are briefly two explanations. One says: the words 'the twelvefold dependent origination is not' mean that it is not a seed; the words 'unconditioned, without grasping, and so forth' explain the reason. The second says: the words 'is not' belong to the lower clause, revealing that the substance of that dependent origination is not unconditioned; the words 'without grasping, and so forth' explain the reason. The former explanation is fundamental. Its primary purpose is to show that the unconditioned is not a seed, not wishing to refute their doctrine of the unconditioned.

3.7

Question: One treatise leads to another treatise: if the opponent rescues [their position] by saying that although the substance of the unconditioned is not produced by conditions, yet it can delimit them and establish the name 'produced by conditions'—what fault is there in this? It is just like the meaning of the unconditioned of ideation and sensation, and so forth.

3.8

Answer: One should cross-examine them: Now does your unconditioned possess functional efficacy, or does it lack functional efficacy? If it possesses functional efficacy, it should not be unconditioned, because it possesses functional efficacy, like the dharmas it delimits; if it lacks functional efficacy, how can it delimit? [Opponent:] If so, the Mahāyāna unconditioned is also like this: 'All wise and noble ones are differentiated by the unconditioned'; the two faults are equally present.

3.9

Answer: It is only because the realizations of the wise and noble ones have depths and shallows that there are distinctions; how could the unconditioned possess functional efficacy that causes the wise and noble ones to be distinguished? Therefore, they are not analogous. If one says that the unconditioned is in substance conditioned origination itself, its fault is even graver, as can be known on reflection. Another view: This also excludes the Sthavira view that in a single present moment mind and mental factors have a before and after, arising first and ceasing later, that material dharmas have the four phases of arising, abiding, decay, and cessation, and the ancient Sarvāstivāda view of the sequential progression of abiding, decay, and cessation in a single present moment.

3.10

Detailed analysis says: This logic is not necessarily the case. Although they posit that two, four, or three dharmas exist simultaneously, all are simply within a single moment and termed 'destruction in an instant'. If one says that it is not accepted because there are many dharmas occurring together in one moment, then when a seed gives rise to an active [dharma] there are three dharmas occurring together, and the seed ought not to be a seed. If one says that because they posit a sequential order they are therefore not seeds, while this might exclude the Sthavira and Sarvāstivāda's single moment, do they divide time? How can they be excluded? The text of the treatise only excludes dharmas that are permanent and unchanging; how could their two, four, or three [dharmas] be permanent and unchanging? Because of this, it does not necessarily exclude their arising and the rest; however, it is also logically tenable to exclude them as an incidental point.

3.11

On the Commentary's: '"Namely manifest" excludes that seventh [consciousness]':

3.12

This means that for icchantikas (those lacking the [Buddha-]nature), when the active seventh consciousness perfidiously produces seeds, although cause and effect are simultaneous, because the nature of the seed-fruit is submerged and hidden, the active seventh is not called a seed.

3.13

Question: The treatise says, 'It means [being present] together with an active fruitional dharma,' which has already completed the exclusion of all active consciousnesses from being called seeds. What further need does the treatise have for the subsequent word 'present (or manifest)'? Why does the Commentary trouble itself to say that 'manifest' excludes it?

3.14

Answer: If there were no subsequent 'present', one might doubt that causes without substantial essence or those in the past and future could also be called seeds; to ward off this, it placed the word 'present'.

3.15

If so, then within 'present' only two senses are subsumed; since the earlier term 'active' already excluded active consciousnesses, 'manifest' ought to be removed from the subsequent word 'present'.

3.16

Answer: It is precisely the word 'manifest' that explains the reason why that seventh consciousness is not a seed. If it were not so, for what reason would the active seventh of an icchantika not be called a seed?

3.17

If so, why did the treatise not say 'manifest'?

3.18

Answer: If it said 'manifest', it would only attain one meaning and lose the other two meanings; therefore it did not say 'manifest'.

3.19

Question: 'Manifest' excludes all active manifestations; why only those of an icchantika?

3.20

Answer: Other active [dharmas] lack the other [conditions], not just this single one. The icchantika's seventh consciousness lacks only this single one; hence it is particularly excluded.

3.21

On the Commentary's: '"Presently existing" resides solely in the cause':

3.22

Question: Since the substance of the produced fruitional dharma is not non-existent, it cannot fail to arise from the cause. Why does 'presently existing' reside solely in the cause?

3.23

Answer: It is not that all produced fruits are existent; for instance, the solitary shadow image has the same seed as the seeing [part], so the cause may not be non-existent. Therefore, the term 'presently existing' resides only on the cause, or it may apply to the fruit as well. The Commentary provisionally distributed them specifically and generally, which also presents no contradiction.

3.24

On the Commentary's: 'Both being in the present also presents no contradiction':

3.25

Although the cause is in the arising and the fruit is in the ceasing, yet because both are in the present, it also does not contradict the principle of 'coexisting with the fruit'. According to the third [view] below, the cause is in the ceasing and the fruit is in the arising; here the Commentary made an error.

3.26

On the Commentary's: 'If so, seed in relation to seed', and so forth:

3.27

If the causal seed is in ceasing and the fruitional seed is in arising, then like seed and active, they ought to be termed 'coexisting with the fruit'. Even if so, what fault is there? If so, what difference would there ultimately be between a seed producing an active [dharma] and an active [dharma] producing a seed? Because both would coexist with their fruits. Thus the Commentary concludes by asking, what is the point of discrimination? Furthermore, it contradicts the Yogācārabhūmi.

3.28

On the Treatise's: 'The active and the seed are of different kinds':

3.29

Question: Why did it previously object to the Vibhajyavādin that their nature and characteristics are identical?

3.30

Answer: That their nature and characteristics are identical was said with respect to sāsrava and anāsrava, not based on everything. Alternatively, it was said in terms of their tenet: in their tenet, the substance of citta is termed a seed and its characteristics are termed active, which is not like the active manifestation and seed in our own school.

3.31

On the Commentary's: 'The darśana-bhāga taking the darśana as object', and so forth:

3.32

This is the svasaṃvitti-bhāga taking the darśana as object; being the substance of the darśana-bhāga, it is also termed darśana-bhāga.

3.33

On the Commentary's: 'It is not subsumed under the causal condition (hetu-pratyaya)':

3.34

Although simultaneous seeing and seeing are called cause and fruit, they are not causal conditions.

3.35

On the Commentary's: 'If so, a seed in relation to an active arising', and so forth:

3.36

Analogously to seed [producing] seed, it is merely cause and effect, not termed a causal condition.

3.37

On the Commentary's: 'Because it is not accepted that a subsequent seed produces a fruit':

3.38

This concludes that there is no causal condition. If sequentially the subsequent could produce a fruit, there could be a causal condition; but since many arise simultaneously and none can generate, there is no causal condition.

3.39

On the Commentary's: 'Seed in relation to seed should likewise be viewed in this way':

3.40

Analogously to active manifestations, no two self-substances can coexist in a single moment.

3.41

Question: Do not innate and newly [perfumed] seeds coexist?

3.42

Answer: If they were causal conditions, coexisting would indeed be impermissible. Since innate and new are not [mutual] causes, their coexistence is without fault.

3.43

If so, supposing a new seed produces an active manifestation, it is also not a causal condition with respect to the active manifestation of the innate seed; why is their coexistence not allowed?

3.44

Answer: That would entail the fault of two cittas coexisting in a single moment.

3.45

If so, a new form-seed should produce an active manifestation, since with respect to unobstructed forms, many can coexist.

3.46

Answer: Because the conditions are not yet complete. Furthermore, if it produced an active manifestation, there would be the fault of inexhaustibility.

3.47

On the Commentary's: 'Question: If so, down to: because their essences conflict':

3.48

The import of this objection is: it should also be that the new seed produced all at once upon the path of seeing does not arise taking the simultaneous innate seed as its cause, because they conflict.

3.49

On the Commentary's: 'These are not simultaneous, down to: the fault of a seed producing a seed':

3.50

The import of this explanation is: this seed produced all at once is induced and produced by the anāsrava seed simultaneous with the worldly supreme dharma (laukikāgryadharma). It is not produced from a simultaneous anāsrava seed, so there is no fault of a seed producing a seed in the same moment.

3.51

Question: Why is this seed produced all at once called newly perfumed?

3.52

Answer: Due to the perfuming power of the worldly supreme dharma, the anāsrava seed is increased. That anāsrava seed induces the subsequent [seed] produced all at once. Because it is produced all at once, it obtains the name 'newly perfumed'.

3.53

On the Commentary's: 'That is, the innate seed, down to: only three dharmas':

3.54

The innate seed and the new active [dharma] both serve as causal conditions to produce the newly perfumed seed; this is not the orthodox explanation. This is because the innate seed in relation to the new is not a causal condition. If based on remote conditions (adhipati-pratyaya), it is logically without fault.

3.55

On the Commentary's: 'Due to this, the prātimokṣa', and so forth:

3.56

Because there is no seed produced all at once in the same moment, this conversely proves that for the previous prātimokṣa vows, an increase in function is superior.

3.57

On the Commentary's: 'The previous explanation means an increase in substance', and so forth:

3.58

This is the doctrine of the simultaneity of four dharmas.

3.59

On the Treatise's: 'Although cause and fruit, down to: because it has no self-substance':

3.60

One master objects: If the cause has present function and the fruit is not non-existent, one can say that the fruit arises from the present cause; but the fruit in the future has no substantial existence, so how can a present fruit arise from a cause?

3.61

Answer: It is precisely because the subsequent fruit is non-existent that it is said to arise from the cause. Objection: If the substance of the cause has perished while its function remains permanently, one could say the fruit arises from the cause's function; but when the substance of the cause perishes its function perishes along with it, so a subsequent fruit lacking a cause cannot arise. A commentary explains: As stated below, observing that present dharmas have the function of inducing the subsequent, the future fruit is conventionally established in counterpart to speak of the present cause; therefore the present cause can induce the subsequent fruit. Refutation: Not so. In this definition of seed, where prior and posterior produce one another, both cause and fruit are real. That passage speaks of the active consciousness as conventionally designated cause and fruit; one should not use that to prove this doctrine.

3.62

Detailed analysis says: The other explanation has flaws, as refuted above with respect to a cause producing a subsequent fruit. Now I briefly answer: If a ceased cause produced a subsequent fruit, then when the cause is absent the subsequent fruit might indeed not arise. But since the substance and function of the present cause are not non-existent, what fault is there in the subsequent fruit having a cause and arising? Other objections may be considered by analogy.

3.63

On the Commentary's: 'Functioning as cause applies both to seed and to possessor of seed':

3.64

The prior seed serves as cause for an active manifestation, and the subsequent seed serves as cause for a seed; a seed able to produce a seed is termed 'possessor of seed'. Or again, reversing that, the active [dharma] capable of perfuming seeds is termed 'possessor of seed', and the seed serves as cause for this possessor of seed; the intention is to clarify that seeds serve as causes for both the active and the seed.

3.65

Question: According to Asabhāva's commentary, fascicle two, explaining 'inducing its own fruit', it says: Whose seed is this seed?

3.66

Answer: It is only able to induce its own fruit. The word 'only' means: if at this time it is able to produce its own fruit, precisely at that time it is termed a seed, for the seed and the possessor of seed have both existed from beginningless time.

3.67

Explanation: 'Seed' refers to the bīja; 'possessor of seed' refers to the ālaya-vijñāna. Because the ālaya-vijñāna can possess seeds, it is termed possessor of seeds. Alternatively, the cause is termed seed and the fruit is termed possessor of seed; the previous explanation is superior. Since this seed and possessor of seed both exist from beginningless time before producing fruit, it is termed a seed relative to inducing its own fruit; does what the Commentary clarifies not contradict this?

3.68

Answer: Although the Commentary employs those terms 'seed' and 'possessor of seed', its meaning is different. Therefore, there is also no contradiction.

3.69

On the Commentary's: 'Because it is produced by what can perfume':

3.70

The bīja is that [which is produced], and the perfuming [factor] actively produces it.

3.71

If so, what is the meaning of [bījas] innate by nature?

3.72

Answer: It is also due to increase; or, by association of terms, it is collectively called 'producing'.

3.73

Commentary: "How does Jayasena explain this?"

3.74

He says that there is no fault: although the two characteristics of arising and ceasing belong to the same single temporal period, they are two [distinct] moments. Because they are considered cause and effect, they are also not the very same moment.

3.75

Commentary: "Again, how does he explain 'already arisen without a bīja'?"

3.76

Jayasena explains: That is according with provisional reasoning, not the Mahāyāna teaching. What fault is there again? This is fully explained below.

3.77

Commentary: "The Sarvāstivādins [hold that] wholesome dharmas, etc., serve as similar cause (sabhāga-hetu) for unwholesome and avyākṛta dharmas," and so forth.

3.78

Question: According to the Kośa, it says: "Similar dharmas serve as similar cause for similar dharmas." With respect to the three natures and the five skandhas, their own categories and own planes serve as cause only for their own planes and own categories. How can it be said now that wholesome [dharmas] serve as a similar [cause] in relation to unwholesome [dharmas]?

3.79

Answer: The wording of the Commentary is general; the intended meaning is to state that unwholesome [dharmas] can serve as cause for veiled avyākṛta [dharmas], because they belong to the same category.

3.80

Commentary: "The omnipresent cause (sarvatraga-hetu), etc., has a fruit of a different nature."

3.81

According to the tenets of the Sarvāstivāda school, the two views of identity and extremes are omnipresent causes; their essence is avyākṛta, and they serve universally as causes for the defiled dharmas of the five categories in the same plane. Since among the defilements of the five categories there are unwholesome ones, the cause and effect can indeed become of different natures. If so, how do they obtain a fruit of similar outflow (niṣyanda-phala)? Because both are defiled, it is called similar outflow.

3.82

Commentary: "The co-existent cause (sahabhū-hetu) takes fruits such as maturation (vipāka)," and so forth.

3.83

Therefore, the sixth chapter of the Kośa says: "This and citta together have one maturation fruit and one similar outflow [fruit]."

3.84

Question: Why does it say below that co-existent [causes] and associated [causes] obtain the virile fruit (puruṣakāra-phala)?

3.85

Answer: Among virile fruits, there are general and specific [senses]. The specific virile fruit is obtained solely by co-existent and associated causes. In the general sense of virile [fruit], all six causes obtain it; any fruit obtained through the exertion of force is called virile, so there is no contradiction. The Commentary speaks in terms of the general sense.

3.86

Commentary: "Which meaning is lacking here?" and so forth.

3.87

This is both a question and an answer: the eighth [consciousness] is not a perfuming agent, and therefore it lacks [the requirement of] being simultaneous with the fruit.

3.88

Commentary: "As for those who lack [untainted] nature..." and so forth.

3.89

This follows upon the preceding to pose a question. The eighth [consciousness] does not perfume, so it lacks the meaning of being simultaneous with the fruit; but since the seventh perfumes, it possesses all six meanings, and hence it should be called a bīja.

3.90

Commentary: "In the eighth gate..."

3.91

In re-explaining the causal characteristics, there are ten gates in all; the meaning of bīja corresponds to the eighth.

3.92

Question: When it is said that they induce their own fruit, that is, form, citta, and so forth each arise from their own bījas, how can the nimitta-bhāga of the seventh [consciousness] produce the eighth?

3.93

Answer: Because it is the nimitta-bhāga of citta, it is able to produce citta.

3.94

Question: Is the perfumed bīja one or two? Suppose either, what fault ensues? If it is only one bīja, how can it produce both the cogitative and the non-cogitative? For the nimitta[-bhāga] of the seventh and the darśana[-bhāga] of the eighth are different. If it perfumes two bījas, since the perfuming agent is one, how can the bījas be two?

3.95

Answer: Although the perfuming agent is one, because there is an underlying real referent (mūla-dharmin), there is no fault in perfuming two. The rest should be reflected upon and examined.

3.96

Treatise: "External grain, barley..." and so forth.

3.97

Question: Both internal and external bījas can serve as causes; why are external ones alone designated as nominal and not real bījas?

3.98

Answer: According to Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha, two verses are spoken in explanation, fully quoted in the Commentary. Asabhāva explains: Furthermore, external bījas such as rice and grain may sometimes perish despite being sown; and weeds such as tares may sometimes grow without being sown. How could internal bījas not have the faults of loss of what is done and acquisition of what is not done, just like external bījas? Therefore, the subsequent answer states: "Hence there is a contradiction." Because internal bījas and external bījas do not share the same principle, it is called a contradiction. If there is a difference between internal bījas and external bījas, why did the previous text say that the ālaya-vijñāna is the true bīja of all dharmas? To avoid this difficulty, it says that external bījas take the internal as their condition, etc., because rice, grain, and the like are all bījas perfumed by the karma of sentient beings' experience of enjoyment, manifested through the power of the ālaya; therefore, external bījas are not separate from the internal. Furthermore, Vasubandhu says: External bījas are spoken of as bījas solely from the perspective of saṃvṛti. Why is this? Because they, too, are all manifested by the ālaya-vijñāna.

3.99

Commentary: "Because of transforming again..." and so forth.

3.100

When the eighth [consciousness] has transformed the bījas of the faculties and produces the active faculties, it transforms the active faculties again.

3.101

Treatise: "The power of this bīja produces the proximate fruit..." and so forth.

3.102

Question: Why is an inducing [cause] needed?

3.103

Answer: Asabhāva's commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, fascicle two, explains this in full. In brief, it states: If the two bījas were only generative causes (janma-hetu) and not inducing causes (ākarṣaṇa-hetu), grain bījas gathered and stored in granaries and the like should not continue in a similar succession for a long time; and the sequential continuation of states such as blue-black swelling and putrefaction of a corpse after death should also not occur. Why? The moment death occurs, it should instantly perish and disintegrate. How could it be likened to perishing naturally later on? Just as when shooting an arrow and releasing the bowstring, the force of the movement serves as the generative cause that makes the arrow leave the string without immediately falling; and the force of drawing the bow serves as the inducing cause of the arrow, causing the arrow to travel forward and reach a distance. It is not that the force of releasing the string alone is generative, for then it should immediately drop; nor is it that the impetus successively pushes it forward, for then it should never drop. Since it leaves the string and travels far to reach a destination, we know that there are two forces here: the generative and the inducing.

3.104

Commentary: "If so, then from space, etc., up to nominal dharmas are not discussed."

3.105

The intent of this challenge is: If nominal dharmas are non-existent and thus need not be excluded, unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta) should likewise not need to be excluded. True Suchness and the unconditioned are subsumed under the term 'wholesome', and cessation not through deliberation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha) and so forth are identical to arising, etc. Although they are subsumed under wholesome, etc., they are still distinctly excluded; even though nominal dharmas are non-existent, what fault is there in negating them?

3.106

Commentary: "Therefore, the first explanation should be regarded as good."

3.107

This refers to the previously stated assertion that the dependent nature subsumes the nominal; this explanation is superior.

3.108

Commentary: "Avidyā perfumes True Suchness..." and so forth.

3.109

From ancient times, many masters held this view. This Treatise clearly excludes it; hence we know the ancients were mistaken. Bodhisattva Aśvaghoṣa also stated that True Suchness receives perfuming and holds bījas, which is likely an error of the translators.

3.110

Commentary: "As for those who lack [untainted] nature..." and so forth.

3.111

Question: Even if one does not mention defilement, it is still not something that receives perfuming; why bother with this exclusion?

3.112

Answer: It is specifically the primary mind (citta-rāja) that is taken as the substratum capable of being perfumed; is the seventh [consciousness] not a primary mind? For this reason, it is excluded merely on account of being defiled.

3.113

Commentary: "Then the fault of one bīja producing two sprouts would ensue."

3.114

For instance, if one bīja of consciousness were held in both places, form and citta: since the perfuming is simultaneous, their potency is also equal. Later, when encountering conditions for arising, they would arise simultaneously in both places; hence two consciousnesses would arise at the same time. Although the locations are two, because it is one consciousness, it is called 'one bīja'.

3.115

If so, why does the refutation below challenge them by saying that there is the fault of multiple bījas producing one [fruit]?

3.116

Answer: In actual principle, there are both the faults of one producing many and many producing one; alternating between mentioning the former and the latter entails no error.

3.117

Treatise: "Second, having superior efficacy, it is a perfuming agent..." and so forth.

3.118

Some say: Among the six consciousnesses produced by karma, there are superior and inferior ones; the inferior cannot perfume. When the Treatise says they do not perfume, it refers to the inferior ones. If one assumes that because the text of the Treatise makes no distinction, it speaks generally of not perfuming, then grasping at dharmas should also not be subsumed under perfuming agents because it is termed 'maturation'; therefore, we know that the superior among those produced by karma can perfume. What are the superior ones? That is, feeling is divided into three: those associated with neutral feeling are solely inferior, and therefore cannot perfume; those associated with painful or pleasurable feeling are designated as having superior ākāras, and are perfuming agents. Or again, neutral feeling is subdivided into three types: disagreeable, agreeable, and indifferent; the indifferent does not perfume, while the other two can perfume. Others say: Here it only negates the mental factors of the eighth [consciousness]; none of the matured states of the six consciousnesses are non-perfuming agents, because there is no other holy teaching stating that they do not perfume. Since the eighth has no perfumed [locus], it may well not be a perfuming agent; but the six do have a perfumed [locus], so none fail to perfume. Furthermore, if a citta or caitasika is not a perfuming agent, it must be that which is perfumed; how could there be a mental dharma that is neither the perfuming nor the perfumed?

3.119

Examination: Both positions are contrary to reason. The view of the first master has already been refuted as in the Yideng. Furthermore, to determine superiority and inferiority on the basis of the three feelings—since this is not from the holy teaching, is it not merely personal conjecture? If one follows the second master's claim that only the eighth is negated and all the rest are capable of perfuming, then this Treatise should conclude that only the seven transforming consciousnesses can be perfuming agents; why would it need to say 'having superior efficacy and power'? Since it says 'superior', etc., it clearly makes an exclusion. Moreover, if the other six consciousnesses are all made capable of perfuming because they have a perfumed [locus], then the caitasikas of the eighth should also be capable of perfuming, since they too have a perfumed [locus]. Furthermore, as for the claim 'how could there be a mental dharma that is neither perfuming nor perfumed': the dharmas associated with the eighth would have to not be caitasikas, because they are neither perfuming nor perfumed. Since there are many faults [in these views], they cannot be relied upon.

3.120

Commentary: "Produced by two kinds of bījas..." and so forth.

3.121

These are the bījas of conventional nominal designation (nāma-prapañca-bīja) and karma bījas.

3.122

Commentary: "Or this is by intrinsic nature..." and so forth.

3.123

It is not necessary to rely on their being produced by those two kinds of bījas; they simply cannot perfume because they lack efficacy.

3.124

Commentary: "Like wrong views..." and so forth.

3.125

Question: Although the categories are the same, there is a difference between increase and decrease; can it be called a perfuming agent solely through increase?

3.126

Answer: When the Treatise states that increasing and decreasing is called a perfuming agent, if either one of the two is present, it is indeed a perfuming agent. If this were not so, the untainted [dharmas] produced from the path of seeing onward, which only increase and do not decrease, would not be able to perfume. If even those can perfume, why not grant it here?

3.127

Commentary: "Can they be severed suddenly prior to this? Is there such an implication?"

3.128

Can they be severed suddenly in the various stages prior to the ten bhūmis? This is a hypothetical question, and being easily understood, it is not answered. In principle, bodhisattvas have the power to sever them, but first, they intentionally retain them, and second, they do not obstruct the bhūmis; therefore, there is definitely no severing of the afflictions of the path of cultivation without reaching the vajropama-[samādhi].

3.129

Commentary: "Each single bhūmi applies to what is severed in the three realms."

3.130

These words are inverted. The meaning intended is that in each ground, the cognitive obscurations (jñeyāvaraṇa) of the three realms can be severed.

3.131

As for the Commentary saying, "If there are nine grades":

3.132

The nine grounds of the three realms are combined to make nine grades; it does not mean that each ground separately has nine grades.

3.133

As for the Commentary saying, "The former explanation is then established":

3.134

Namely, the first interpretation's meaning of "only increasing" is established; therefore the Commentary itself says "today it is taken as increasing," making clear that it is not concluding the former second interpretation.

3.135

Question: Although born across the three realms, the cognitive object (ālambana) does not differ, and the cognitive aspect (ākāra) of the apprehending [mind] is solely taken as uniform and permanent; what other cause is there for the nine grades to be established?

3.136

Answer: Ignorance (avidyā) gradually increases across the three realms, and by inherent nature (dharmatā) there are differences of nine grades; what fault is there in this?

3.137

As for the Commentary saying, "If on the basis of the seventh [consciousness] of sentient beings lacking the gotra," etc.:

3.138

This reveals that the former second interpretation is unreasonable.

3.139

Detailed analysis: Examining the second interpretation, it does not draw a parallel between those who have the gotra and those who lack the gotra; but there are others who hold this explanation, and therefore it is set out and refuted.

3.140

Question: Between the two interpretations of the Commentary, which is superior?

3.141

Answer: The first interpretation is superior, as the meaning of "increasing" is clear. In the case of the second interpretation, the meaning of "decreasing" is difficult to understand: although the three realms differ, the apprehending and the apprehended are equal, so why should there be a decrease in the cognitive aspect (ākāra)? Therefore the first is superior.

3.142

As for the Commentary saying, "If the nimitta-bhāga perfumed the nimitta-bhāga, what dharma would be an obstruction?":

3.143

What dharma would obstruct it from transforming into a nimitta-bhāga and perfuming? Since there is no obstructing dharma, it can indeed perfume.

3.144

As for the Commentary saying, "Like the svasaṃvitti-bhāga," etc.:

3.145

If so, why speak of the darśana-bhāga and nimitta-bhāga perfuming? The answer is that it is spoken of in terms of their functioning.

3.146

As for the Commentary saying, "Namely, the root consciousness being identical with this is without fault":

3.147

It means that within the root consciousness, seeds producing active manifestations (samudācāra) are called simultaneous causes (sahabhū-hetu), identical with this vijñapti-mātra.

3.148

As for the Commentary saying, "Like the substance of a sahabhū-hetu [...] because it cannot perfume":

3.149

It concludes that the Hīnayāna cause is, in substance, not a sahabhū-hetu. The statement that it "does not perfume" explains the reason, thereby revealing the other's error through one's own doctrine.

3.150

As for the Commentary saying, "It is not active manifestation in relation to active manifestation being subsumed under hetu-pratyaya as an equal-class cause (sabhāga-hetu)":

3.151

It is not an active manifestation in relation to an active manifestation acting as a sabhāga-hetu.

3.152

As for the Commentary saying, "Questioning on the basis of the meaning":

3.153

"Meaning" refers to the essential substance; since "unknowable" has no separate substance, it is not questioned.

3.154

As for the Commentary saying, "In the subsequent explanation, it cites following the verse":

3.155

The explanation follows the question, so it is called "subsequent"; the word "unknowable" is precisely the root verse.

3.156

As for the Commentary saying, "The Abhidharma relies solely [...] and so briefly does not speak [of it]":

3.157

Therefore that treatise says: With what meaning does one view what is grasped (upātta)? It means that form (rūpa) is the support for the arising of sensation (vedanā); hence it is the meaning of what is grasped. If sensation arises supported by this form, it is called what is grasped (upātta).

3.158

As for the Commentary saying, "Sound produced by the great [elements] which are not separate," etc.:

3.159

Since the four great elements are already grasped by the eighth [consciousness], the sound that is not separate from the great [elements] produced by them is also called what is grasped (upātta).

3.160

As for the Commentary saying, "Just like a hair-net (keśoṇḍuka)":

3.161

The cognitive object is illusory, conditioned and unreal, hence it is compared to a hair-net. Some say: it means the object is subtle, or because the objects are multiple, hence it is compared to a hair-net; this should be examined.

3.162

As for the Commentary saying, "Otherwise, mind, etc., and association (saṃprayoga) would be its cognitive object":

3.163

If one also does not accept this, harmonizing it as before, the four aggregates are called "name" (nāma). Since citta is subsumed under name, citta should then be the cognitive object of the ālaya, and other characteristics are likewise. The word "or" (或) is an error; it should be "how" (豈), taking the former explanation as primary.

3.164

As for the Commentary saying, "Grasped due to the grasping mind," etc.:

3.165

Wholesome and avyākṛta minds are the imaginer (parikalpaka); they are dharmas grasped by the false-grasping mind. The grasped dharma takes its name from that which can grasp; the grasped itself perfumes seeds by way of the darśana-bhāga and nimitta-bhāga, and can also be called the false-grasping vāsanā of the parikalpita-svabhāva. Alternatively, within the nimitta-bhāga of the imaginer, the grasped seed is perfumed, and the grasped seed is called the grasping vāsanā; the former explanation is superior.

3.166

As for the Commentary saying, "All forms [...] should not be cognized":

3.167

Form is neither that which can perfume nor that which can conceptualize, and the eighth [consciousness] furthermore lacks grasping. In this form-aspect there are also no seeds; thus the eighth [consciousness] should also not cognize this aspect, because they state that it cognizes the seeds of grasping. If it is said that although actual it can cognize form, and that it speaks of cognizing the grasping vāsanā merely with reference to seeds: if so, what prevents it from actually cognizing the seeds of the three natures, while speaking [only] in terms of defiled seeds?

3.168

As for the Commentary saying, "If so, the eighth [consciousness] should also be capable of perfuming":

3.169

This refutes a concealed clinging. The clingers say: Since you say the eighth [consciousness] cognizes the grasping vāsanā, how could it lack grasping? Therefore there is this reproof.

3.170

As for the Commentary saying, "Taking this precisely as the proof":

3.171

Question: The perfumed seeds are called grasping vāsanā; to prove that the perfuming consciousness is grasping might be plausible, but the storehouse consciousness is not like that; how can this serve as proof?

3.172

Answer: The other wholesome minds, etc., are called grasping because of the two divisions (bhāga). The storehouse consciousness is also like this; how could it not have grasping? Therefore it can serve as proof.

3.173

If so, the storehouse consciousness should also be capable of perfuming, the same as the other seven consciousnesses.

3.174

Answer: There is no distinct [substance] to be perfumed, so it is not subsumed under that which can perfume.

3.175

As for the Commentary saying, "Now, this master's intention [...] will be understood below":

3.176

The first explains that the svasaṃvitti-bhāga, darśana-bhāga, and nimitta-bhāga share the same seed; the latter explains that their seeds are distinct. There are many questions and answers, as will be explained in full below.

3.177

As for the Commentary saying, "If so, the formless realm [...] this meaning should be contemplated":

3.178

Question: According to that treatise, it says: "In the desire realm it cognizes narrow grasped objects; in the form realm it cognizes vast grasped objects; in the formless realm's base of boundless space and base of boundless consciousness, it cognizes immeasurable grasped objects"; in the base of nothingness, it cognizes subtle grasped objects; in the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, it cognizes extremely subtle grasped objects. How can it be said to cognize the vast [objects] of the formless realm?

3.179

Answer: The one who inspected the text made an error. The Commentary master's intention was to take the formless realm as the objection, because the formless realm cognizes only seeds. Since it says that that consciousness cognizes immeasurable and other grasped objects, we clearly know that the eighth [consciousness] cognizes the functions of seeds.

3.180

Question: Why are those seeds called immeasurable, etc.?

3.181

Answer: Because they are perfumed by minds that cognize immeasurable objects, they are called immeasurable. Alternatively, "immeasurable," etc., refers to the functions on the seeds, because they are capable of producing immeasurable active minds. The former explanation is superior.

3.182

As for the Commentary saying, "Namely, capable of producing [...] does not contradict the root consciousness":

3.183

Although on that seed there are many distinct functions, namely being wholesome and being vast; the vast function is avyākṛta like the consciousness, and therefore [the consciousness] can cognize it. The vast is precisely the function, which is precisely the seed.

3.184

As for the Commentary saying, "Moreover, the vast function of the formless realm," etc.:

3.185

This explanation should be sound, because it eliminates various errors. There is an opinion: It simply cognizes the substance of the seed, and whatever function it has, it can cognize all of it. Why is this? If the distinct functions of wholesome seeds were said not to be cognized because their natures are different, then the seeds perfumed by sāsrava wholesomeness and unwholesomeness would both have to partake of two natures: their substance being avyākṛta, and their function divided into wholesome and unwholesome. Since that is not the case, how could it be said that their substance is avyākṛta like the root consciousness and thus is an object of cognition, while their function partakes of wholesomeness, etc., and is not an object of cognition? If it is said that because the substance and function of a single seed are distinct, it partakes of two natures: if so, when the treatises say that cause and fruit are both wholesome, could that only be with reference to the function? Furthermore, the substance is not separate from the consciousness, and the substance of wholesome seeds, etc., is called avyākṛta; the function is not separate from the substance, and accords with the substance being avyākṛta; therefore, both the substance and function of the seed are objects cognized by the consciousness; both substance and function are produced by wholesomeness, etc., and capable of producing wholesomeness, etc., and are both subsumed under wholesomeness, etc.

3.186

Question: If so, would the non-conceptual attainment (asaṃjñi-samāpatti), etc., all be objects of cognition?

3.187

Answer: They are not objects of cognition.

3.188

If so, how can it be said that it cognizes all of them merely in terms of function?

3.189

The explanation is: On the seed of the mind of revulsion (nirvid), the function of guarding against the mind is not the asaṃjñi-samāpatti itself; that attainment is merely designated nominally on the basis of this function. Although it cognizes the distinct functions of the seeds, it does not cognize the nominal. However, since those nominal dharmas are not separate from the real, if in cognizing the seed it also cognizes the nominal, there is no fault.

3.190

Examination: The principles are not confined to a single path; how could this meaning be absent? When the Commentary's intent is thoroughly investigated, it certainly does not conflict either, and the incoming objection turns out to be fallacious. As for the reason why: when it says that nature is determined by conforming to the fundamental consciousness and by confronting cause and fruit, this is explained on the basis of the substance of seeds, not on the basis of their function. The functions of wholesome and unwholesome are established in their two natures by themselves; how would they depend on cause and fruit before being called wholesome or unwholesome? Furthermore, the substance of a seed conforms to the cause and fruit of consciousness, and since its nature is not permanent, how can one demand that wholesome, unwholesome, and other seeds be definitively restricted to only two natures? Furthermore, because the substance of a seed is not apart from consciousness, it is called indeterminate; if one then objects that the function of a seed is not apart from the substance of the seed and must therefore also become indeterminate, then by the same token, because the seeds of form are not apart from consciousness, they should lack material obstruction; and because the actual fruits of the seeds of form are not apart from the seeds, they should lack material obstruction, since substance and function, cause and fruit, are neither identical nor separate. Since this is not the case, how could that be so? Furthermore, it was said: [The eighth consciousness] only takes as an object the function of the seed of revulsion, and does not take as an object designated dharmas such as the absorption of non-conception.

3.191

If so, that absorption would entirely lack substance, and the function of the seed of revulsion would be neither absorption nor designation. The preceding Treatise states that designations are also capable of obstructing—what dharma does "designation" refer to? Furthermore, if that absorption is established on the basis of the preventive function: is the absorption identical to the function, or is the absorption only designated on the basis of the function? If the absorption were identical to the function, how could the absorption be designated? If it were established on the basis of the function, there would be the fault of infinite regress. Therefore, one knows that the absorption is precisely the seed's preventive function; it is not an absorption of a distinct sphere. Being fixed, it is called designated; that the fundamental consciousness does not take it as an object is not because it is designated. Furthermore, it was said: Taking the seed as an object is also taking the designated as an object. If so, the fundamental consciousness would have to transform by conceptual discrimination. Because of this, the reasoning of the Commentary is indeed fully coherent.

3.192

Commentary: "Furthermore, seeds have three grades."

3.193

Seeds of mind, form, and so forth, in their distinctions such as the three natures, each have three grades; or the seeds of the three realms are called the three grades.

3.194

Commentary: "Namely, its own substance."

3.195

The image is not apart from the consciousness; this is called its own substance.

3.196

Commentary: "Increasing or decreasing according to what is severed and unsevered."

3.197

When severed it decreases, when unsevered it increases; what is taken as an object by the eighth [consciousness] of ordinary beings and āryas differs.

3.198

Treatise: "The body possessing faculties."

3.199

One interpretation: The substance of the five faculties itself is called "possessing faculties"; there is no separate possessor. Just as in the expression "possessing form", although the physical bases and so forth are not themselves faculties, because they are capable of possessing faculties they are also called "possessing faculties". Because the faculties and that which possesses faculties are assembled and accumulated, it is called "body".

3.200

Commentary: "Because the faculties are subtle...", and so forth.

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成唯識論演祕 — Classical Chinese