唯識二十論述記 1.77

1.77

述曰：自下第四，顯唯識義，舉喻以成。舊論此中，設為外難，方顯正理，此譯家增，非梵本有。內識生時，似外境現，此中都無少分實義，顯唯識義。如有眩翳，見髮、蠅等，此中都無少分實義，舉喻以成。或前雖引教，今以理成。若安慧等以前聖者，說此內識生似外境現言，謂唯有識依他起性一自證分，似外遍計所執見、相二取境現。所執雖無，妄情謂有，似妄情故，名似所取。《成唯識論》第一卷言：「或復內識轉似外境。」第七卷說：「或轉變者，謂諸內識轉似我、法外境相現。」此師意說：見、相二分是所執無，唯自證分依他性有。《中邊》等說：能取、所取，皆所執故，由自證分，虛妄熏習為因緣故，自體生時，似能、所取外境相現，此中二取，都無少實，唯有自證似彼而生，唯取自體。故無少法能取少法，愚者不知，謂離識體有實二分，故說唯識，令其了知。若護法等以後聖說言：內識生似外境現，謂有依他自證、見、相三分而生，不離識故，名為唯識，愚者依此不離識法，執為離心有實境相。此實所取心外二取，體性都無。《中邊》等說：二取非有，依他二取其體非無。《攝論》等說：「唯二」等故，若無依他見、相二分，即違《厚嚴》及諸聖說「唯量、唯二」，能、所取纏，見種種等。故今唯有非有似有，依他內識三分而生，都無少分離心之外遍計所執實二取現，故無少法能取少法，說「唯識」言，令其了達，不生愚昧。謂彼為有，《成唯識論》第一卷說：「謂內識體，轉似二分，相、見俱依自證起故，依斯二分施設我、法，彼二離此無所依故。」第七卷說：「三能變識及諸心所，皆能變似見、相二分。」此師說也，法體雖然，理猶未顯，故次舉喻，以成此宗。如世有人，眼有眩翳，意識遂於空中見有髮、蠅等。「等」者，等取空花、黃色、第二月等。眩是亂病，翳是障疾，眼病為緣，意見髮等，此中都無少分實義。由眼有病，以眼為門，意見蠅等，非即眼識能見髮、蠅。如以手等按一目時，意識便見第二月現，非即眼識見第二月。第六意識以眼為門，同時明了，狀如眼見，實非眼見，以五識中無慧執故。《成唯識》說：「現量證時，不執為外，後意分別，妄生外想。故自相分，識所變故，亦說為有。意識所執，妄計度故，說之為無」，此護法等說唯六、七有執者解。《攝大乘》說：能計度者是意識故；又說：唯有二分，內識變相，不離於識，似外境現，此中都無離識實物，如有眩翳見髮、蠅等。若安慧等說八識中皆有執者，以此等論諸文為證，眼有眩翳，見第二月，眼即能見，故眼識等諸見、相分，皆是所執，此中都無少分實義。誰言意識依眼見也？言唯意識能計度者。彼論意說：遍一切境而計度者，唯意識能。誰言五識無有遍計？若不爾者，此中云何說眼有眩，見髮、蠅等。廣此等諍如《成唯識》。瞿波論師同護法釋，以眼為門，意識能執。無有道理五識緣無，無分別故，一向緣實。如《阿毘達磨經》偈中說：「無有眼等識不緣實境起，意識有二種，緣實、不實境。」安慧解此文云：五識起執，必詫似境實法而起似色用故，不同意識緣龜毛等，本無亦生無似用故，不說五識不起法執，唯緣實境妄習內緣。所見外境皆非實有，亦如髮、蠅，所見，蠅、蛇，喻亦如是，故《成唯識》云：「如患夢者，患夢力故，心似種種外境相現，緣此執為實有外境。」雖有此喻，理仍未顯，應更立量。量云：極成眼識；定不親緣離自色境，五識之中隨一攝故；如餘四識。此餘意識，亦不親緣離自諸法，是識性故，如眼識等。中間四識，比量准思，此成心外境非內心所緣。次成心內境，定不離於識，量云：此親所緣定不離此；二隨一故；如彼能緣。又親所緣決定不離心及心所；所緣法故；如相應法。復第二云：餘所執法異心心所非實有性；是所取故；如心、心所。能取彼覺，亦不緣彼，是能取故，如緣此覺。

The Commentary says: From here below is the fourth [section], which reveals the meaning of vijñapti-mātra and adduces an analogy to establish it. In the older translation, a question from an opponent was posed at this point before clarifying the correct principle; this was added by the translator and is not present in the Sanskrit text. "When internal consciousness arises, it manifests resembling external objects, yet in this there is not the slightest real referent": this reveals the meaning of vijñapti-mātra. "Just as one with cataracts sees hairs, flies, and so forth, yet in this there is not the slightest real referent": this adduces an analogy to establish it. Or alternatively, although the scriptures were cited previously, it is now established through logical reasoning.

According to earlier masters such as Sthiramati, regarding the statement that this internal consciousness arises resembling external objects, it means that there is only consciousness's paratantra-svabhāva, a single svasaṃvitti-bhāga, which manifests resembling the external parikalpita-svabhāva objects of the two graspers—the seeing and the object-aspect. Although the imputed does not exist, deluded perception considers it to exist; because it resembles deluded perception, it is called resembling the apprehended object. The Cheng weishi lun, fascicle one, states: "Or again, internal consciousness transforms, resembling external objects." Fascicle seven states: "What is called 'transformation' refers to the various internal consciousnesses transforming and manifesting the semblances of the external objects of self and phenomena." This master's intended meaning is: the two divisions of seeing and object-aspect are the imputed non-existent; only the svasaṃvitti-bhāga is paratantra existence. As the Madhyāntavibhāga and other texts say, the grasper and the grasped are both the imputed. Because deluded perfuming serves as the direct causal condition for the svasaṃvitti-bhāga, when its own entity arises, it manifests resembling the images of external objects of grasper and grasped. In this, the two graspers have not the slightest reality; there is only the svasaṃvitti that arises resembling them, which apprehends only its own entity. Thus, not the slightest dharma can apprehend the slightest dharma. Fools, not understanding this, suppose that apart from the entity of consciousness there are real two divisions; therefore, vijñapti-mātra is taught to make them comprehend it.

According to later masters such as Dharmapāla, regarding the statement that internal consciousness arises resembling external objects, it means that the paratantra svasaṃvitti, seeing, and object-aspect arise as three divisions. Because they are not apart from consciousness, it is called vijñapti-mātra. Fools, relying on these dharmas that are not apart from consciousness, grasp them as real objective images existing apart from the mind. These real apprehended objects, the two graspers external to the mind, completely lack essential nature. The Madhyāntavibhāga and other texts state that the two graspers are non-existent, [which means] the paratantra two graspers are not without an entity. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other texts state: "There are only two," and so on; if there were no paratantra seeing and object divisions, that would contradict the Ghanavyūha and the teachings of various noble ones on "only measure, only two," the entanglement of grasper and grasped, seeing various kinds, and so forth. Therefore, now there are only non-existent [grasped forms] that resemble existents, arising as the three divisions of paratantra internal consciousness, and there is not the slightest manifestation of real two graspers of parikalpita-svabhāva apart from the mind. Thus, not the slightest dharma can apprehend the slightest dharma; the term "vijñapti-mātra" is taught to cause them to understand thoroughly and not give rise to foolish delusion, supposing those to exist. The Cheng weishi lun, fascicle one, states: "The entity of internal consciousness transforms, resembling two divisions; because the object-aspect and the seeing-aspect both arise relying on svasaṃvitti, self and phenomena are posited based on these two divisions, for those two would have nothing to rely on apart from these." Fascicle seven states: "The three transformative consciousnesses and their mental factors are all capable of transforming, resembling the two divisions of seeing and object-aspect." This is the explanation of this master.

Although the ontological reality is such, the reasoning is not yet apparent; therefore, an analogy is adduced next to establish this thesis. Just as someone in the world whose eyes have cataracts and floaters consequently sees hairs, flies, and so forth in the sky by means of mental consciousness. "And so forth" includes space-flowers, yellow color, a second moon, and so forth. Dizziness is an ailment of confusion, and cataracts are a disease of obstruction. With the eye disease as condition, the mind sees hairs and so forth, yet in this there is not the slightest real referent. Because the eyes are diseased, taking the eyes as the doorway, the mind sees flies and so forth; it is not that the visual consciousness itself can see hairs and flies. Just as when pressing an eye with one's hand or the like, the mental consciousness then sees a second moon manifest; it is not that the visual consciousness itself sees a second moon. The sixth mental consciousness, taking the eye as the doorway, is simultaneously clear, appearing as if seen by the eye, but in reality it is not seen by the eye, because there is no discernment or grasping within the five consciousnesses. The Cheng weishi lun states: "When directly experiencing in direct perception, it does not grasp [the object] as external; later, the mind discriminates and falsely gives rise to the conception of externality. Therefore, one's own object-aspect, being transformed by consciousness, is also said to exist; what is grasped by the mental consciousness, being falsely conceptualized, is said to be non-existent." This is the interpretation of Dharmapāla and others who state that grasping exists only in the sixth and seventh [consciousnesses]. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that what is capable of conceptualizing is the mental consciousness. It also states: "There are only two divisions; the internal consciousness transforms its image, which is not apart from consciousness, manifesting resembling external objects; in this, there is no real entity apart from consciousness at all, just as someone with cataracts sees hairs, flies, and so forth."

If we turn to Sthiramati and others who state that there is grasping in all eight consciousnesses, they take the passages of these various treatises as evidence: when the eyes have cataracts and see a second moon, the eye itself can see it; therefore, the seeing and object divisions of the visual consciousness and so on are all parikalpita, and in this there is not the slightest real referent. Who says that the mental consciousness sees based on the eye? As for the statement that only the mental consciousness can conceptualize, that treatise's intent is that conceptualizing with respect to all objects can only be done by the mental consciousness. Who says that the five consciousnesses have no parikalpa? If it were not so, why does it say here that the eye has dizziness and sees hairs, flies, and so forth? These debates are detailed extensively in the Cheng weishi lun.

Master Gopa agrees with Dharmapāla's explanation: taking the eye as the doorway, the mental consciousness is capable of grasping. There is no principle whereby the five consciousnesses take non-existence as an object; because they are non-conceptual, they invariably take real entities as objects. As stated in a verse of the Abhidharma-sūtra: "There is no visual or other consciousness that arises without taking a real object as its condition; mental consciousness is of two kinds, taking real or unreal objects as its conditions." Sthiramati explains this text by saying: when the five consciousnesses give rise to grasping, they must rely on real dharmas that resemble objects to arise, because they resemble the function of form; unlike the mental consciousness taking a tortoise's hair and so forth as object, where even what is fundamentally non-existent also arises because it lacks resembling functions, he does not say that the five consciousnesses do not give rise to grasping of dharmas, but only that they take real objects as conditions while deluded perfuming serves as internal condition. The external objects seen are all not truly existent, just like hairs and flies; the seen flies and snakes serve as an analogy in the same way. Therefore, the Cheng weishi lun states: "Like one afflicted by dreams, due to the force of the dream-affliction, the mind manifests resembling the forms of various external objects, and conditioned by these, grasps them as truly existent external objects."

Although there is this analogy, the principle is still not fully revealed, so inferences should be further formulated. The inference is formulated: [Thesis:] The widely accepted visual consciousness / [Probandum:] definitely does not directly take as object a form-realm separated from itself; / [Reason:] because it is subsumed under any one among the five consciousnesses; / [Example:] like the remaining four consciousnesses. The remaining mental consciousness likewise does not directly take as object dharmas separated from itself, because it is of the nature of consciousness, like the visual consciousness and so on. The intermediate four consciousnesses are to be inferred accordingly. This establishes that objects external to the mind are not objects cognized by the internal mind. Next, to establish that objects internal to the mind are definitely not apart from consciousness, the inference is: [Thesis:] This direct object / [Probandum:] is definitely not apart from this [cognizing consciousness]; / [Reason:] because it is one of the two; / [Example:] like that cognizing consciousness. Furthermore, [Thesis:] The direct object / [Probandum:] is definitely not apart from the mind and mental factors; / [Reason:] because it is an objective phenomenon; / [Example:] like associated phenomena. Again, the second [formulation] states: [Thesis:] Other grasped dharmas distinct from the mind and mental factors / [Probandum:] are not truly existent in nature; / [Reason:] because they are apprehended; / [Example:] like the mind and mental factors. The awareness that can grasp them also does not take them as object, because it is a grasping [awareness], like the awareness taking this [internal object] as its object.