唯識二十論述記 1.77

1.77

The Commentary says: From here below is the fourth [section], which reveals the meaning of vijñapti-mātra and adduces an analogy to establish it. In the older translation, a question from an opponent was posed at this point before clarifying the correct principle; this was added by the translator and is not present in the Sanskrit text. "When internal consciousness arises, it manifests resembling external objects, yet in this there is not the slightest real referent": this reveals the meaning of vijñapti-mātra. "Just as one with cataracts sees hairs, flies, and so forth, yet in this there is not the slightest real referent": this adduces an analogy to establish it. Or alternatively, although the scriptures were cited previously, it is now established through logical reasoning.

According to earlier masters such as Sthiramati, regarding the statement that this internal consciousness arises resembling external objects, it means that there is only consciousness's paratantra-svabhāva, a single svasaṃvitti-bhāga, which manifests resembling the external parikalpita-svabhāva objects of the two graspers—the seeing and the object-aspect. Although the imputed does not exist, deluded perception considers it to exist; because it resembles deluded perception, it is called resembling the apprehended object. The Cheng weishi lun, fascicle one, states: "Or again, internal consciousness transforms, resembling external objects." Fascicle seven states: "What is called 'transformation' refers to the various internal consciousnesses transforming and manifesting the semblances of the external objects of self and phenomena." This master's intended meaning is: the two divisions of seeing and object-aspect are the imputed non-existent; only the svasaṃvitti-bhāga is paratantra existence. As the Madhyāntavibhāga and other texts say, the grasper and the grasped are both the imputed. Because deluded perfuming serves as the direct causal condition for the svasaṃvitti-bhāga, when its own entity arises, it manifests resembling the images of external objects of grasper and grasped. In this, the two graspers have not the slightest reality; there is only the svasaṃvitti that arises resembling them, which apprehends only its own entity. Thus, not the slightest dharma can apprehend the slightest dharma. Fools, not understanding this, suppose that apart from the entity of consciousness there are real two divisions; therefore, vijñapti-mātra is taught to make them comprehend it.

According to later masters such as Dharmapāla, regarding the statement that internal consciousness arises resembling external objects, it means that the paratantra svasaṃvitti, seeing, and object-aspect arise as three divisions. Because they are not apart from consciousness, it is called vijñapti-mātra. Fools, relying on these dharmas that are not apart from consciousness, grasp them as real objective images existing apart from the mind. These real apprehended objects, the two graspers external to the mind, completely lack essential nature. The Madhyāntavibhāga and other texts state that the two graspers are non-existent, [which means] the paratantra two graspers are not without an entity. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other texts state: "There are only two," and so on; if there were no paratantra seeing and object divisions, that would contradict the Ghanavyūha and the teachings of various noble ones on "only measure, only two," the entanglement of grasper and grasped, seeing various kinds, and so forth. Therefore, now there are only non-existent [grasped forms] that resemble existents, arising as the three divisions of paratantra internal consciousness, and there is not the slightest manifestation of real two graspers of parikalpita-svabhāva apart from the mind. Thus, not the slightest dharma can apprehend the slightest dharma; the term "vijñapti-mātra" is taught to cause them to understand thoroughly and not give rise to foolish delusion, supposing those to exist. The Cheng weishi lun, fascicle one, states: "The entity of internal consciousness transforms, resembling two divisions; because the object-aspect and the seeing-aspect both arise relying on svasaṃvitti, self and phenomena are posited based on these two divisions, for those two would have nothing to rely on apart from these." Fascicle seven states: "The three transformative consciousnesses and their mental factors are all capable of transforming, resembling the two divisions of seeing and object-aspect." This is the explanation of this master.

Although the ontological reality is such, the reasoning is not yet apparent; therefore, an analogy is adduced next to establish this thesis. Just as someone in the world whose eyes have cataracts and floaters consequently sees hairs, flies, and so forth in the sky by means of mental consciousness. "And so forth" includes space-flowers, yellow color, a second moon, and so forth. Dizziness is an ailment of confusion, and cataracts are a disease of obstruction. With the eye disease as condition, the mind sees hairs and so forth, yet in this there is not the slightest real referent. Because the eyes are diseased, taking the eyes as the doorway, the mind sees flies and so forth; it is not that the visual consciousness itself can see hairs and flies. Just as when pressing an eye with one's hand or the like, the mental consciousness then sees a second moon manifest; it is not that the visual consciousness itself sees a second moon. The sixth mental consciousness, taking the eye as the doorway, is simultaneously clear, appearing as if seen by the eye, but in reality it is not seen by the eye, because there is no discernment or grasping within the five consciousnesses. The Cheng weishi lun states: "When directly experiencing in direct perception, it does not grasp [the object] as external; later, the mind discriminates and falsely gives rise to the conception of externality. Therefore, one's own object-aspect, being transformed by consciousness, is also said to exist; what is grasped by the mental consciousness, being falsely conceptualized, is said to be non-existent." This is the interpretation of Dharmapāla and others who state that grasping exists only in the sixth and seventh [consciousnesses]. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that what is capable of conceptualizing is the mental consciousness. It also states: "There are only two divisions; the internal consciousness transforms its image, which is not apart from consciousness, manifesting resembling external objects; in this, there is no real entity apart from consciousness at all, just as someone with cataracts sees hairs, flies, and so forth."

If we turn to Sthiramati and others who state that there is grasping in all eight consciousnesses, they take the passages of these various treatises as evidence: when the eyes have cataracts and see a second moon, the eye itself can see it; therefore, the seeing and object divisions of the visual consciousness and so on are all parikalpita, and in this there is not the slightest real referent. Who says that the mental consciousness sees based on the eye? As for the statement that only the mental consciousness can conceptualize, that treatise's intent is that conceptualizing with respect to all objects can only be done by the mental consciousness. Who says that the five consciousnesses have no parikalpa? If it were not so, why does it say here that the eye has dizziness and sees hairs, flies, and so forth? These debates are detailed extensively in the Cheng weishi lun.

Master Gopa agrees with Dharmapāla's explanation: taking the eye as the doorway, the mental consciousness is capable of grasping. There is no principle whereby the five consciousnesses take non-existence as an object; because they are non-conceptual, they invariably take real entities as objects. As stated in a verse of the Abhidharma-sūtra: "There is no visual or other consciousness that arises without taking a real object as its condition; mental consciousness is of two kinds, taking real or unreal objects as its conditions." Sthiramati explains this text by saying: when the five consciousnesses give rise to grasping, they must rely on real dharmas that resemble objects to arise, because they resemble the function of form; unlike the mental consciousness taking a tortoise's hair and so forth as object, where even what is fundamentally non-existent also arises because it lacks resembling functions, he does not say that the five consciousnesses do not give rise to grasping of dharmas, but only that they take real objects as conditions while deluded perfuming serves as internal condition. The external objects seen are all not truly existent, just like hairs and flies; the seen flies and snakes serve as an analogy in the same way. Therefore, the Cheng weishi lun states: "Like one afflicted by dreams, due to the force of the dream-affliction, the mind manifests resembling the forms of various external objects, and conditioned by these, grasps them as truly existent external objects."

Although there is this analogy, the principle is still not fully revealed, so inferences should be further formulated. The inference is formulated: [Thesis:] The widely accepted visual consciousness / [Probandum:] definitely does not directly take as object a form-realm separated from itself; / [Reason:] because it is subsumed under any one among the five consciousnesses; / [Example:] like the remaining four consciousnesses. The remaining mental consciousness likewise does not directly take as object dharmas separated from itself, because it is of the nature of consciousness, like the visual consciousness and so on. The intermediate four consciousnesses are to be inferred accordingly. This establishes that objects external to the mind are not objects cognized by the internal mind. Next, to establish that objects internal to the mind are definitely not apart from consciousness, the inference is: [Thesis:] This direct object / [Probandum:] is definitely not apart from this [cognizing consciousness]; / [Reason:] because it is one of the two; / [Example:] like that cognizing consciousness. Furthermore, [Thesis:] The direct object / [Probandum:] is definitely not apart from the mind and mental factors; / [Reason:] because it is an objective phenomenon; / [Example:] like associated phenomena. Again, the second [formulation] states: [Thesis:] Other grasped dharmas distinct from the mind and mental factors / [Probandum:] are not truly existent in nature; / [Reason:] because they are apprehended; / [Example:] like the mind and mental factors. The awareness that can grasp them also does not take them as object, because it is a grasping [awareness], like the awareness taking this [internal object] as its object.