唯識二十論述記 2.33

2.33

論有宗言及因，《觀所緣論》約所緣緣，以立量破，「所緣緣者，謂能緣識帶彼相起，及有實體令能緣識託彼而生」，具二支義。色等極微，我非許有，設有實體，能生五識，容有緣義，然非所緣，如眼根等。於眼等識無彼相故，遂立量云：「極微於五識設緣非所緣，彼相識無故，猶如眼根等。」彼言雖別，意與此同。《成唯識論》第一卷說：小與此同，彼論說言：「非諸極微共和集位可與五識各作所緣，此識上無極微相故。」設彼救言：極微各別有和合相為五識境，和合相者，即似一相，此相是用，大於本極微，用不離體，體既實有，成所緣緣。彼論破言：「非和合位與不合時，此諸極微體相有異故，和合位如不合時，色等極微非五識境。」然更有救，復有別徵，如《成唯識》第一疏說。

The treatise has the statement of the thesis and the reason. The Ālambanaparīkṣā establishes an inference to refute this in terms of the ālambana-pratyaya: 'An ālambana-pratyaya means that the apprehending consciousness arises bearing that aspect, and there is a substantial entity causing the apprehending consciousness to arise relying upon it', thus possessing both limbs of the definition. We do not accept the existence of atoms of form and so on; even if they had a substantial entity capable of generating the five consciousnesses, they might allow the sense of a condition (pratyaya), but they are not the object (ālambana), like the eye faculty and so forth. Because that aspect does not exist on the eye consciousness and the others, an inference was thereupon established: 'Atoms, in relation to the five consciousnesses, may be conditions but are not objects (pratijñā); because their aspect is absent from the consciousness (hetu); like the eye faculty and so forth (dṛṣṭānta).' Although the wording differs, the meaning is the same as here. The first fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun states something slightly similar to this; that treatise says: 'It is not the case that when all atoms are in a state of aggregation, each can serve as an object for the five consciousnesses, because the aspect of atoms is absent from this consciousness.' If they should rescue [their position] by saying: 'Atoms individually have an aspect of composition that serves as the object of the five consciousnesses; the aspect of composition is a resembling single aspect, and this aspect is a function, larger than the original atom; function is not separate from substance, and since the substance exists substantially, it forms an ālambana-pratyaya.' That treatise refutes them, saying: 'It is not the case that when composed, the substances and aspects of these atoms differ from when they are not composed; therefore, in the composed state, just as when uncomposed, the atoms of form and so on are not objects of the five consciousnesses.' Yet there are further rescues and further specific cross-examinations, as explained in the first commentary on the Cheng weishi lun.