唯識二十論述記 2.359

2.359

有義：後得智二分俱有，說此思惟似真如相，不見真實真如性故，乃至廣說。又若此智不變似境，離自體法，應非所緣，緣色等智，應緣聲等。又緣無等，應無所緣緣，彼體非實，無緣用故。《佛地論》中亦作是說：後得智品有分別故，所緣境界或離體故，如有漏心。似境相現，分明緣照如是境相，同無漏心。無漏種起，雖有相似有漏法者，體非有漏，如有漏心。似無漏相，非無漏故。《成唯識》中又作是說：「現在彼聚心、心所法，非此聚識親所緣緣，他聚攝攝故」，如非所緣。然真如等與能緣心不異、不一，非他所攝，不可為例。餘所引證，如有漏中，由斯教理，若佛、非佛，諸後得智無漏心者，定有相分。亦有見分。然除佛外，餘無漏他心智，法執未斷；有漏此智，虛妄現故，不知如佛淨智所行不可言境，與佛無漏他心智異。佛他心智雖變為境，親似他心，名為如實，以無執故，知性離言；餘他心智，亦變為境，未斷執故，疎似他心，名不如實，以有執故，不知諸法體性離言，故說有異。此中通說除佛以外諸他心智說不如實，非佛此智親能照了他心等故，名為如實。《成唯識》說「誰說他心非自識境？但不說彼是親所緣」，故佛亦變。若說佛心親能了者，便與上說理教相違，故佛之心，亦名唯識。於此義中略為褒貶，初說無漏心亦無相見，亦有法執，此不須說。如《成唯識》破無二分，《佛地論》中廣破相分亦有緣無之心，非所緣緣故。然後二師或說無漏親所取緣，或說佛心亦變影像，若許親取，云何應取無法，無法無體，非所緣緣。《觀所緣》說：要具二支是所緣義。此師意說：此心不具所緣緣，餘具所緣，心必具二支故。若許無法得為緣者，破經部師量有不定，自許無法得成緣故。若破他為量，非述自宗故，無不定者。又唯識理，亦復相違。親取心外法，何得名唯識。破他心等，取心外法，比量相違及不定過，此師意說，如下當知。其第三師，若佛之心亦變影像，不親取者，應不知無，心內相分是有法故。又應不說遍計所執是凡夫境。由此故知，二說皆是，二說竝非，此則雙貶。

One position holds: Subsequent knowledge possesses both aspects, for it is said to contemplate an image resembling tathatā without seeing the true nature of tathatā, and so on at length. Furthermore, if this knowledge did not transform into a semblance of the object, being a phenomenon apart from its self-substance, it would not be an intentional object; a cognition cognizing form and so forth would then cognize sound and so forth. Moreover, when cognizing non-existence and the like, it would lack an ālambana-pratyaya, because that substance would not be real and lack the function of being a condition. In the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra it is also stated: Because the category of subsequent knowledge has conceptual differentiation, and its cognized sphere may be separate from its substance, it is like a defiled mind. Appearing with the semblance of an object's aspect, distinctly cognizing and illuminating such an aspect of an object, it is the same as an undefiled mind. Arising from undefiled seeds, although it has something resembling defiled phenomena, its substance is not defiled, just as when a defiled mind resembles an undefiled aspect, it is not undefiled. In the Cheng weishi lun it is also stated: 'The present mental and mental factor phenomena of that aggregate are not the immediate ālambana-pratyaya of the consciousness of this aggregate, because they are subsumed under another aggregate', just like what is not an intentional object. Tathatā and the like, however, are neither different nor one with the cognizing mind and are not subsumed under another, so they cannot serve as an analogy. The rest of the citations and proofs are as in the discussion of the defiled [mind]. By this teaching and reasoning, whether of a Buddha or a non-Buddha, all undefiled minds of subsequent knowledge definitely possess the objective aspect. They also possess the subjective aspect. However, outside of a Buddha, other undefiled knowledges of other minds have not severed attachment to phenomena; and because this defiled knowledge manifests falsely, they do not know the ineffable sphere of activity of the Buddha's pure knowledge, differing from the Buddha's undefiled knowledge of other minds. Although the Buddha's knowledge of other minds transforms into an object, directly resembling the other mind, it is called 'as it truly is', because being free from attachment he knows that the nature is ineffable; other knowledges of other minds also transform into an object, but because attachment is not yet severed, they distantly resemble the other mind and are called 'not as it truly is', because having attachment they do not know that the intrinsic substance of all phenomena is ineffable; therefore they are said to be different. Here, all knowledges of other minds outside of a Buddha are spoken of in general as 'not as it truly is'; it is not that the Buddha's knowledge is called 'as it truly is' because it can directly illuminate and understand other minds and so forth. The Cheng weishi lun says: 'Who says another mind is not an object of one's own consciousness? We only do not say that it is an immediate object.' Therefore a Buddha also transforms [an image]. If one says the Buddha's mind can directly understand, that would contradict the reasoning and teachings stated above; therefore the Buddha's mind is also called consciousness-only. Here let us briefly evaluate these positions. The first says the undefiled mind also lacks the objective and subjective aspects and also possesses attachment to phenomena; this need not be discussed. As the Cheng weishi lun refutes the lack of the two aspects, so the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra refutes at length the position that the objective aspect is absent, because a mind cognizing non-existence would lack an ālambana-pratyaya. Furthermore, as for the latter two masters, one says the undefiled directly grasps its object-condition, while the other says the Buddha's mind also transforms an image. If one grants direct grasping, how could it grasp non-existent phenomena, since non-existent phenomena have no substance and are not an ālambana-pratyaya? The Ālambanaparīkṣā states: it must possess two components to be an intentional object. This master's intention is: this mind does not possess the ālambana-pratyaya, but where others possess an intentional object, the mind must possess both components. If one grants that non-existent phenomena can serve as a condition, then the inference refuting the Sautrāntikas would incur the fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika), because one would oneself grant that non-existent phenomena can become a condition. If it is an inference refuting the other and not stating one's own thesis, then there is no inconclusiveness. Furthermore, it also contradicts the principle of consciousness-only. Grasping phenomena outside the mind directly, how could it be termed consciousness-only? The fallacies of contradiction and inconclusiveness in the inference regarding knowing other minds by grasping phenomena outside the mind will be understood below according to this master's intention. As for the third master, if the Buddha's mind also transforms an image and does not directly grasp, he should not know non-existence, because the objective aspect within the mind is an existent phenomenon. Furthermore, one should not say that the imagined nature is the sphere of ordinary beings. From this we know: both explanations have merit, and both are flawed; this is an evaluation that criticizes both.