唯識二十論述記 2.359

2.359

One position holds: Subsequent knowledge possesses both aspects, for it is said to contemplate an image resembling tathatā without seeing the true nature of tathatā, and so on at length. Furthermore, if this knowledge did not transform into a semblance of the object, being a phenomenon apart from its self-substance, it would not be an intentional object; a cognition cognizing form and so forth would then cognize sound and so forth. Moreover, when cognizing non-existence and the like, it would lack an ālambana-pratyaya, because that substance would not be real and lack the function of being a condition. In the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra it is also stated: Because the category of subsequent knowledge has conceptual differentiation, and its cognized sphere may be separate from its substance, it is like a defiled mind. Appearing with the semblance of an object's aspect, distinctly cognizing and illuminating such an aspect of an object, it is the same as an undefiled mind. Arising from undefiled seeds, although it has something resembling defiled phenomena, its substance is not defiled, just as when a defiled mind resembles an undefiled aspect, it is not undefiled. In the Cheng weishi lun it is also stated: 'The present mental and mental factor phenomena of that aggregate are not the immediate ālambana-pratyaya of the consciousness of this aggregate, because they are subsumed under another aggregate', just like what is not an intentional object. Tathatā and the like, however, are neither different nor one with the cognizing mind and are not subsumed under another, so they cannot serve as an analogy. The rest of the citations and proofs are as in the discussion of the defiled [mind]. By this teaching and reasoning, whether of a Buddha or a non-Buddha, all undefiled minds of subsequent knowledge definitely possess the objective aspect. They also possess the subjective aspect. However, outside of a Buddha, other undefiled knowledges of other minds have not severed attachment to phenomena; and because this defiled knowledge manifests falsely, they do not know the ineffable sphere of activity of the Buddha's pure knowledge, differing from the Buddha's undefiled knowledge of other minds. Although the Buddha's knowledge of other minds transforms into an object, directly resembling the other mind, it is called 'as it truly is', because being free from attachment he knows that the nature is ineffable; other knowledges of other minds also transform into an object, but because attachment is not yet severed, they distantly resemble the other mind and are called 'not as it truly is', because having attachment they do not know that the intrinsic substance of all phenomena is ineffable; therefore they are said to be different. Here, all knowledges of other minds outside of a Buddha are spoken of in general as 'not as it truly is'; it is not that the Buddha's knowledge is called 'as it truly is' because it can directly illuminate and understand other minds and so forth. The Cheng weishi lun says: 'Who says another mind is not an object of one's own consciousness? We only do not say that it is an immediate object.' Therefore a Buddha also transforms [an image]. If one says the Buddha's mind can directly understand, that would contradict the reasoning and teachings stated above; therefore the Buddha's mind is also called consciousness-only. Here let us briefly evaluate these positions. The first says the undefiled mind also lacks the objective and subjective aspects and also possesses attachment to phenomena; this need not be discussed. As the Cheng weishi lun refutes the lack of the two aspects, so the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra refutes at length the position that the objective aspect is absent, because a mind cognizing non-existence would lack an ālambana-pratyaya. Furthermore, as for the latter two masters, one says the undefiled directly grasps its object-condition, while the other says the Buddha's mind also transforms an image. If one grants direct grasping, how could it grasp non-existent phenomena, since non-existent phenomena have no substance and are not an ālambana-pratyaya? The Ālambanaparīkṣā states: it must possess two components to be an intentional object. This master's intention is: this mind does not possess the ālambana-pratyaya, but where others possess an intentional object, the mind must possess both components. If one grants that non-existent phenomena can serve as a condition, then the inference refuting the Sautrāntikas would incur the fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika), because one would oneself grant that non-existent phenomena can become a condition. If it is an inference refuting the other and not stating one's own thesis, then there is no inconclusiveness. Furthermore, it also contradicts the principle of consciousness-only. Grasping phenomena outside the mind directly, how could it be termed consciousness-only? The fallacies of contradiction and inconclusiveness in the inference regarding knowing other minds by grasping phenomena outside the mind will be understood below according to this master's intention. As for the third master, if the Buddha's mind also transforms an image and does not directly grasp, he should not know non-existence, because the objective aspect within the mind is an existent phenomenon. Furthermore, one should not say that the imagined nature is the sphere of ordinary beings. From this we know: both explanations have merit, and both are flawed; this is an evaluation that criticizes both.