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唯識二十論述記 2.116

English (machine translation) 2.116

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2.116

Commentary: In clarifying that a single real paramāṇu is not established, the second point above was: having conjunction or lacking conjunction, having divisions or lacking divisions, which directly answered that it is not established. This is the third point: presenting our correct doctrine and concluding in summary that it is not established. Among these four lines, the first three lines present the correct doctrine, and the fourth line concludes that it is not established. Reply: For the Vaiśeṣikas, paramāṇus are subsumed under the category of substance (dravya) and span the eternal and non-eternal. Paramāṇus during the cosmic period of emptiness are eternal in essence; the paramāṇus during the period of formation produced by them are called non-eternal, and their measure is then large. Later, the great earth and so on aggregate into single entities. Only earth, water, fire, and wind are of the nature of paramāṇus; color-form, sound, odor, taste, and touch are qualities (guṇa) of the five great elements and their substances are not paramāṇus. For the Lokāyata, it is the same as the Vaiśeṣika, but the produced child-paramāṇus have the same measure as the original cause; because the child-paramāṇu conjoins distinctly with the quality of measure (parimāṇa), it can be called coarse, whereas the original paramāṇus do not conjoin with the quality of measure. For the Sarvāstivāda, paramāṇus are subsumed under the ten material āyatanas: seven paramāṇus make an aṇu, and so on in succession, accumulating the small to form the large. Paramāṇus are real entities, hence the five consciousnesses take them as objects; from aṇus upward, all are conventional entities, not taken as objects by the five consciousnesses. For the Sautrāntika, no matter which āyatana they are subsumed under, paramāṇus are also real entities that accumulate to form large objects; large objects are conventional, taken as objects by the five consciousnesses, while their real paramāṇus are apprehended only by the mental consciousness. However, in the Mahāyāna, paramāṇus are also conventional, subsumed under the dharma-āyatana; they are merely divided down from large objects into small ones and named paramāṇus, not accumulated from the small to form the large. The Cheng weishi lun states: "However, when consciousness transforms, according to the measure, whether large or small, it suddenly manifests a single image; it does not distinctly transform into numerous paramāṇus that aggregate into a single object. For those who grasp coarse form as having a real entity, the Buddha taught paramāṇus to cause them to analyze and eliminate it, not meaning that forms really have paramāṇus. Yogācāras, by means of conceptual wisdom, gradually analyze coarse material marks until they can be analyzed no further, and conventionally designate them paramāṇus. Although this paramāṇu still has spatial divisions, it cannot be further divided; if it were further divided, it would appear like empty space and not be called form; therefore it is said that a paramāṇu is the limit of form." This is explained at length in chapters 3 and 54 of the Yogācārabhūmi, and chapters 5, 16, and 18 of the Prakaraṇāryavācā. Therefore the treatise now states: through differences of arrangement by conceptual analysis, they are designated paramāṇus; when not analyzed, suddenly manifesting a single image, they are designated aggregates. Aggregated form can be further analyzed, and paramāṇus are arranged by conventional conceptualization. Hence paramāṇus and aggregates are both not single real entities. This excludes their view that the substance of aggregates and paramāṇus is real; it is not that in our Mahāyāna aggregates are also merely called conventional, for they have real material functions arising distinctly from seeds, whereas paramāṇus do not have this meaning.

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