唯識二十論述記 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.1

Composed by Kuiji, monk-translator of scriptures.

2.2

Treatise: Furthermore, how is it known that the Buddha, relying on such intentional import, spoke of the existence of the āyatanas of form and so forth,

The Commentary says: Within the first section, the fourth part below refutes the other systems' claim that external objects are truly existent, proving and knowing that there is only consciousness. In this there are three parts: first, the Hīnayāna and others raise a question based on what came before; next, from 'The verse says' below, the treatise master directly refutes them; finally, from 'Having already explained that paramāṇus are not single and real' below, it concludes by returning to vijñapti-mātra. This is the first part: it first cites the intention previously stated by the Mahāyāna, and only then presents the objection. The treatise master previously said: 'Relying on those who are to enter the selflessness of sentient beings, the Buddha spoke of the ten [āyatanas] of form and so forth.' Now it cites this: 'How is it known that relying on such an intentional meaning he spoke of the existence of the āyatanas of form and so forth?'

2.4

Treatise: and not that distinct, truly existent external phenomena of form and so forth serve as the distinct objects for the consciousnesses of form and so forth?

2.5

The Commentary says: From here below, the opponent directly makes his inquiry. Is it not that, apart from consciousness, there are distinct, real substances of external phenomena such as form that serve as the distinct objects for the consciousnesses of form and so forth? Because the eye-consciousness and so forth take form and so forth as objects and transform to resemble form and so forth, they are called the consciousnesses of form and so forth; it is not that form and so forth are called the consciousnesses of form and so forth.

2.6

Treatise: The verse says: / Because that object is neither a single / Nor multiple paramāṇus, / Nor again a combination and so forth, / Because paramāṇus are not established.

2.7

The Commentary says: From here below is the second part, where the treatise master directly refutes them, comprising five verses in total, in which there are three parts: the first single verse refutes both Hīnayāna and non-Buddhist systems together; the next three verses directly refute Hīnayāna; the final verse directly refutes non-Buddhists while hypothetically refuting Hīnayāna. This is the first verse. Within the first verse, the first line refutes non-Buddhists; the lower three lines refute Hīnayāna. Within the refutation of Hīnayāna, the first line refutes the ancient Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas; the lower two lines refute the Sautrāntikas and the Neo-Sarvāstivāda Nyāyānusāra masters. 'Nor again a combination and so forth' establishes the pratijñā; 'because paramāṇus are not established' establishes the hetu. Verifying this, it also refutes the aggregation of paramāṇus. When composing this Viṃśikā śāstra, Vasubandhu was advanced in age; it was only composed after the Nyāyānusāra, as should be understood below.

2.8

Treatise: What does this say?

2.9

The Commentary says: From here below is the refutation of grasping, which has three parts: first, a hypothetical question introduces it; next, the opponent's view is stated; finally, it is directly refuted. This is the hypothetical question, following the same pattern as before.

2.10

Treatise: It means that if external āyatanas of form and so forth truly existed and served as distinct objects for the consciousnesses of form and so forth,

2.11

The Commentary says: From here below, the views are stated. If non-Buddhists and Hīnayāna grasp that apart from consciousness there truly exist external āyatanas of form and so forth that serve as distinct objects for the cognizing consciousnesses that take form and so forth as objects,

2.12

this generally states the conceptualized doctrine of Hīnayāna and non-Buddhists; below they are stated separately.

2.13

Treatise: such an external object must either be single,

2.14

The Commentary says: This is the non-Buddhist view, which grasps that the substance of phenomena such as form is solely single.

2.15

Treatise: as the Vaiśeṣikas grasp composite form,

2.16

The Commentary says: This shows the teacher of this view, which is the Vaiśeṣika, translated here as 'victorious doctrine' (shenglun), and the masters who compose this treatise are called Vaiśeṣikas. The explanation of this designation and the account of its origins are explained elsewhere. The original doctrine of this school posited six categories of meaning (padārtha), while later derivative views established ten categories, as in the Cheng weishi lun. Now, the six categories are: 1. substance (dravya); 2. quality (guṇa); 3. action (karman); 4. existence (sāmānya/bhāva); 5. particularity (viśeṣa); 6. inherence (samavāya). Within substance there are nine: earth, water, fire, wind, ether, time, space, self, and mind. Earth, water, fire, and wind are of the nature of paramāṇus; when an eon dissolves, these do not perish but are dispersed in various places; their substances are without arising or ceasing and are said to be permanent, possessing many phenomena whose substances are not single. Later, during the eon of formation, paramāṇus join pairwise to produce a single dyad atom; the measure of the dyad atom is equal to that of the parent [atoms], its substance is solely single, and because it is produced from another, its nature is impermanent. In this way, the dispersed paramāṇus all join pairwise to produce single dyad atoms; the dyad atom together with the original ones make three atoms. In this way, they again join with three other atoms to produce a single product atom; the seventh product atom equals the measure of the six original atoms. In this way, the seven atoms again join with others to produce a single product atom; the fifteenth product atom has a measure equal to the fourteen original producing parent atoms. Proceeding in this manner, they successively form the trichiliocosm. Since this trichiliocosm is produced from the two factors of the parents, its measure collectively equals the measure of the parents, and therefore the trichiliocosm serves as the object of consciousness and so forth, its substance being solely a single entity. Form is a quality of fire, and so on up to touch, which is a quality of wind. When the eye sees form, it does not apprehend the wind element, but apprehends earth, water, and fire, because in form there is no mark of wind. When ear, nose, and tongue apprehend sound, odor, and taste, their apprehending of the three is likewise. Only when the body apprehends touch does it apprehend the four great elements, because in touch there is the wind element. The mental faculty takes all as object. Therefore, composite form serves as the object of eye-consciousness and so forth, its substance being solely one thing. The gross product atom is called the 'composite' (avayavin) because it possesses subtle parts; its original subtle atoms are merely called 'parts' (avayava) because they do not possess anything else. A detailed account of this view is as given in the Cheng weishi lun.

2.17

Treatise: or it must be multiple, as when grasping that multiple, truly existent paramāṇus individually serve as objects,

2.18

The Commentary says: Below is the refutation of Hīnayāna; here it first relates the ancient Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika doctrine. This master's intention states: phenomena such as the form āyatana are multiple in substance, serving as the object of eye-consciousness. Why is this? Each individual paramāṇu is truly existent in substance; when combined into an aṇu, the aṇu is conventional, and therefore everything above this is not truly existent. Since the five consciousnesses take real phenomena as objects, they do not take as objects the combined conventional form from an aṇu upwards. Therefore, when the form āyatana and so forth serve as objects of the eye-consciousness and so forth, their real paramāṇus individually and distinctly serve as objects for the eye-consciousness and so forth, because they do not take the conventional as object, since that which possesses real substance is able to generate consciousness.

2.19

Treatise: or it must be multiple paramāṇus in combination or aggregation,

2.20

The Commentary says: This relates the doctrines of the Sautrāntikas and the Neo-Sarvāstivāda Nyāyānusāra masters. The Sautrāntika masters say: multiple paramāṇus in combination (saṃhatāḥ); the Nyāyānusāra masters say: multiple paramāṇus in aggregation (saṃcitāḥ).

2.21

Treatise: as when grasping that multiple, truly existent paramāṇus all combine or aggregate together to serve as an object.

2.22

The Commentary says: This explains in detail: for the Sautrāntika masters, truly existent paramāṇus are not the objects of the five consciousnesses, because the aspect of a paramāṇu does not appear on the five consciousnesses. When these seven combine into aṇu-form, it is gross and manifest from that point upwards; although its substance is conventional, because this aspect appears upon the five consciousnesses, it serves as the object of the five consciousnesses. Since individual real paramāṇus are not cognized, they must combine into a single gross conventional [entity] for the five consciousnesses to cognize them. Hence the treatise says: 'multiple, truly existent paramāṇus all combine together.'

2.23

The master of the Nyāyānusāra, fearing contradiction with his own school's [tenet] that the five consciousnesses such as the eye do not take conceptual designations as objects, differed from the Sautrāntikas. If he followed the ancients, Dignāga's objection would apply: because there is no appearance of atoms on the five consciousnesses, they would suffer the fault of not being objects. Thereupon he further said: 'Form and other phenomena each have many aspects, among which one portion is the sphere of direct perception. Therefore, atoms assist each other so that each possesses an aggregate aspect; this aspect exists substantially, and each can produce a consciousness resembling its own aspect, thereby serving as an ālambana-pratyaya for the five consciousnesses. Just as many atoms aggregate into a mountain or the like, and assisting each other, each possesses the dimension and aspect of the mountain or the like; when the five consciousnesses such as the eye take the mountain or the like as an object, there are substantially many atoms mutually assisting into the mountain aspect, and the five consciousnesses apprehend them together, so they become the object. Otherwise, there would be the fault of not being an object.' Admitting that they have substantial entities solely as conditions, the treatise says: 'They hold that substantially existing numerous atoms all come together in aggregation.' This is explained at length in Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣā and the first fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun. However, the older translation of the Viṃśikā had only the positions of the Vaiśeṣikas and the ancient Sarvāstivādins; regarding composition and aggregation, the text only mentioned one, calling it 'aggregate form of adjacent infinitesimals', yet its meaning was hard to discern and its phrasing hard to understand. In the refutation below, it says 'not that adjacent infinitesimals aggregate into a dust particle'; a reader can understand this on their own—how could it compare to the present treatise?

2.24

Treatise: Moreover, that external object, by reason, cannot be one.

2.25

Commentary: From here on is the third part, refuting the attachments one by one. First refuting the non-Buddhists before refuting the Hīnayāna, it therefore says: 'Moreover, that external object held [by them], by reason, cannot be one.' This explains the first line of the verse; this is a general negation, and next its unreasonableness is shown.

2.26

Treatise: Because the entity of a composite form distinct from its parts cannot be apprehended.

2.27

Commentary: What is held is a single, coarse composite form having a substantially existing entity distinct from its original atoms; [this is impossible] because the entities of all composite forms cannot be apprehended, like mountains, the earth, and so forth. Each distinct part is just a partial form; how could there be a distinct, single, substantially coarse composite form separate from these? An inference should be established thus: 'Your composite form is not distinct from its part-forms (pratijñā); because, being distinct from all part-forms, it cannot be apprehended (hetu); like the part-forms (dṛṣṭānta).' If you were to say again, 'Who says that the composite is distinct from its part-forms? That it is unapprehended suffers from the fault of an unaccepted reason (asiddha-hetu)', one should further refute: 'Your composite form is definitely not distinct from its minute part-forms (pratijñā); because it is a form of the category of substance accepted by your own school (hetu); like the minute part-forms (dṛṣṭānta).' Or, in the earlier reason, one should insert the word 'admitted' [saying: 'because it is not admitted by our intention to be apprehendable as distinct from part-forms'], so there is no fault of an unaccepted reason. This treatise is concise in words, so it omits the word 'admitted'. Or it may be that this treatise merely states its thesis and abbreviates the reason and example, stating the thesis: 'The entity of your composite form, being distinct from your part-forms, definitely cannot be apprehended; because it is accepted as a form of the category of substance; like the minute part-forms.' The word 'because' in the treatise is used for the fluency of the phrasing; thus this inference is also free from fault.

2.28

Treatise: Nor, by reason, can it be many.

2.29

Commentary: Below is the refutation of the Hīnayāna, explaining the second line of the verse; this is a general negation of the ancient Sarvāstivādins.

2.30

The specific refutations follow below.

2.31

Treatise: Because the atoms individually cannot be apprehended.

2.32

Commentary: Below is the specific refutation. You say that atoms, each individually, are the objects of the five consciousnesses; this is definitely not so. Because atoms individually cannot be apprehended by the five consciousnesses such as the eye. Moreover, in your own school, the eyes of ordinary beings and the like do not see atoms, and their aspect does not appear on the five consciousnesses; how can you say that atoms individually are the object? An inference should be established thus: 'Individual atoms are not the object of the five consciousnesses (pratijñā); because they cannot be apprehended by the five consciousnesses such as the eye (hetu); like the eye faculty and so forth (dṛṣṭānta).' Therefore, in this treatise, 'atoms individually' is merely the subject (pakṣa), and 'because they cannot be apprehended' is merely the reason (hetu), while the similar example and the thesis to be proved are omitted; or the inference should run: 'The numerous atoms in aggregate form are not the object of the five consciousnesses (pratijñā); because atoms individually are not apprehended by the five consciousnesses (hetu); like the eye faculty and so forth (dṛṣṭānta).'

2.33

The treatise has the statement of the thesis and the reason. The Ālambanaparīkṣā establishes an inference to refute this in terms of the ālambana-pratyaya: 'An ālambana-pratyaya means that the apprehending consciousness arises bearing that aspect, and there is a substantial entity causing the apprehending consciousness to arise relying upon it', thus possessing both limbs of the definition. We do not accept the existence of atoms of form and so on; even if they had a substantial entity capable of generating the five consciousnesses, they might allow the sense of a condition (pratyaya), but they are not the object (ālambana), like the eye faculty and so forth. Because that aspect does not exist on the eye consciousness and the others, an inference was thereupon established: 'Atoms, in relation to the five consciousnesses, may be conditions but are not objects (pratijñā); because their aspect is absent from the consciousness (hetu); like the eye faculty and so forth (dṛṣṭānta).' Although the wording differs, the meaning is the same as here. The first fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun states something slightly similar to this; that treatise says: 'It is not the case that when all atoms are in a state of aggregation, each can serve as an object for the five consciousnesses, because the aspect of atoms is absent from this consciousness.' If they should rescue [their position] by saying: 'Atoms individually have an aspect of composition that serves as the object of the five consciousnesses; the aspect of composition is a resembling single aspect, and this aspect is a function, larger than the original atom; function is not separate from substance, and since the substance exists substantially, it forms an ālambana-pratyaya.' That treatise refutes them, saying: 'It is not the case that when composed, the substances and aspects of these atoms differ from when they are not composed; therefore, in the composed state, just as when uncomposed, the atoms of form and so on are not objects of the five consciousnesses.' Yet there are further rescues and further specific cross-examinations, as explained in the first commentary on the Cheng weishi lun.

2.34

Treatise: Nor, by reason, can they be objects as composed or aggregated.

2.35

Commentary: Below is the refutation of the Sautrāntikas and the masters of the Nyāyānusāra. This is a general negation; specific refutations follow below.

2.36

Treatise: Because a single, substantial atom is logically untenable.

2.37

Commentary: The atom of the Sautrāntikas and others has a single substantial entity and is solely an object of mental consciousness; for the Sarvāstivāda masters and others, it also has a single substantial entity, is subsumed under the ten āyatanas, and is an object of the six consciousnesses. However, as for the single substantial atom held by you, I do not accept its existence; and since it is logically untenable, to say that atoms are composed or aggregated is in every sense contradictory. Now, the Ālambanaparīkṣā, in refuting the Sautrāntika master, says: 'Because composed forms and so on have that aspect upon the eye consciousness and the like, even if they act as the object (ālambana) because they are coarse and apparent, and the consciousness manifests their aspect, they lack the sense of a condition (pratyaya), because they lack a substantial entity, like an eye with impaired vision seeing a second moon. Because it has no substantial entity, it cannot produce [the consciousness].' Thereupon it establishes the inference: 'Composition, in relation to the five consciousnesses, may be an object but is not a condition (pratijñā); because its entity is substantially non-existent (hetu); like the second moon (dṛṣṭānta).' The Cheng weishi lun further refutes them, saying: 'It is not the case that the aspect of composition has a real intrinsic nature distinct from all the atoms, for when they are broken apart, the consciousness resembling that aspect definitely does not arise; since that aspect of composition is not substantially real, it cannot be said to be a condition for the five consciousnesses, lest a second moon and the like could generate the five consciousnesses.' The gist of the objection here is: if there were real atoms, there could conceivably be a nominal composition; but if the composing real [elements] do not exist, the composed nominal [entity] becomes non-existent. The Ālambanaparīkṣā, in refuting the master of the Nyāyānusāra, says: 'Although characteristics such as solidity are substantially real, they may conceivably have the sense of a condition in relation to the eye consciousness and so on, but they are not the object, because their aspect is absent from the eye consciousness and the like; the various aggregated aspects of atoms of form and so on should logically be the same, because they both hold them to be aspects of atoms.' Thereupon it establishes the inference: 'The aggregated aspects of atoms, even if conditions for the eye consciousness and so on, are not objects (pratijñā); because they are accepted as aspects of atoms (hetu); like solidity, wetness, and so forth (dṛṣṭānta).' Holding that the eye consciousness and so on can perceive the aggregated aspects of atoms, there would furthermore arise different cognitive aspects of pots, bowls, and the like; their position should entail that there is no difference [between them], for the difference is not due to shape, shape-difference being unreal; nor should one hold that atoms also have differentiated shapes and aspects. Why is this? Because atoms are equal in dimension; difference in shape pertains only to the nominal, and when breaking them down to atoms, that cognition is definitely discarded. The Cheng weishi lun further says: 'Their position is not correct: when aggregated together, the substance and aspects are identical with when they are unaggregated; therefore, the consciousness taking as its object the aspect of things such as pots and bowls whose atoms are equal should have no difference. In the state of aggregation together, each and every atom should forfeit its subtle and spherical aspect; it is not that a consciousness of a coarse aspect can take as its object a subtle-aspect sphere, lest a consciousness of one object take another object, and one consciousness would take all objects.' This treatise merely refutes the original atom as not substantially real, whereby the resulting aggregation is logically not established; the various deductions are as explained in the other treatises.

2.38

Treatise: Why is it untenable?

2.39

Commentary: Below is a detailed explanation of why atoms are untenable. In this there are three parts: first, questioning the untenability; second, answering the untenability; third, stating the correct doctrine and concluding its untenability. This is the first, the question: the opponent, seeing that his atom being a single substance is rejected as untenable, incurring the fault of an unaccepted reason (asiddha), thereupon asks the treatise master: 'Why is it untenable?'

2.40

Treatise: The verse says: / If an atom conjoins with six, / One would have six parts. / If it shares the same place with six, / The aggregate would be like an atom.

2.41

Commentary: Next is answering the untenability, consisting of two verses in total, specifically refuting the Hīnayāna. Herein there are two parts: the first two verses refute the untenability of atoms having conjunction or non-conjunction; the latter one verse refutes the untenability of atoms having parts or lacking parts. Within the first section, it is again divided into two: first, answering that conjunction and so forth are untenable; second, concluding the untenability. In answering that conjunction and so forth are untenable, since there are two verses, it is again divided into two: first, setting forth the answer of untenability; second, refuting the rescues as untenable. In the first part there are two difficulties: the upper two lines present the difficulty that if atoms conjoin, one should have six parts; the lower two lines present the difficulty that if atoms conjoin they would have six parts, and if atoms share the same location, an aggregate would be like an atom. Just as a particle of aṇu-form is formed by the conjunction of seven atoms: there is one atom in the middle and six on the outside; if the middle atom conjoins with the outer six atoms, since the conjoined are six, the conjoining atom should have six parts; if, because atoms have no further parts, they do not conjoin with each other, then when the six face it, they would merge and abide together in one and the same location. Since they are in the same location, the aṇu-forms and so on should each be equal in size to a single atom.

2.42

Treatise: If one atom conjoins in the six directions each with one atom, it should have six parts.

2.43

Commentary: Explaining the first two lines of the verse: this is a hypothetical refutation of the other party, not the doctrine of our own school. The atom in the middle has six atoms in the four directions, above, and below; conjoining with the middle atom, it should have six parts.

2.44

Why is this?

2.45

Treatise: Because the place of one cannot be the place of the others.

2.46

Commentary: Showing the reason for having six parts: that is, at the place of the eastern atom, the middle atom has no logical possibility of admitting the five atoms of the other five directions; likewise down to: the place of the lower atom for the middle atom is not the other five places. Because the six conjoined with the middle atom are distinct, the middle atom should have six parts. An inference should be established thus: 'The middle atom should have multiple parts (pratijñā); because the place of one cannot be the place of the others (hetu); like coarse aggregate forms (dṛṣṭānta).' Or within the verse, an inference is also formed: 'The one atom in the middle should have six parts (pratijñā); because it conjoins with six (hetu); like a coarse aggregate form conjoining with six forms (dṛṣṭānta).' However, the verse has only the thesis and the reason, omitting the similar example.

2.47

Treatise: If six atoms were in the place of one atom, all aggregate forms should be equal to the dimension of an atom.

2.48

Commentary: This explains the lower two lines of the verse. If it is said that because atoms have no spatial divisions they do not conjoin with each other, then when the middle atom conjoins with the six, they should mutually merge and occupy one and the same location. Since the six atoms abide in the same place as the one atom in the middle, all coarse aggregate forms such as the aṇu should be equal to the dimension of an atom, without any increase, because they occupy the very same location as the atom.

2.49

Why is this?

2.50

Treatise: Because, mutually regarded, they would not exceed its dimension.

2.51

The Commentary says: This explains the reason that aggregate form has the extent of a paramāṇu: because each of the six [surrounding ones] mutually faces [the center], their extents do not exceed one another; hence all aggregate form has the extent of a paramāṇu. An anumāna should be formulated: 'Your aggregate forms should have the extent of a paramāṇu; because their extents do not exceed a paramāṇu; just like a single paramāṇu.' Alternatively, an anumāna can also be formulated based on the verse: 'The extent of your aggregate form should be like a paramāṇu; because it occupies the same location as a paramāṇu; just like a paramāṇu,' being identical without difference. However, the phrase 'like a paramāṇu' in the following verse applies both as the predicate of the pratijñā and as the sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta, because its meaning does not conflict [with either]; or it is only the predicate and not the sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta, because the momentum of the text is different. Its pratijñā, hetu, and so forth should be matched accordingly according to the meaning.

2.52

The Treatise says: Then aggregate form should also be invisible.

2.53

The Commentary says: If it is accepted that the extent of aggregate form is identical to that of a paramāṇu, then all aggregate form should be invisible, because its extent is like that of a paramāṇu. Furthermore, an anumāna is formulated: 'Your coarse aggregate form should be invisible; because its extent is like that of a paramāṇu, or because it occupies the same location as a paramāṇu; just like a paramāṇu.' Here the pratijñā is stated, and the hetu is as stated before; however, conjunction and identical location—these two objections—are both hypothetical refutations, not their fundamental tenet.

2.54

The Treatise says: The Vaibhāṣikas of the country of Kāśmīra say that paramāṇus do not have the property of conjunction.

2.55

The Commentary says: Having seen the preceding refutation, the Sarvāstivādin masters hypothetically ward off that meaning and thereupon say: 'Paramāṇus do not have the property of conjunction.' This establishes their pratijñā. Furthermore, according to these original teachers, [paramāṇus] also do not mix into one identical location; there is definitively no such thing. Here, for now, we merely negate conjunction. Vasumitra said: 'If paramāṇus touched, they would persist into the subsequent moment.' The Bhadanta said: 'Paramāṇus do not truly touch; but because there is no interval between them, the designation "contact" is metaphorically established. If it were otherwise and paramāṇus had intervals, since the intermediate space would be empty, what would obstruct their movement?' They accept that they possess resistance; 'conjunction' and 'contact' are different names with the same meaning. Kāśmīra is in northern India; the *Vibhāṣā-śāstra* was composed in this country, and took its name from it; the reasons for this treatise are explained elsewhere. 'Vaibhāṣika' means one who propounds the *Vibhāṣā*. *Vi* has three meanings: first, 'superior' (viśeṣa), because this treatise definitively excels other treatises; second, 'divergent' (vibhinnā), because within one school various masters have divergent explanations; third, 'extensive' (vipula), because regarding each meaning, various masters explain extensively.

2.56

The Treatise says: Because they lack spatial divisions, they are free from the preceding fault.

2.57

The Commentary says: This shows the reason for non-conjunction. If they had spatial divisions, one could say they have conjunction and could form six divisions; since they lack spatial divisions, they cannot conjoin, and are thus free from the preceding fault raised to refute me.

2.58

The Treatise says: But aggregate forms logically have conjunction, because they have spatial divisions.

2.59

The Commentary says: From aṇu-form upwards, all coarse aggregate forms can have conjunction; because they have spatial divisions, they can form six divisions. Aggregate forms are also established, which shows that aggregated conjunction is accepted to have spatial divisions. Paramāṇus have no conjunction, so the meaning of partlessness is established. The *Kośa* says: 'Furthermore, because composite forms are accepted to have parts, there is no fault in their touching.' 'Touching' and 'conjunction' have the same meaning with different names; here it is called 'aggregate form' (jùsè), and there it is called 'composite form' (héhésè).

2.60

The Treatise says: This too is incorrect.

2.61

The Commentary says: This is a general negation.

2.62

Below, the reasoning is revealed.

2.63

The Treatise says: The verse says:
Since paramāṇus have no conjunction, who is it that conjoins in an aggregate?
Or, conjunction is not established, and not because of lacking spatial divisions.

2.64

The Commentary says: From here on is the refutation proper showing that paramāṇus are unestablished. In this there are two parts: the first two lines merely examine and interrogate directly; the second two lines hypothetically refute their revised defense. You say: since paramāṇus have no property of conjunction, and paramāṇus are the aggregate, who is it that conjoins in an aggregate, if not paramāṇus? Or, if aggregate forms also have no conjunction, then one knows that it is not because of lacking spatial divisions that paramāṇus do not conjoin, because aggregates have spatial divisions and yet also do not conjoin.

2.65

The Treatise says: Now we should interrogate the reasoning of their statement.

2.66

The Commentary says: About to explain the first two lines of the verse, this first introduces and marks the beginning. Here there is no objection [yet], but merely an interrogation of the reasoning of non-conjunction asserted by the opponent. 'Principle' (lǐ) refers to the doctrinal sense; 'purport' (qù) refers to the intended meaning. Both the doctrinal sense and the intended meaning are interrogated together, hence 'interrogate the reasoning'. Alternatively, the purport is itself the principle; the principle is the cognitive object (grāhya), where the intention aims.

2.67

The Treatise says: Since apart from paramāṇus there is no separate aggregate form, if paramāṇus have no conjunction, who is it that conjoins in the aggregate?

2.68

The Commentary says: The first two phrases restate [the premise]; the latter two phrases interrogate it. If apart from paramāṇus there were aggregate forms, one could say the aggregate conjoins while paramāṇus have no conjunction. Since apart from paramāṇus aggregates do not exist, when you say the aggregate has conjunction, who is it that conjoins? 'Who' is a question, asking what the substance of that which conjoins in the aggregate is. To assist, an anumāna is formulated: 'Aggregates should have no conjunction; because they are identical to paramāṇus; just like paramāṇus. Paramāṇus should have conjunction; because they are identical to aggregates; just like aggregate forms.'

2.69

The Treatise says: If they pivot to defend by saying that aggregate forms mutually also have no property of conjunction;

2.70

The Commentary says: This is not their orthodox defense, because that school's tenet accepts that aggregates conjoin; saying that aggregates have no conjunction is a hypothetical defense. If aggregate forms mutually merely arise contiguously without intervals, being metaphorically termed 'conjoined', and not pressing against each other is called 'having no conjunction', that master also says this.

2.71

The Treatise says: Then one should not say that paramāṇus have no conjunction because they lack spatial divisions.

2.72

The Commentary says: Here there is a general refutation of both the orthodox and the hypothetical defenses. Since your aggregate forms do not conjoin, you should not say that paramāṇus have no conjunction because paramāṇus lack spatial divisions.

2.73

Why is that?

2.74

The Treatise says: Because aggregates have spatial divisions and yet are not accepted to conjoin; thus that paramāṇus have no conjunction is not due to lacking spatial divisions.

2.75

The Commentary says: This reiterates the establishment, refuting that aggregates have no conjunction. Your aggregate forms are accepted to have spatial divisions and yet are not accepted to conjoin; this in turn demonstrates that paramāṇus having no conjunction is not due to lacking spatial divisions. If, due to lacking spatial divisions, one clings to paramāṇus having no conjunction, then since aggregates have spatial divisions, aggregate forms should have conjunction. Herein there are [the fallacies of] particularity of the predicate (dharma-viśeṣa-viparyaya), particularity of the subject (dharmi-viśeṣa-viparyaya), unestablished for either party (anyatarāsiddha), lack of universal presence in the subject (asvapara-pratijñārtha-hetu / bhāgāsiddha), unestablished sadhya-property in the positive example (sādhya-vikala), and non-exclusion of the sadhya-property in the negative example (sādhyāvyāvṛtta). Altogether there are six fallacies. Why is that? They formulate an anumāna: 'As I state, paramāṇus have no conjunction; because they lack spatial divisions; like the mind and mental factors.' Real paramāṇus have no conjunction, and non-real paramāṇus have no conjunction: these are particularities of the predicate; being the condition for real paramāṇus versus not being the condition for real paramāṇus, possessing resistance versus lacking resistance: these are called particularities of the subject. This hetu not only proves non-conjunction, but in like manner also proves the predicate's particularity of non-conjunction in non-real paramāṇus, and proves the subject's particularity of being a condition for non-real paramāṇus, as well as lacking physical resistance. If one says that your real paramāṇu lacks spatial divisions, it is unestablished for the other party (anyatarāsiddha). If one says that my nominal paramāṇu has no conjunction because it lacks spatial divisions, the hetu is not pervasive of the subject, because I say nominal paramāṇus have spatial divisions. If, because aggregate form also has no conjunction, it is taken as a positive instance (sapakṣa) of paramāṇus, the sadhya is unestablished (sādhana-vikala / sādhya-vikala), because aggregate forms are said to have spatial divisions. If, because aggregate form has spatial divisions, it is taken as a negative instance (vipakṣa) for the hetu, the sadhya is not excluded (sādhyāvyāvṛtta), because although aggregate forms have spatial divisions, they also have no conjunction. In this context, there is also the case where, as with lightning and the sun being positive instances of impermanence, the hetu 'produced by effort' is absent therein, so in the positive example the prover is unestablished; yet if lightning and the sun are taken as negative instances for the hetu, because they possess impermanence, the proved property is not excluded. As for using this as an analogy to object, this too is not correct: now the other party merely takes aggregates as the negative example for paramāṇus, and because it has no conjunction, there is the fault of non-exclusion of the property to be proved. It is not like the thesis that sound is impermanent where lightning and so forth are negative instances, so there is no fault of non-exclusion of the property to be proved. Therefore, this treatise now merely reveals that the other's anumāna has this fault of non-exclusion of the property to be proved; the remaining five faults are now shown additionally by me, not being the primary intention of the root treatise. Those skilled in hetuvidyā should examine this for themselves.

2.76

The Treatise says: Therefore, a single real paramāṇu is not established.

2.77

The Commentary says: In this refutation of the Hīnayāna paramāṇu being unestablished, this concludes its non-establishment. 'This' points to the preceding; 'therefore' indicates the reason. Because of the faults in the anumāna and so forth stated by me previously, your posited single real paramāṇu is unestablished.

2.78

The Treatise says: Furthermore, whether paramāṇus are accepted to conjoin or not to conjoin, the faults are just as [shown].

2.79

The Commentary says: The preceding two verses refuted both conjunction and non-conjunction of paramāṇus as unestablished. The following verse refutes both possessing parts and lacking parts for the opponent's paramāṇu as unestablished. Herein there are three parts: first, the treatise's opening introduces the reason for non-establishment; next, the opponent interrogates in return; finally, the verse below is cited to demonstrate non-establishment directly. In introducing the topic, it first concludes the preceding conjunction and non-conjunction; then it introduces the subsequent faults of possessing and lacking parts. This concludes the preceding conjunction and non-conjunction. For the single real paramāṇu accepted in your school, whether you accept that they conjoin or do not conjoin, the faults are just as I have explained, concluding what was clarified above and setting it aside without further discussion.

2.80

The Treatise says: If paramāṇus are accepted to have parts or to lack parts, both entail great faults.

2.81

The Commentary says: This directly introduces the subsequent faults of possessing and lacking parts. It means that whether paramāṇus are said to further possess spatial divisions or to lack spatial divisions, both entail great faults.

2.82

The Treatise says: Why is that?

2.83

The Commentary says: Here the opponent asks: for what reason do both entail great faults?

2.84

The Treatise says: The verse says:
If a paramāṇu has spatial divisions, logically it should not be a unity;
If it lacks them, there should be no shadow and obstruction, and the aggregate being not different, there would be neither.

2.85

The Commentary says: The first two lines show the fault of having parts; the latter two lines clarify the fault of lacking parts. The meaning of the first two lines is clear; in the latter two lines, there are three refutations in total. If it lacks spatial divisions, it should cast no shadow and present no obstruction. The third line of the verse contains these two objections, refuting the lack of spatial divisions. The fourth line of the verse refutes the opponent's revised defense: if aggregate forms are not different from paramāṇus, and paramāṇus lack both [shadow and obstruction], then aggregate forms should lack shadow and obstruction. Re-establishing the previous meaning will be known below. However, the verse in the old translation is divided into three parts: the first two lines form one part, and the latter two lines form one each.

2.86

The Treatise says: Since the different six spatial divisions of a single paramāṇu constitute multiple parts, how could it be a unity?

2.87

The Commentary says: Explaining the first half of the verse, this objects to having spatial divisions, primarily refuting the Sautrāntikas, and also hypothetically warding off the Sarvāstivādins. Now, by force of reasoning, [the paramāṇu] is forced to conjoin and possess spatial divisions; this is not their original tenet. For example, regarding the central paramāṇu of an aṇu-form, the parts facing the six directions are all distinct; since this single [paramāṇu] facing them becomes manifold in essence, how could it be a unity? Because it can be divided, as was already objected to previously. Conjoining with six paramāṇus causes it to form six parts; hence this uses having parts to refute unity as the hetu. An anumāna should be formulated: 'The posited paramāṇu should not be a unity; because it is necessarily further divisible and has spatial divisions; just like aggregate forms.' If paramāṇus do not conjoin, but can only be contiguous without multiple parts, then the central paramāṇu, although not conjoined, has a place directed toward the east that is not the place directed toward the west, and so forth; since the six facets are distinct, it must again form six and cannot be a unity. 'The posited paramāṇu should not be a unity; because the place directed toward the east is not the west and so on; like aggregate forms lacking spatial divisions.' If the direction facing east were not east, then facing west and so on would also not be west and so on. If so, this paramāṇu should not be form (rūpa), because its east, west, and so forth cannot be indicated, just like the mind and mental factors. The *Cheng weishi lun* says: 'Furthermore, paramāṇus, according to where they reside, must have differences of up, down, and the four directions; otherwise, there would be no meaning of combined aggregation (saṃghāta).' 'Combined' refutes the ancient Sarvāstivādins; 'aggregation' refutes the new Sarvāstivādin Nyāyānusāra masters. Furthermore, possessing spatial divisions necessarily entails being divisible, and hence it is not real existence.

2.88

The Treatise says: If a single paramāṇu has no distinct spatial divisions,

2.89

Commentary: Below is the refutation of the Sarvāstivāda position on having no spatial divisions, explaining the first word "no" in the third line of the verse. This recounts their position: according to them, because paramāṇus are extremely minute and spherical, the east faced [by one] is not east, and the other directions are likewise; they have no different spatial divisions because they are extremely minute and spherical in characteristic.

2.90

Treatise: When the solar orb has just arisen and its light shines and touches [an object], how could a shadow appear on the opposite side?

2.91

Commentary: Here below is the actual refutation, explaining the words "there should be no shadow" in the third line of the verse. Take for instance when the solar orb has just arisen: after its body emits its light and shines touching one side, the east side, of a pillar or the like, how could a shadow appear on the west side? Although this is a dialectical objection, the reason why a shadow is not admitted has not yet been clarified.

2.92

Treatise: Because there would be no remaining part that the light does not reach.

2.93

Commentary: Because the east faced by a paramāṇu is not east and so forth, when the sun shines on the east, it is precisely shining on the west and other places. Since a paramāṇu has no side that the light does not reach, when it shines on the east, there should be no shadow in the west. A formal inference should be formulated: "When the sun shines on a pillar or the like, there should be no shadow; because it lacks various spatial divisions such as east and west; like empty space and the like." The Cheng weishi lun states: "If they have no spatial divisions, they would be like non-matter. How could an aggregate receive light and cast a shadow? Since the place receiving light and the place casting a shadow are different, the posited paramāṇus must have spatial divisions." This refutes it by pratyakṣa.

2.94

Treatise: Furthermore, for those who hold that paramāṇus lack spatial divisions,

2.95

Commentary: This repeats their position, explaining the meaning of the first word "no" in the third line of the verse; the intention is to show that this single word "no" applies to both objections regarding shadow and obstruction, repeating their position.

2.96

Treatise: how could one obstruct another mutually?

2.97

Commentary: This directly presents the objection, explaining the words "obstruction would be absent" in the third line of the verse. For instance, when two hands strike and touch each other, since east is not east and so forth, how could the left and right hands mutually obstruct each other? This is because the reason for non-obstruction has not yet been understood.

2.98

Treatise: Because there would be no remaining part where the other does not reach, so that one could speak of mutual obstruction between them.

2.99

Commentary: Because the east faced by a paramāṇu is not east and so forth, the east of the left hand is precisely its west and so forth. There is no part that is not reached by the other, the left hand. Because west is precisely east, the east of a tree should reach the west; hence when two strike each other, there definitely would be no mutual obstruction. "To reach" (行) means to go. A formal inference should be formulated: "Hands striking each other or the like should not obstruct each other; because they lack spatial divisions; like empty space and the like." Here, lacking spatial divisions also entails not obstructing each other, hence it is used as an example. The Cheng weishi lun states: "Furthermore, when seeing or touching an object such as a wall, one perceives only this side and does not perceive that part. Since the aggregated entity is precisely the paramāṇus, these paramāṇus must have spatial divisions."

2.100

Treatise: Since they would not obstruct each other, all paramāṇus should occupy the same location mutually.

2.101

Commentary: Previously it was refuted that lacking parts would mean they cannot obstruct each other; now it is refuted that if they do not obstruct each other, their locations should be identical. The location of this paramāṇu should be precisely the location of all the paramāṇus, because they do not obstruct each other. If so, this form could not become coarse, because they would all interpenetrate.

2.102

Treatise: Then all aggregates of form would have the measure of a single paramāṇu, with the same fault as stated before.

2.103

Commentary: If you admit they occupy the same location, then according to what you say, all phenomena of aggregated form would have the measure of a single paramāṇu and could not become coarse. Because they could not become coarse, the fault is as stated before. What was stated before? It means that if six [paramāṇus] occupy the same location, the measure of the aggregate should be like a single paramāṇu, and then aggregated form should also be invisible. The formal inference is as before, hence it is not repeated.

2.104

Treatise: Why do you not admit that shadow and obstruction belong to the aggregate and do not belong to paramāṇus?

2.105

Commentary: This is the opponent's rescue: "I state that paramāṇus have no spatial divisions, and you then object that there should be no shadow or obstruction. Why does your school not allow me to say that aggregates have spatial divisions, and that shadow and obstruction belong to aggregates, while paramāṇus have no divisions and do not possess them?"

2.106

Treatise: Do you admit that apart from paramāṇus there exists aggregated form that casts a shadow and acts as an obstruction?

2.107

Commentary: The author cross-examines him: "Although you raise this objection, in your own fundamental tenet, do you admit that apart from paramāṇus there exists a distinct aggregated form, such that paramāṇus lack shadow and obstruction while the aggregate casts a shadow and acts as an obstruction?"

2.108

Treatise: No.

2.109

Commentary: This is the opponent's reply. There is no distinct aggregated form apart from paramāṇus; hence he says "No."

2.110

Treatise: If so, the aggregate should lack both.

2.111

Commentary: This is the author's objection. "If so" explains "the aggregate is not different [from paramāṇus]" in the fourth line of the verse. "The aggregate should lack both" explains the words "neither exists." "So" refers to their position: if the aggregate is not different from paramāṇus, then aggregated form should lack both shadow and obstruction, because it is identical to paramāṇus, just like paramāṇus.

2.112

This is the general answer; the specific explanation follows next.

2.113

Treatise: That is, if aggregated form is not different from paramāṇus, shadow and obstruction would result in not belonging to aggregated form.

2.114

Commentary: This expands the previous objection. Within these four lines, the first half clarifies "the aggregate is not different", and the second half clarifies "neither exists." That is, if the aggregated form stated in your school is not different from the single real paramāṇu you hold, its shadow and obstruction should belong to paramāṇus and not belong to aggregated form, because the substance of aggregated form is precisely paramāṇus. The formal inference is as before. In the Cheng weishi lun it is also stated like this: since the aggregated entity is precisely those paramāṇus which cast shadows, obstruct, and so on, we know that paramāṇus definitely have spatial divisions.

2.115

Treatise: Whether designated as a paramāṇu or designated as an aggregate through differences of arrangement, neither is a single real [entity].

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唯識二十論述記 — Classical Chinese