唯識二十論述記 2.157

2.157

Commentary: This is the eighth part, where the author of the treatise directly refutes them. If, due to characteristics, this and that are distinct and each has a single substance, then you must definitely admit that what you hold to be this differentiated thing with a single substance, when broken down progressively by the discerning intellect, becomes multiple paramāṇus and has no single thing at all. For example, the place where a horse stands is called one thing, but its four feet are distinct, so the ground becomes four. Likewise, on each foot, east and west are distinct. In the east and west, there are many hundreds of thousands of divisions; thus, reaching the finest point, it becomes multiple paramāṇus. Therefore, in the world there is nothing that definitely and substantially exists as a single thing alone. Hence the theories you all hold are merely the expression of false delusions, empty conceptual constructs.