唯識二十論述記 2.171

2.171

The commentary says: This directly presents the objection. Just as people in the world say: 'I now see form,' and so on up to 'touch tangibles.' If there are no real objects such as form external to consciousness, how could there be this awareness: 'I am now directly experiencing such form and so forth'? Since this awareness is not non-existent, external form and so forth must definitely exist. In general, 'awareness' (buddhi) is another name for mind and caittas. Here, 'awareness' refers to direct perceptual cognition, not solely to wisdom. Epistemologists say that 'cognition of realization' is a general name for mind and caittas. Therefore, the old translation of the treatise says: 'How could such an understanding cognition arise?' This objection also appears in the Cheng weishi lun: 'External objects such as form are distinctly and directly experienced, being obtained by direct perception; how can they be rejected as non-existent?'