唯識二十論述記 2.198

2.198

Commentary: This doubly concludes the objection and explains the fourth line of the verse. For the Saṃmatīya and others, when this judgment arises, that which sees is already non-existent; how can direct perception be conceded at this time to prove the existence of external objects? For the Sarvāstivāda and others, when this judgment arises, its object is also non-existent; how can direct perception be conceded at this time to prove the existence of external objects? Therefore, to say that direct perception proves the existence of external objects is an unestablished proof. If so, since the Mahāyāna concedes the simultaneity of the six consciousnesses, when this judgment arises, both that which sees and that which is seen are presently existent—what is the meaning of this perception of direct perception? If the mental consciousness concomitant with the five consciousnesses has the same object as the five, it is subsumed under direct perception, but this judgment does not arise. If this judgment arises, they necessarily do not share the same object, because it is discursive cognition based on designation. Since the five consciousnesses were previously induced by the mental consciousness and now arise in succession without relying on the mental consciousness, when the mental consciousness arises it is also subsumed under the other two means of valid cognition. Whether the five are simultaneous or separated by a moment, there is no fault either. Yet it is by taking an object within the mind that this judgment of direct perception arises.