唯識二十論述記 2.23

2.23

The master of the Nyāyānusāra, fearing contradiction with his own school's [tenet] that the five consciousnesses such as the eye do not take conceptual designations as objects, differed from the Sautrāntikas. If he followed the ancients, Dignāga's objection would apply: because there is no appearance of atoms on the five consciousnesses, they would suffer the fault of not being objects. Thereupon he further said: 'Form and other phenomena each have many aspects, among which one portion is the sphere of direct perception. Therefore, atoms assist each other so that each possesses an aggregate aspect; this aspect exists substantially, and each can produce a consciousness resembling its own aspect, thereby serving as an ālambana-pratyaya for the five consciousnesses. Just as many atoms aggregate into a mountain or the like, and assisting each other, each possesses the dimension and aspect of the mountain or the like; when the five consciousnesses such as the eye take the mountain or the like as an object, there are substantially many atoms mutually assisting into the mountain aspect, and the five consciousnesses apprehend them together, so they become the object. Otherwise, there would be the fault of not being an object.' Admitting that they have substantial entities solely as conditions, the treatise says: 'They hold that substantially existing numerous atoms all come together in aggregation.' This is explained at length in Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣā and the first fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun. However, the older translation of the Viṃśikā had only the positions of the Vaiśeṣikas and the ancient Sarvāstivādins; regarding composition and aggregation, the text only mentioned one, calling it 'aggregate form of adjacent infinitesimals', yet its meaning was hard to discern and its phrasing hard to understand. In the refutation below, it says 'not that adjacent infinitesimals aggregate into a dust particle'; a reader can understand this on their own—how could it compare to the present treatise?