唯識二十論述記 2.27

2.27

Commentary: What is held is a single, coarse composite form having a substantially existing entity distinct from its original atoms; [this is impossible] because the entities of all composite forms cannot be apprehended, like mountains, the earth, and so forth. Each distinct part is just a partial form; how could there be a distinct, single, substantially coarse composite form separate from these? An inference should be established thus: 'Your composite form is not distinct from its part-forms (pratijñā); because, being distinct from all part-forms, it cannot be apprehended (hetu); like the part-forms (dṛṣṭānta).' If you were to say again, 'Who says that the composite is distinct from its part-forms? That it is unapprehended suffers from the fault of an unaccepted reason (asiddha-hetu)', one should further refute: 'Your composite form is definitely not distinct from its minute part-forms (pratijñā); because it is a form of the category of substance accepted by your own school (hetu); like the minute part-forms (dṛṣṭānta).' Or, in the earlier reason, one should insert the word 'admitted' [saying: 'because it is not admitted by our intention to be apprehendable as distinct from part-forms'], so there is no fault of an unaccepted reason. This treatise is concise in words, so it omits the word 'admitted'. Or it may be that this treatise merely states its thesis and abbreviates the reason and example, stating the thesis: 'The entity of your composite form, being distinct from your part-forms, definitely cannot be apprehended; because it is accepted as a form of the category of substance; like the minute part-forms.' The word 'because' in the treatise is used for the fluency of the phrasing; thus this inference is also free from fault.