唯識二十論述記 2.37

2.37

Commentary: The atom of the Sautrāntikas and others has a single substantial entity and is solely an object of mental consciousness; for the Sarvāstivāda masters and others, it also has a single substantial entity, is subsumed under the ten āyatanas, and is an object of the six consciousnesses. However, as for the single substantial atom held by you, I do not accept its existence; and since it is logically untenable, to say that atoms are composed or aggregated is in every sense contradictory. Now, the Ālambanaparīkṣā, in refuting the Sautrāntika master, says: 'Because composed forms and so on have that aspect upon the eye consciousness and the like, even if they act as the object (ālambana) because they are coarse and apparent, and the consciousness manifests their aspect, they lack the sense of a condition (pratyaya), because they lack a substantial entity, like an eye with impaired vision seeing a second moon. Because it has no substantial entity, it cannot produce [the consciousness].' Thereupon it establishes the inference: 'Composition, in relation to the five consciousnesses, may be an object but is not a condition (pratijñā); because its entity is substantially non-existent (hetu); like the second moon (dṛṣṭānta).' The Cheng weishi lun further refutes them, saying: 'It is not the case that the aspect of composition has a real intrinsic nature distinct from all the atoms, for when they are broken apart, the consciousness resembling that aspect definitely does not arise; since that aspect of composition is not substantially real, it cannot be said to be a condition for the five consciousnesses, lest a second moon and the like could generate the five consciousnesses.' The gist of the objection here is: if there were real atoms, there could conceivably be a nominal composition; but if the composing real [elements] do not exist, the composed nominal [entity] becomes non-existent. The Ālambanaparīkṣā, in refuting the master of the Nyāyānusāra, says: 'Although characteristics such as solidity are substantially real, they may conceivably have the sense of a condition in relation to the eye consciousness and so on, but they are not the object, because their aspect is absent from the eye consciousness and the like; the various aggregated aspects of atoms of form and so on should logically be the same, because they both hold them to be aspects of atoms.' Thereupon it establishes the inference: 'The aggregated aspects of atoms, even if conditions for the eye consciousness and so on, are not objects (pratijñā); because they are accepted as aspects of atoms (hetu); like solidity, wetness, and so forth (dṛṣṭānta).' Holding that the eye consciousness and so on can perceive the aggregated aspects of atoms, there would furthermore arise different cognitive aspects of pots, bowls, and the like; their position should entail that there is no difference [between them], for the difference is not due to shape, shape-difference being unreal; nor should one hold that atoms also have differentiated shapes and aspects. Why is this? Because atoms are equal in dimension; difference in shape pertains only to the nominal, and when breaking them down to atoms, that cognition is definitely discarded. The Cheng weishi lun further says: 'Their position is not correct: when aggregated together, the substance and aspects are identical with when they are unaggregated; therefore, the consciousness taking as its object the aspect of things such as pots and bowls whose atoms are equal should have no difference. In the state of aggregation together, each and every atom should forfeit its subtle and spherical aspect; it is not that a consciousness of a coarse aspect can take as its object a subtle-aspect sphere, lest a consciousness of one object take another object, and one consciousness would take all objects.' This treatise merely refutes the original atom as not substantially real, whereby the resulting aggregation is logically not established; the various deductions are as explained in the other treatises.