因明入正理論疏 1.114

1.114

示因相中有五：一標舉、二徵數、三列名、四別釋、五示法。此即初也。其言生因及敵證智所詮之義，各有三相，相者向也。正取言生正能立故，此生智了照解宗故，故正因體，言生、智了，兼亦義生，能建宗故。宗同異喻各有一體，因相貫三更無別體，由此故說相者向義。故《理門》云：「不共不定，一向離故，闕一相也。」又此相者，面也、邊也，三面三邊。若爾，既一因，如何說多言名為能立？其相義多，能詮言一，於三相中致一因言，故一因所依貫三別處，故多相之言名為多言，非言多故名為多言。古師解云：「相者，體也。」初相同此，餘二各以有法為性。陳那不許同異有法非能立故，但取彼義，故相非體。

In showing the characteristics of the reason, there are five parts: first, stating them; second, asking the number; third, listing the names; fourth, explaining them individually; fifth, indicating the rules. This is the first. The verbal productive reason and the meaning expressed by the cognition of the opponent and adjudicator each have three characteristics; 'characteristic' (lakṣaṇa) means 'direction'. Primarily, the verbal productive reason is taken because it is the primary proof; this produces cognitive understanding, illuminating and comprehending the thesis. Thus the primary substance of the reason consists of verbal production and cognitive understanding, and secondarily also objective production, because it can establish the thesis. The thesis, the similar example, and the dissimilar example each have an individual essence; the characteristics of the reason penetrate all three without having any other distinct essence, and therefore 'characteristic' is said to mean 'direction'. Hence the Nyāyamukha states: 'In the case of the uncommon inconclusive reason, because it is entirely separated, it lacks one characteristic.' Moreover, this 'characteristic' means an aspect or a side: three aspects, three sides. If so, since there is one reason, how can it be said that 'many words are called the proof'? Its characteristic-meanings are multiple, but the expressive words are one; within the three characteristics, one word for the reason is posited, so the basis of the one reason penetrates three distinct loci. Thus, the words of multiple characteristics are called 'many words', not because the words themselves are multiple. An ancient master explained: '"Characteristic" means essence.' The first characteristic is identical to this; the other two each take the subject as their nature. Diṅnāga did not accept this, because the similar and dissimilar subjects are not the proof; he took only their meaning, so the characteristic is not the essence.