因明入正理論疏 1.118

1.118

述曰：三、列名也。遍是宗法性，此列初相，顯因之體以成宗故，必須遍是宗之法性。據所立宗，要是極成法及有法不相離性。此中宗言，唯詮有法；有法之上，所有別義，名之為法。此法有二：一者不共有，宗中法是；二者共有，即因體是。《理門論》云：「此中宗法，唯取立論及敵論者決定同許，今此唯依證了因故。」彼自難云：「既爾，便失前說言為能成立性。」論主解云：「由有言生，令彼憶念本極成故。」意以因體共許之法，成宗之中不共許法，故此二法皆是有法之上別義。故今唯以有法名宗，對敵所申因、喻成立。雖取二依不相離性以為宗體，有法既為二法總主，總宗一分，故亦名宗。《理門論》云：「豈不總以樂所成立合說為宗，云何此中乃言宗者唯取有法？此無有失，以其總聲，於別亦轉，如言燒衣。或有宗聲唯詮於法。」若以宗中後陳名法，即宗是法，持業為名。總宗之法，亦依主釋，具二得名。今因名法，宗之法性，唯依主釋。性者，體也。此唯義性，非是體性，義相應故，餘二亦然。此共許因唯得遍是有法宗性，以宗之法成，即宗法故。不遍是法宗之性，因犯兩俱不成過故，又不欲成宗有法故。

The Commentary states: Third, listing the names. 'Pervasive property of the subject' (pakṣadharmatva)—this sets out the first characteristic [of a valid reason]. To demonstrate that the reason itself establishes the thesis, it must necessarily be a pervasive property of the subject. With respect to the thesis to be established, it must be an inseparable relation between an established property and subject. Here, the word 'thesis' refers only to the subject (dharmin). Any distinct attribute upon the subject is called a property (dharma). These properties are of two kinds: first, uncommon properties, which are the properties in the thesis [i.e., the probandum]; second, common properties, which are the reason itself. The Nyāyamukha states: 'Here, the property of the thesis is taken exclusively as that which is decisively accepted in common by both the proponent and opponent, for here we rely solely on the cognitive reason of proof (jñāpaka-hetu).' It then raises its own objection: 'If so, one loses the previous statement that speech is the producer of proof (kāraka).' The author of the treatise resolves this: 'Because through the arising of speech, one causes the other to recollect what was originally well-established.' The intention is that by means of the property commonly accepted as the reason, one establishes the property in the thesis that is not commonly accepted; hence both of these properties are distinct attributes upon the subject. Therefore, here we refer solely to the subject as the 'thesis', which is established before the opponent by advancing the reason and example. Although the inseparable relation of the two relata is taken as the substance of the thesis, since the subject is the overall possessor of both properties and constitutes one component of the entire thesis, it is also called the 'thesis'. The Nyāyamukha states: 'Is not the whole of what one desires to establish referred to jointly as the thesis? Why is it said here that the thesis takes only the subject? There is no fault in this, for a term for the whole also applies to a part, as when one says "the garment is burned". Or, the word "thesis" may refer solely to the property.' If the predicate placed second in the thesis is called the property, then the thesis is the property, named as a karmadhāraya compound. As the property of the entire thesis, it is also a tatpuruṣa compound; bearing both, it gains its name. Here, the reason is called the property, and the nature of the property of the subject is exclusively a tatpuruṣa compound. 'Nature' (dharmatva) means essence. This is merely a conceptual nature, not an ontological nature, because of conceptual qualification; the remaining two [characteristics] are also like this. This commonly accepted reason can only pervasively exist as the property of the thesis's subject, because by being a property of the thesis, it establishes it—namely, being the property of the thesis. It does not pervasively exist as the property's subject, for the reason would incur the fallacy of being unestablished for both parties (ubhaya-asiddha), and furthermore one does not desire to establish the subject of the thesis.