因明入正理論疏 1.119

1.119

然因明理，有法不成於有法，此亦不成於法，因犯所依不成過故。《理門》難云：「若以有法立餘有法，或立其法，如以烟立火，或以火立觸，其義云何？」此義難云：如遠見烟，立下有火，以有烟故。豈非彼以有法成有法？烟之與火俱有法故。又如見火，云定有熱，以有火故。熱觸既是火家之法，豈不以有法成於法耶？陳那釋云：「今於此中，非以成立火觸為宗，但為成立此相應物。」謂成山處決定有火，以有烟故，爐中定熱，以有火故，名為烟火相應之物。非以有法烟還成有法火，亦不以有法火而成熱觸法。彼論又云：「若不爾者，依烟立火，依火立觸，應成宗義一分為因。」還以宗中一分有法而為因故，便為不可。故因乃有所依不成，無所依故。亦不以法成立有法。宗中所陳，後能別前，名為能別，亦名為法。因成於此，不欲以因成前所陳，是所別故，非別後故。《理門》又云：「又於此中觀所成故，立法、有法、非德、有德，故無有過。」前陳名有法，後陳皆名法，非法有法，法性決定。如勝論師，德與有德，有德謂實，彼決定故。《理門》頌云：「有法非成於有法，及法此非成有法。但由法故成其法，如是成立於有法。」謂有法、因法二俱極成，宗中之法敵先不許，但得共許因在宗中有法之上，成不共許宗中之法，如是資益有法義成。可得因在不共許中，許在彼中，何所成立？又若共許之因依不共許法，凡所立因，皆有他隨一所依不成過。不說有法而為所依，但以其法而為所依，法非共許，縱唯立許，豈定無此過？又如立宗，聲是無常，所作性故。無常滅義，所作生義，聲有滅者，以有生故，一切生者皆有滅故。聲既因生，明有果滅。若因所作不遍聲宗，豈得遍在無常上有？一切正因中應皆有兩俱不成，無常之上本無生故。由此故知，因但是宗有法之法，非法法也。

However, according to the principles of hetuvidyā, a subject cannot establish another subject, nor does it establish a property, because the reason would incur the fallacy of having an unestablished substratum (āśrayāsiddha). The Nyāyamukha raises the objection: 'If one establishes another subject by means of a subject, or establishes its property, as in establishing fire by means of smoke, or establishing touch by means of fire, what is the meaning of this?' This objection means: for instance, seeing smoke from afar, one establishes that below there is fire, because of the presence of smoke. Is this not establishing a subject by means of a subject? For both smoke and fire are subjects. Furthermore, as seeing fire, one says there is definitely heat, because of the presence of fire. Since hot touch is a property of fire, is this not establishing a property by means of a subject? Diṅnāga explains: 'Now herein, the thesis is not to establish fire or touch, but merely to establish that which is qualified by them.' That is to say, establishing that at the mountain there is definitely fire because of the presence of smoke, or that in the hearth there is definitely heat because of the presence of fire, which are called entities qualified by smoke or fire. It is not using the subject smoke to establish in turn the subject fire, nor using the subject fire to establish the property of hot touch. That treatise also says: 'Were it not so, if one established fire based on smoke, or established touch based on fire, one component of the thesis's meaning would become the reason.' For it would be inadmissible to make one component of the subject in the thesis into the reason. Hence the reason would incur being unestablished in its substratum, having no substratum. Nor does one establish the subject by means of the property. In the presentation of the thesis, that which is placed second can qualify that which comes before; it is called the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) and is also called the property. The reason establishes this; one does not desire to use the reason to establish what was presented before, because that is the qualified (viśeṣya) and does not qualify what comes after. The Nyāyamukha also states: 'Furthermore, herein, because of considering what is to be established, we establish property and subject, not quality and possessor of quality; hence there is no fault.' That which is placed first is called the subject; that which is placed second is always called the property. It is not that property and subject have an inherently fixed nature. It is like the Vaiśeṣika's quality (guṇa) and possessor of quality (guṇin), where the possessor of quality refers to substance (dravya), which is fixed for them. The Nyāyamukha's verse states: 'A subject does not establish a subject, / nor does a property establish a subject. / Only by means of a property does one establish its property, / and in this way one establishes the subject.' This means that both the subject and the property-as-reason are established for both parties; the property in the thesis is not previously accepted by the opponent, but when the commonly accepted reason resides upon the subject in the thesis, it establishes the unaccepted property in the thesis, and in this manner promotes the establishment of the meaning of the subject. If the reason could reside in what is not commonly accepted, and being accepted to reside in that, what would be established? Furthermore, if a commonly accepted reason relied on an unaccepted property, then any reason advanced would incur the fallacy of having an unestablished substratum for the other party (parataḥ-āśrayāsiddha). If one does not speak of the subject as the substratum, but takes the property as the substratum, since the property is not commonly accepted, even if accepted by the proponent alone, how could it certainly be free of this fault? Moreover, for example, when advancing the thesis: 'Sound is impermanent, because of being produced.' Impermanence means destruction, and producedness means arising; that sound has destruction is because it has arising, for whatever arises has destruction. Since sound arises from causes, it clearly has the result of destruction. If the reason, producedness, did not pervade the thesis of sound, how could it pervasively reside upon impermanence? All correct reasons would incur the fallacy of being unestablished for both parties, for upon impermanence there is fundamentally no arising. From this, one knows that the reason is only the property of the thesis's subject, not the property of a property.