因明入正理論疏 1.121

1.121

言同品定有性者，顯第二相。同是相似義，品是體類義，相似體類名為同品。故《理門》云：「此中若品與所立法隣近均等，說名同品，以一切義皆名品故。」彼言意說：雖一切義皆名為品，今取其因，正所成法。若言所顯法之自相，若非言顯意之所許，但是兩宗所諍義法，皆名所立。隨應有此所立法處說名同品。以隨有無體名同品，由此品者是體類故。若唯言所陳所諍法之自相名為所立，有此法處名同品者，便無有四相違之因。比量相違、決定相違皆應無四。若全同有法上所有一切義者，便無同品，亦無異品，宗有一分相符極成，非一切義皆相違故，故但取所立有此名同。然下論云「如立無常，瓶等無常名同品」者，唯舉所陳兩宗本諍法之自相名為同品，以餘意所許是傍所諍，略而不說，理皆同品。以此釋文，應當深義。同品有二：一、宗同品，故下論云：「謂所立法均等義品，是名同品。」二、因同品，下文亦言：「若於是處顯因同品決定有性。」然論多說宗之同品名為同品，宗相似故。因之同品名為同法，宗之法故。何須二同？因之在處說宗同品，欲顯其因遍宗、喻故。宗法隨因，說因同法，顯有因處，立法必隨故。且宗同品，何者名同？若同有法，全不相似，聲為有法，瓶為喻故。若法為同，敵不許法於有法有，亦非因相遍宗法中，何得取法而以為同？此中義意，不別取二，總取一切有宗法處名宗同品。故論說言：「如立無常，瓶等無常是名同品。」有此宗處，決定有因，名因同品。然實同品，正取因同，因貫宗、喻，體性寬遍。有此共許因法之處，不共許法定必隨故。今明一切有宗法處其因定有，故說宗同。不欲以宗成因義故，非正同品。其因於彼宗同品處決定有性，故言同品定有性也。因既決定有，顯宗法必隨，《理門》亦云「說因宗所隨，宗無因不有」等。依上二相，《理門論》云：「云何別法於別處轉？」此中問意：如所作因必隨附聲，與瓶等上所作性別，如何聲宗之上別因，於瓶等中別處而轉？或所作因是聲有法宗上別法，云何於彼別瓶處轉，而言共相貫在宗、喻，遍是宗法，同品定有？陳那釋云：「由彼相似，不說異名，言即是此，故無有失。」此答意言，由聲、瓶上共所作性相似而有，總相合說，不說聲、瓶二異名中聲所作性即喻處所作性，言彼即此，故無有失。彼復難云：「若不說異，云何此因說名宗法？」前難聲宗所作性因，云何得於別瓶上轉？此難云何瓶所作性說為宗法？既不說彼所作性異總合說者，所作性因既於瓶有，云何此因說名宗法？彼復釋言：「此中但說定是宗法，不欲說言唯是宗法。」此釋意言：總因之中但說定遍宗法性，不欲說言唯是宗法，故一總言貫通二處，宗、非宗上悉皆得有，其中可有遍是宗法。若別異說，唯聲所作唯宗法性，別不容有舉喻成宗。又別異說唯瓶所作，亦不得成是宗法性，何所成立？彼復難言：「若爾，同品應亦名宗。」此意難云：二中所作總貫稱因，二上無常應皆宗諍。彼自釋云：「不然，別處說所成故，因必無異方成比量，故不相似。」答難不然，唯別聲上有無常義是其所成，共所諍故，非於瓶上。夫立因者，必須立敵宗、喻之上兩俱無異，方成比量。故能立通，所立義局，理不相似，故答不然。

The phrase "necessarily existing in the sapakṣa" indicates the second characteristic. "Sa-" (same) means similar; "-pakṣa" means an ontological class; a similar ontological class is called sapakṣa. Therefore, the Nyāyamukha states: "Here, if a class is adjacent and equal to the property to be proven (sādhya-dharma), it is called sapakṣa, because all objects are called pakṣa." The purport of its statement is: although all objects are called pakṣa, we here take that which the hetu directly proves as the dharma. Whether it is the intrinsic mark (svalakṣaṇa) of the dharma explicitly expressed by speech, or that which is not explicitly stated in words but intended in thought, as long as it is the dharma at dispute between the two parties, all of it is termed the sādhya. Wherever this sādhya-dharma is appropriately present is called sapakṣa. Because it is called sapakṣa whether it has an ontological reality or not, pakṣa is an ontological class. If one were to say that only the svalakṣaṇa of the dharma explicitly stated and disputed is called sādhya, and where this dharma exists is sapakṣa, there would be no four viruddha-hetus. Neither anumāna-bādhita nor viruddhāvyabhicārin would have four [subdivisions]. If it were entirely identical to all properties on the subject (dharmin), there would be no sapakṣa and no vipakṣa, because the pratijñā would have a part that is already mutually agreed upon (siddhasādhana), since not all properties are contradictory; therefore, one only takes the presence of this sādhya as 'similar' (samāna). However, when the subsequent treatise states: "For instance, in proving impermanence, [things like] pots, being impermanent, are sapakṣa," it only adduces the svalakṣaṇa of the dharma primarily disputed and stated by the two traditions as sapakṣa; because what is otherwise intended is merely an ancillary dispute, it is omitted and not mentioned, yet in principle all are sapakṣa. Explaining the text in this way should reveal its profound meaning. Sapakṣa is twofold: first, the sapakṣa of the pratijñā; hence the subsequent treatise states: "A class of things equal to the sādhya-dharma is called sapakṣa." Second, the sapakṣa of the hetu; the subsequent text also states: "If in that locus it reveals the necessity of existence of the hetu's sapakṣa." However, the treatise mostly refers to the sapakṣa of the pratijñā as sapakṣa, because it resembles the pratijñā; the sapakṣa of the hetu is called sādharmya (similarity of dharma), because it is a dharma of the pratijñā. Why are two kinds of similarity needed? The sapakṣa of the pratijñā is mentioned in relation to the locus of the hetu because one wishes to show that the hetu pervades both the pratijñā and the dṛṣṭānta. The dharma of the pratijñā follows the hetu, and this is called the hetu's sādharmya, to show that wherever the hetu is present, the sādhya-dharma necessarily follows. Now, regarding the sapakṣa of the pratijñā, what is it that is similar? If it is similar to the dharmin, there is no similarity at all, because sound is the dharmin and the pot is the dṛṣṭānta. If the dharma is what is similar, the opponent does not accept that the dharma exists on the dharmin, nor does the hetu-aspect pervade the pakṣadharma; how could one take the dharma to be similar? The meaning intended here is not to take the two separately, but generally to take all loci where the pakṣadharma exists as the sapakṣa of the pratijñā. Hence the treatise says: "For example, in establishing impermanence, pots and the like, being impermanent, are called sapakṣa." Where this pratijñā exists, the hetu necessarily exists, and this is called the hetu's sapakṣa. In reality, however, sapakṣa properly takes the similarity of the hetu, for the hetu runs through both the pratijñā and the dṛṣṭānta, its nature being broad and pervasive. Where this mutually acknowledged hetu-dharma exists, the unacknowledged dharma must necessarily follow. Here, to clarify that the hetu definitely exists in all loci where the pakṣadharma exists, it speaks of the similarity of the pratijñā. Because one does not intend to establish the hetu by means of the pratijñā, it is not the primary sapakṣa. That the hetu necessarily exists in that sapakṣa of the pratijñā is why it is called "necessarily existing in the sapakṣa." Since the hetu definitely exists, it shows that the pakṣadharma necessarily follows; the Nyāyamukha also says: "It is stated that the hetu is followed by the pratijñā, and without the pratijñā, the hetu does not exist," and so on. Based on the above two characteristics, the Nyāyamukha states: "How can an individual dharma occur in an individual locus?" The question intends: if the hetu 'productness' necessarily belongs to sound, and is different from the productness on pots and the like, how can an individual hetu belonging to the pratijñā of sound occur in an individual different locus such as a pot? Or, if the hetu 'productness' is an individual dharma on the subject (dharmin) of sound in the pratijñā, how can it occur in that individual different pot, such that a universal (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) can be said to run through both pratijñā and dṛṣṭānta, pervading the pakṣadharma and necessarily existing in the sapakṣa? Diṅnāga explains: "Because of their similarity, different designations are not spoken, saying 'that is just this'; therefore, there is no error." The purport of this answer is: because the common productness on both sound and pot exists by similarity, they are stated collectively as a universal, without distinguishing between the two different designations of sound and pot as to whether the productness of sound is identical to the productness of the dṛṣṭānta; by saying 'that is just this', there is no error. That text objects again: "If difference is not stated, how is this hetu called pakṣadharma?" The former objection asked how the productness-hetu of the sound-pratijñā could occur on an individual different pot; this objection asks how the productness of the pot can be called pakṣadharma? Since one does not state that their productness is different but speaks of them collectively, if the productness-hetu exists on the pot, how can this hetu be called pakṣadharma? That text explains again: "Here it is only stated that it is definitely a pakṣadharma; it is not intended to say that it is solely a pakṣadharma." The purport of this explanation is: within the collective hetu, it only states that it definitely pervades the pakṣadharmatā, not intending to say that it is solely a pakṣadharma; thus a single collective expression runs through both loci, being present on both the pratijñā and the non-pratijñā, and within this it can pervade the pakṣadharma. If one spoke of them as distinct and different, so that only the productness of sound were solely the pakṣadharmatā, there would be no distinct locus to cite as an example to establish the pratijñā. Furthermore, if one spoke of it as distinctly being only the productness of the pot, it could not be established as the pakṣadharmatā, so what would be established? That text objects again: "If so, the sapakṣa should also be called pakṣa." The intention of this objection is: if the productness in both runs through and is collectively called the hetu, then the impermanence on both should also be the disputed pratijñā. He resolves it himself: "Not so, because what is to be established is stated of a distinct locus; only when the hetu is free of difference does it form an inference (anumāna); hence they are not similar." The reply to the objection is that it is not so, because only the impermanence on the distinct locus of sound is what is to be established (sādhya), being mutually disputed, not that on the pot. When establishing a hetu, it must be without difference on both the pratijñā and the dṛṣṭānta for both proponent and opponent before it constitutes an anumāna. Therefore, the sādhana (proving element) is general while the sādhya (property to be proved) is restricted; in principle they are not similar, so he replies 'not so'.