因明入正理論疏 1.120

1.120

問：「稱為宗法，即已是因，何須言遍？初既云遍，因義已明，何須復云是宗法性？」答：「若因不遍宗有法上，此所不遍，便非因成，有所不立；顯皆因立，是故稱遍。若但言遍，不言宗法，即不能顯因是有法，宗之法性能成於法。又因於宗過，名為不成。於二喻中俱有俱無，名為不定。於二喻中有無相違，名曰相違。若唯言法性，不言遍者，因於宗過即是不成，或兩俱不遍、或隨一不遍、或猶預不遍、或所依不遍，全分、一分等隨應有之。為簡此失，是故言遍。若但言遍，不言宗法，不知此因誰家之因？為顯是宗有法之因，成於宗法，故言法性。由此應為諸句分別：有宗法而非遍、有是遍亦宗法、有非遍非宗法，必無是遍非宗法句。但遍有法，若有別體、若無別體，並能成宗，義相關故，必是宗法。如薩婆多對大乘者，立命根實，以有業故，如五根等。豈以命根與業別體即非正因？故有別體、若無別體，義相關帶，必是宗法，皆得說為宗之法性，非無體是，非有體非。初有宗法而非遍者，四不成中皆一分攝。初兩俱、一分、兩俱不成者，如勝論師對聲生者，立一切聲皆是無常宗，勤勇無間所發性因。立敵二宗，唯許內聲有勤勇發，外聲非有。立敵俱說此因於宗半有半無，故此過是兩俱有體一分不成。餘無體兩俱一分一種不成。若有體若無體、若自若他，合四種一分，隨一不成。兩俱一分，若自若他，合三種一分猶豫不成。兩俱有體一分，若他若自，有體一分隨一，合三所依不成。如是更有十一，并前十二一分不成，皆如下釋。後句非遍非宗法者，四不成中并全分過。如聲論師對佛弟子，立聲為常，眼所見故，俱說此因於聲無故。此是有體兩俱全分兩俱不成，餘無體兩俱全分一種不成。有體無體，若自若他，四種全分隨一不成。兩俱全分，若自若他，三種猶豫不成。有體無體兩俱全分，有體無體若自若他，隨一全分六種所依不成。如是更有十四，并前十五全分不成，亦如下釋。此二遍句並皆是過，唯第二句遍亦宗法，是正因相。為簡非句，故說遍是宗法性。」

Question: 'If calling it a property of the thesis already constitutes the reason, why must one say "pervasive"? Since "pervasive" is stated first and the meaning of the reason is already clear, why must one further say "nature of the property of the thesis"?' Answer: 'If the reason does not pervade the subject of the thesis, then what is not pervaded will not be established by the reason, leaving something unestablished; to show that it is entirely established by the reason, one therefore says "pervasive". If one merely said "pervasive" without saying "property of the thesis", it could not show that the reason is the property of the thesis's subject capable of establishing the property. Furthermore, a fallacy of the reason with respect to the thesis is called unestablished (asiddha); being present in both or absent in both regarding the two examples is called inconclusive (anaikāntika); being contradictory regarding presence and absence in the two examples is called contradictory (viruddha). If one only said "nature of the property" without saying "pervasive", the fallacy of the reason with respect to the thesis would be unestablishedness: either unpervasive for both (ubhaya), unpervasive for one party (anyatara), unpervasive due to doubt (saṃdigdha), or unpervasive in substratum (āśraya), occurring as total or partial as appropriate. To exclude these faults, one therefore says "pervasive". If one merely said "pervasive" without saying "property of the thesis", one would not know whose reason this reason is. To show that it is the reason of the thesis's subject establishing the property of the thesis, one says "nature of the property". For this reason, one should distinguish the various alternatives: there is that which is a property of the thesis but not pervasive; that which is pervasive and also a property of the thesis; that which is neither pervasive nor a property of the thesis; and there is definitively no case of being pervasive while not being a property of the thesis. As long as it pervades the subject, whether it has a distinct ontological entity or has no distinct ontological entity, it can establish the thesis because the senses are related; it must be a property of the thesis. For example, when the Sarvāstivādin argues against the Mahāyānist, establishing that the vital faculty (jīvitendriya) is a real entity, because of having karma, like the five sense faculties, etc., could it be that because the vital faculty and karma have distinct entities it is not a correct reason? Therefore, whether having a distinct entity or having no distinct entity, if the senses are interrelated, it must be a property of the thesis and can in all cases be spoken of as the nature of the property of the thesis; it is not that having no entity is valid while having an entity is invalid. First, as for having a property of the thesis but not being pervasive, this is subsumed under the partial forms among the four types of unestablishedness (asiddha). First, as for the partial unestablishedness for both (ubhaya-bhāgāsiddha): for example, the Vaiśeṣika against the Śabdakāryavādin establishes the thesis that "All sounds are impermanent, because of being produced by effort." Both the proponent and opponent accept only that internal sound is produced by effort, while external sound is not. Proponent and opponent both state that this reason is half present and half absent regarding the thesis; hence this fallacy is a real-entity partial unestablishedness for both. The other is the unreal-entity partial unestablishedness for both, making one kind of unestablishedness. Whether having real entity or lacking real entity, whether for oneself or for the other, these combine into four kinds of partial unestablishedness for one party (anyatarabhāgāsiddha). For both parties partially, or for oneself or the other, these combine into three kinds of partial unestablishedness due to doubt (saṃdigdhabhāgāsiddha). Real-entity partial for both, or for the other or oneself, real-entity partial for one party, combine into three kinds of unestablishedness of substratum (āśrayāsiddha). Thus there are eleven more, which together with the previous make twelve kinds of partial unestablishedness, all explained below. As for the latter case of being neither pervasive nor a property of the thesis, it subsumes the total fallacies among the four kinds of unestablishedness. For example, the Śabdavādin against the Buddhist establishes that sound is permanent, because of being visible to the eye, since both state that this reason is absent in sound. This is a real-entity total unestablishedness for both; the other is the unreal-entity total unestablishedness for both, making one kind. Real entity or unreal entity, for oneself or the other, make four kinds of total unestablishedness for one party. Total for both, or for oneself or the other, make three kinds of total unestablishedness due to doubt. Real or unreal total for both, and real or unreal for oneself or the other total for one party, make six kinds of unestablishedness of substratum. Thus there are fourteen more, which together with the previous make fifteen kinds of total unestablishedness, also explained below. Both of these alternatives of pervasion are fallacies; only the second alternative—being pervasive and also a property of the thesis—is the mark of a correct reason. To exclude the invalid alternatives, it is stated: "pervasive property of the subject".'