因明入正理論疏 1.131

1.131

又難或異名異品云：「若別異者，應無有因。」謂若說言與宗有異即名異品，則應無有決定正因。如立聲無常，聲上無我、苦、空等義，皆名異品。所作性因於異既有，何名定因？謂隨所立一切宗法，傍意所許，亦因所成。此傍意許既名異品，因復能成，故一切量皆無正因。故知但是無所立處即名異品。此亦有二：一、宗異品，故下論云：「異品者，謂於是處無其所立。」二、因異品，故下論云：「異法者，若於是處說所立無，因遍非有。」然論多說宗之異品名為異品，宗類異故：因之異品名為異法，宗法異故。何須二異？因之無處說宗異品，欲顯其因隨宗無故。宗之無處說因異品，顯因無處宗必先無。且宗異品，何者名異？若異有法，同法所依有法各別，亦應名異。若異於法，敵本不許所立之法於有法有，一切異法皆應名同。此異品者，不別取二，總取一切無宗法處名宗異品，故論說言「謂於是處無其所立」。又若是常，見非所作，如虛空等。此但略無，正諍無常，唯舉見常名為異品。准理同前，無隨所應所立之法，無此宗處定遍無因，名因異品。然雖異品亦取因異，顯無宗處因定隨無，翻顯有因宗定隨轉。雖復離法，先宗後因，彼若不然，便成異法。今顯能立本欲成宗，於異品無，其宗便立，故正宗異，後方因異。其因於彼宗異品處決定遍無，故言異品遍無性也。

It also objects to the definition that what is distinct is called a vipakṣa, saying: 'If it were distinct, there would be no [valid] reason.' That is, if one were to say that what is distinct from the thesis is called a vipakṣa, then there would be no determined valid reason. For example, when positing that sound is impermanent, the meanings on sound such as non-self, suffering, and emptiness would all be called vipakṣa. Since the reason 'producedness' exists in the dissimilar, how could it be a determined reason? For whatever probandum property is posited, that which is implicitly accepted by intention is also established by the reason; since what is implicitly accepted by intention is called a vipakṣa, and the reason is also able to establish it, no inference whatsoever would have a valid reason. Therefore, we know that simply the locus where the probandum is absent is called the vipakṣa. This also has two kinds: first, the vipakṣa of the thesis (pakṣa-vipakṣa), hence the treatise below says: 'The vipakṣa means the locus where that probandum is absent'; second, the vipakṣa of the reason (dṛṣṭānta-vaidharmya), hence the treatise below says: 'The dissimilar example means: where the probandum is stated to be absent, the reason is pervasively absent.' However, the treatises mostly call the vipakṣa of the thesis 'vipakṣa' because the classes of the thesis are dissimilar, while calling the vipakṣa of the reason 'dissimilar property' (vaidharmya) because the properties of the thesis are dissimilar. Why are two dissimilarities necessary? The locus where the reason is absent is stated as the vipakṣa of the thesis because one wishes to show that the reason is absent along with the thesis. The locus where the thesis is absent is stated as the vipakṣa of the reason to show that where the reason is absent, the thesis must first be absent. Furthermore, with regard to the vipakṣa of the thesis, what is called distinct? If it is distinct from the subject (dharmin), the subjects upon which similar properties depend are each distinct, and thus should also be called distinct. If it is distinct from the predicate (dharma), the opponent originally does not accept that the probandum property exists on the subject, so all dissimilar properties would have to be called similar. As for this vipakṣa, it does not pick out the two separately, but takes collectively any locus lacking the property of the thesis as the vipakṣa of the thesis; hence the treatise states, 'It means the locus where that probandum is absent.' Moreover, if it is permanent, it is observed not to be produced, like empty space, etc. This is merely a brief absence; when impermanence is being directly contested, one merely adduces observed permanence as the vipakṣa. By parity of reasoning as before, where there is no corresponding probandum property, the locus lacking this thesis where the reason is definitely and pervasively absent is called the vipakṣa of the reason. Although the vipakṣa also takes the reason's dissimilarity, this shows that where the thesis is absent, the reason is definitely absent along with it, which inversely reveals that where the reason is present, the thesis definitely follows. Although in the formulation of negative concomitance (vyatireka), the thesis comes first and the reason after, if it were not so, it would become an erroneous dissimilar property. Now it is shown that the proving statement originally aims to establish the thesis; when absent in the vipakṣa, the thesis is thereby established; hence, first is the dissimilarity of the thesis, and only afterwards the dissimilarity of the reason. Because that reason is definitely and pervasively absent in that vipakṣa of the thesis, it is said to be 'the nature of pervasive absence in the vipakṣa'.