因明入正理論疏 1.130

1.130

異品遍無性者，顯第三相。異者，別義，所立無處，即名別異。品者，聚類，非體類義，許無體故。不同同品體類解品，隨體有無，但與所立別異聚類即名異品。古因明云：「與其同品相違或異，說名異品，如立善宗，不善違害，故名相違。」苦樂、明闇、冷熱、大小、常無常等，一切皆爾。要別有體違害於宗，方名異品。或說與前所立有異，名為異品。如立無常，除無常外，自餘一切苦、無我等慮、礙等義，皆名異品。陳那以後皆不許然，如無常宗，無常無處即名異品，不同先古。《理門》破云：「非與同品相違或異，若相違者，應唯簡別。」謂彼若非無所立處名為異品，要相違法名異品者，應唯簡別，是則唯立相違之法簡別同品，不是返遮宗因二有。若許爾者，則一切法應有三品，如立善宗，不善違害，唯以簡別名為異品，無記之法無簡別故，便成第三品，非善非不善故。此中容品，既望善宗非相違害，豈非第三？由此應知，無所立處即名異品，不善無記既無所立，皆名異品，便無彼過。

"Pervasive absence in the vipakṣa" (vipakṣe 'sattvam eva) reveals the third characteristic. "Vi-" (dissimilar) means distinct: the locus where the probandum is absent is called distinct. "Pakṣa" (class) means an aggregation or category; it does not mean an ontological category (svabhāva-jāti), because the absence of an entity is accepted. It is not like the sapakṣa, where "class" is explained as an ontological category; regardless of whether an entity exists or not, simply any category distinct from the probandum is called vipakṣa. Ancient Hetuvidyā stated: 'What is contradictory to or distinct from the sapakṣa is called the vipakṣa. For instance, when positing the thesis of wholesome, the unwholesome is oppositional and destructive to it, hence called contradictory.' Suffering and pleasure, light and darkness, cold and heat, large and small, permanent and impermanent, and so forth—all are like this: only when there is distinctly an existent entity that opposes and impairs the thesis is it called a vipakṣa. Or it was said that what is distinct from the previously posited probandum is called a vipakṣa; for example, when positing impermanence, everything else aside from impermanence—such as suffering, non-self, thought, spatial obstruction, and so forth—is called a vipakṣa. From Diṅnāga onwards, none of this is accepted: as in a thesis of impermanence, the locus where impermanence is absent is called the vipakṣa, which differs from the ancients. The Nyāyamukha refutes this, saying: 'It is not contradictory to or distinct from the sapakṣa; if it were contradictory, it would merely be an exclusion.' That is, if a vipakṣa were not the locus of the absence of the probandum, but had to be a contradictory phenomenon to be called a vipakṣa, it would merely be an exclusion; in that case, one would merely establish a contradictory phenomenon to exclude the sapakṣa, rather than precluding the coexistence of both the probandum and the reason. If that were granted, then all phenomena would have three classes: for example, when positing the thesis of wholesome, the unwholesome is oppositional, and only by exclusion is it called a vipakṣa; indeterminate phenomena (avyākṛta), lacking such exclusion, would then become a third class, being neither wholesome nor unwholesome. Since this intermediate class is not oppositional or destructive with respect to the thesis of wholesome, how could it not be a third? Therefore, one should know that the locus where the probandum is absent is simply called the vipakṣa; since both the unwholesome and the indeterminate lack the probandum, both are called vipakṣa, and then there is no such fault.