因明入正理論疏 1.50

1.50

辨八義同異者，有是能立而非能破，如真能立建立自宗。有釋無此，能立自宗，即能破敵，必對彼故。有是能破而非能立，如顯過破。有釋無此，但破他宗，自便立故。有是能立亦是能破，如真立破他所不成。有釋無此，立謂能申自，破謂就他宗。有非能立亦非能破，謂似立破。有是能立而非似立，謂真能立。有是似立而非能立，除決定相違，所餘似立。有是能立亦是似立，謂決定相違。有釋無此，此唯似立，非能立故，立者雖具言，他智不決故。有非能立亦非似立，謂妄破他所成立義。有是能立而非似破，如無過量。有是似破而非能立，如十四過類等。有是能立亦是似破，如決定相違。有釋無此，此但似破，非真立故。有非能立亦非似破，謂顯過破。有釋無此，顯他過非，自便立故，能破定非似立，亦非似破，真似異故。有是似立而非似破，謂有過量，建立自宗。有釋無此，自宗義成，即是真破，自既不立，即似破他。有是似破而非似立，謂妄顯他非，十四過類。有釋無此，妄謂破他即妄立故。有似能立亦是似破，如以過量破他不成。有非似立亦非似破，謂真能立，或真能破。

In distinguishing the agreements and differences among the eight items: There is that which is a valid proof (sādhana) but not a valid refutation (dūṣaṇa), such as a genuine proof establishing one's own thesis. Some explain that there is no such thing: establishing one's own thesis is precisely refuting the opponent, as it is necessarily directed against him. There is that which is a valid refutation but not a valid proof, such as a refutation revealing fallacies. Some explain that there is no such thing: merely refuting the other thesis itself establishes one's own. There is that which is both a valid proof and a valid refutation, such as a genuine proof refuting what is unestablished by the other. Some explain that there is no such thing: proof means expressing one's own, while refutation means addressing the other thesis. There is that which is neither a valid proof nor a valid refutation, namely fallacious proofs and fallacious refutations. There is that which is a valid proof but not a fallacious proof, namely a genuine proof. There is that which is a fallacious proof but not a valid proof: except for the mutually contradictory (viruddha-avyabhicārin), all remaining fallacious proofs. There is that which is both a valid proof and a fallacious proof, namely the mutually contradictory. Some explain that there is no such thing: this is solely a fallacious proof and not a valid proof, for although the proponent fully states the words, the other's cognition is not resolved. There is that which is neither a valid proof nor a fallacious proof, namely a false refutation of a thesis established by the other. There is that which is a valid proof and not a fallacious refutation, like an inference free from fallacy. There is that which is a fallacious refutation and not a valid proof, like the fourteen kinds of futile rejoinder (jāti), etc. There is that which is a valid proof and also a fallacious refutation, like the mutually contradictory. Some explain that there is no such thing: this is merely a fallacious refutation and not a genuine proof. There is that which is neither a valid proof nor a fallacious refutation, namely a refutation revealing fallacies. Some explain that there is no such thing: revealing the other's fallacies itself establishes one's own; a valid refutation is definitely not a fallacious proof, nor is it a fallacious refutation, because genuine and fallacious are distinct. There is that which is a fallacious proof and not a fallacious refutation, namely establishing one's own thesis with a fallacious inference. Some explain that there is no such thing: when one's own thesis is established, it is a genuine refutation; when one's own is not established, it is a fallacious refutation of the other. There is that which is a fallacious refutation and not a fallacious proof, namely falsely pointing out the other's error, the fourteen kinds of futile rejoinder. Some explain that there is no such thing: falsely supposing one refutes the other is precisely a false establishment. There is that which is a fallacious proof and also a fallacious refutation, as when one refutes the other's unestablished thesis with a fallacious inference. There is that which is neither a fallacious proof nor a fallacious refutation, namely a genuine proof or a genuine refutation.