因明入正理論疏 1.62

1.62

問：「能立因、喻，有言、義、智，論何不說多智、多義名為能立，而說多言名為能立？」答：「立論之法本生他解，他解照達所立宗義，本由立者能立之言，其言生因，正是能立。智、義順此亦得因名。由言生因，生敵證智，敵證智解為正了因。」《理門論》難云：「若爾，既取智為了因，是言便失能成立性。」此難言因，應非能立。彼自釋云：「此亦不然，令彼憶念本極成故。」此釋意云：由言因故，令敵證智了本極成因，解所立宗義，故立論者言正為能立，敵證智了亦為能立性。若不爾者，相違決定，言支具足，應名能立。既由他智，不生決解，名為似立，故知通取言生智了為能立體。今此據本，故但標言名為能立。《瑜伽》亦云：「六種言論是論體性，不說智生、義生、義了名為能立。」言了則言生，故體亦可爾。

Question: "Regarding the reason and example that prove, there are statements, referents, and cognitions. Why does the treatise not state that multiple cognitions or multiple referents are called proof, but states that multiple statements are called proof?" Answer: "The method of establishing a treatise is originally to generate understanding in another; the other's understanding discerns and comprehends the meaning of the thesis to be proved, which fundamentally originates from the proponent's proving statements. Their productive reason of statements (śābda-kāraka-hetu) is precisely proof. Cognition and referents, by according with this, also acquire the name of reason. Due to the productive reason of statements, cognition in the opponent and the judges is generated; the cognitive comprehension of the opponent and the judges is the proper informative reason (jñāpaka-hetu)." The Nyāyamukha objects, saying: 'If so, since one takes cognition as the informative reason, these statements would lose their nature of being able to establish.' This objects that the reason of statements should not be proof. It itself explains, saying: 'This also is not so, because it causes them to recall what is fundamentally well-established.' The meaning of this explanation is: due to the reason of statements, one causes the cognition of the opponent and the judges to cognize the fundamentally well-established reason, and comprehend the meaning of the thesis to be proved; therefore, the proponent's statement is properly proof, and the cognitive comprehension of the opponent and the judges is also the nature of proof. Were it not so, then in the case of counterbalanced inconclusiveness (viruddhāvyabhicārin), where the verbal members are fully present, it should be called proof. Since, due to the other's cognition, decisive comprehension is not generated, it is called pseudo-proof; hence one knows that comprehensively taking both the production by statements and the information by cognition constitutes the essence of proof. Here, it relies on the root; therefore, it merely marks statements as proof. The Yogācārabhūmi also says: 'Six kinds of verbal discourse are the essence of the treatise; it does not say that generation by cognition, generation by referents, or information by referents are called proof.' If statements inform, then statements produce; therefore, the essence may also be such.