因明入正理論疏 1.86

1.86

述曰：出宗體。差別者，謂以一切有法及法互相差別。性者，體也。此取二中互相差別不相離性以為宗體，如言「色蘊無我。」色蘊者，有法也；無我者，法也。此之二種，若體若義互相差別，謂以色蘊簡別無我，色蘊無我，非受無我；及以無我簡別色蘊，無我色蘊，非我色蘊。以此二種互相差別合之一處不相離性，方是其宗。即簡先古諸因明師但說有法為宗，以法成有法故；或但說法為宗，有法上法是所諍故；或以有法及法為宗、彼別非宗，合此二種宗所成故。此皆先共許，何得成宗？既立已成而無果故。但應取互相差別不相離性，有許不許以為宗體。

Commentary: Explaining the essence of the thesis. "Qualified" (viśeṣa) means that the subject and predicate qualify each other. "Nature" (svabhāva) means its intrinsic essence. Here, what is taken as the essence of the thesis is the mutually qualified, inseparable nature of the two, as when saying: "The aggregate of form is non-self." "The aggregate of form" is the subject (dharmin); "non-self" is the predicate (dharma). These two, whether in substance or in meaning, qualify each other: that is to say, one qualifies non-self by the aggregate of form, such that it is the non-self of the aggregate of form, not the non-self of sensation; and one qualifies the aggregate of form by non-self, such that it is the form aggregate of non-self, not the form aggregate of a self. Only the inseparable nature of these two qualifying each other combined in one place is the thesis. This rules out the ancient masters of hetuvidyā who asserted that only the subject is the thesis, because the predicate establishes the subject; or who asserted that only the predicate is the thesis, because the predicate upon the subject is what is disputed; or who held that the subject and predicate together are the thesis while their qualification is not the thesis, because the combination of the two constitutes the thesis. All these [components] are already mutually accepted beforehand; how could they constitute the thesis? For if one proves what is already established, there is no result. One must solely take their mutually qualified, inseparable nature—where one accepts it and the other does not—as the essence of the thesis.