因明入正理論疏 1.93

1.93

樂為所成立性，簡能成立者。能成立法者，謂則因、喻。因、喻成立自義亦應名宗，但名能立，非所成立，舊已成故不得名宗。今顯樂為新所成立，方是其宗，雖樂因、喻，非新成立，立便相符，故不名宗。既爾，似宗、似因、似喻應得名宗，先所未成，應更成故。當時所競方是真宗，因喻時申，故須簡別。似宗、因、喻雖更可成，非是所樂，第二時所可成故，非今所諍，疎故非宗。此上一解依《理門論》，唯簡於真，不簡於似。

"Its nature being intended as that which is to be established" eliminates that which establishes. That which establishes dharmas refers to the reason and the example. If the reason and example, in establishing their own meaning, were also called theses, they would merely be named the means of proof, not that which is to be established; being already established previously, they cannot be called theses. Now, showing that only what is newly intended to be established constitutes the thesis: although one intends the reason and example, they are not newly established; to posit them would be to agree with the opponent, hence they are not called theses. If that is so, should pseudo-theses, pseudo-reasons, and pseudo-examples be called theses, since not having been established previously, they ought to be further established? What is being contested at that very moment is the genuine thesis; since reason and example are presented at that time, they must be excluded. Although pseudo-theses, reasons, and examples could be further established, they are not what is currently intended, as they would only be established at a subsequent time; not being what is presently disputed, being remote, they are not the thesis. This first explanation follows the Nyāyamukha: it eliminates only the genuine [reasons and examples], not the pseudo-forms.