因明入正理論疏 2.121

2.121

述曰：初四句顯宗，次一句因體，後一句結過。西方濕熱，地多叢草，既足虻蚊，又豐煙霧，時有遠望屢生疑惑，為塵為烟？為蚊為霧？由此論文於霧等性。火有二種：一者性火，如草木中極微火大。二者事火，炎熱騰焰，煙照飛烟。其前性火觸處可有，立乃相符。其後事火有處非有，故今建立。凡諸事火，要有地火為質為依，風飄動焰，水加流潤，故名成大種和合火有。有彼火故，如有多人遠共望彼，或霧或塵、或烟或蚊皆共疑惑。其間或立有事火宗云：彼所見烟等下似有事火。而有說者，謂立彼因。《理門論》云「以現烟故，喻如厨等。」此因不但立者自惑不能成宗，亦令敵者於所成宗疑惑不定。夫立共因，成宗不共，欲令敵、證決定智生，於宗共有疑。故言於霧等性起疑惑時，更說疑因，不成宗果，決智不起，是故為過。

Commentary: The first four clauses indicate the pratijñā, the next clause the substance of the hetu, and the final clause concludes the fault. The Western Region is hot and humid, the land has many dense grasses; not only are gnats and mosquitoes plentiful, but smoke and mist are also abundant. Often, when looking from afar, doubts repeatedly arise: is it dust or smoke? Is it mosquitoes or mist? Hence the text says: "regarding the nature of mist and the like." Fire is of two kinds: first, essential fire, like the fire element existing as subtle atoms within grasses and trees; second, manifest fire, which is scorching and blazes with flames, accompanied by glowing smoke and flying soot. The former, essential fire, is present wherever there is tangible contact; to prove it would merely be proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). The latter, manifest fire, is present in some places and absent in others; hence it is what is established here. Every manifest fire must have earth and fire as its substance and support, wind to stir its flames, and water to supply moisture; therefore it is called "fire composed of an aggregation of great elements exists." Because that fire exists, when several people look at it together from afar, they are all mutually doubtful whether it is mist or dust, smoke or mosquitoes. Thereupon, one of them might advance the pratijñā of the existence of manifest fire, saying: "Beneath what is seen as smoke and so forth, there seems to be manifest fire." "If a statement is made" means establishing that reason. The Nyāyamukha states: "Because smoke is perceived, as in a kitchen and so forth." This reason not only fails to prove the pratijñā because the proponent himself is in doubt, but it also causes the opponent to be doubtful and indecisive regarding the pratijñā to be established. Now, when establishing a common reason to prove an uncommon pratijñā, one aims to give rise to determinate cognition in the opponent and the judges; [yet here] they share doubt regarding the pratijñā. Therefore it says: "when doubt arises regarding the nature of mist and the like, if one further states a doubtful reason," it cannot establish the result, which is the pratijñā, and determinate cognition does not arise; therefore it is a fault.