因明入正理論疏 2.122

2.122

此有六句：一、兩俱全分猶預，如論所說，於因、宗內雖皆生疑，成宗不決，故但因過。二、兩俱一分猶預，如有立、敵俱於近處見烟決定，遠處霧等疑惑不定，便立量云：彼近遠處定有事火，以有烟等故，如厨等中。近處一分見烟決定，遠處一分俱說疑故。三、隨他一全分猶預，如有立者從遠處來見定是烟，敵者疑惑，立初全分比量。四、隨自一全分猶預，如有敵者從遠處來見烟決定，立者疑惑，立初全分比量。五、隨他一一分猶預，如有立者於近遠處見烟決定，敵者近定，遠處有疑，立第二一分比量。六、隨自一一分猶預，如有敵者俱於近遠見烟決定，立者近定，遠處有疑，立第二一分比量。能別、所別、總別猶預各有六句，謂兩俱全分及一分，隨他及自各全、一分，合成十八句。如於角決定，於牛有疑；或於火決定，於烟有疑；或二俱疑故。別於三事，並生猶預，不過六因，故唯說六句。

This has six alternatives: First, doubtful for both parties across the whole (ubhaya-saṃdigdha in all parts): as stated in the treatise, although doubt arises regarding both the hetu and the pratijñā, because it cannot decisively establish the pratijñā, it is only a fault of the hetu. Second, doubtful for both parties in part (ubhaya-saṃdigdha in one part): for instance, when proponent and opponent both ascertain the sight of smoke nearby, but are doubtful and uncertain about the mist and so forth in the distance, and then formulate the inference: "In that near and distant place, manifest fire definitely exists, because there is smoke and the like, just as in a kitchen and the like." In the near place, one part is ascertained as seeing smoke, while in the distant place, one part is spoken of as doubted by both. Third, doubtful for the other alone across the whole (para-saṃdigdha in all parts): for instance, when a proponent coming from a distant place ascertains that it is smoke, but the opponent is in doubt, and [the proponent] formulates the first whole inference. Fourth, doubtful for oneself alone across the whole (sva-saṃdigdha in all parts): for instance, when an opponent coming from a distant place ascertains the smoke, but the proponent is in doubt, and formulates the first whole inference. Fifth, doubtful for the other alone in part: for instance, when a proponent ascertains the smoke both near and far, but the opponent is certain about the near and in doubt about the far, and [the proponent] formulates the second partial inference. Sixth, doubtful for oneself alone in part: for instance, when an opponent ascertains the smoke both near and far, but the proponent is certain about the near and in doubt about the far, and formulates the second partial inference. Doubt regarding the predicate (sādhya-dharma / viśeṣaṇa), the subject (pakṣin / viśeṣya), and both combined (saṃghāta) each has six alternatives: namely, for both across the whole and in part, and for the other and oneself across the whole and in part, totaling eighteen alternatives. For example, being certain about the horn but doubtful about the cow; or being certain about the fire but doubtful about the smoke; or being doubtful about both. Thus, doubt arises separately regarding these three matters, but none goes beyond the six reasons, which is why only six alternatives are stated.