因明入正理論疏 2.123

2.123

問：「此宗、此因俱有疑惑，因名猶預，宗何過耶？」答：「若所別定，即是能別猶預不成。若能別定，即是所別猶預不成。互生疑故，互決定故。若兩俱疑，即是兩俱俱不極成；若隨一疑，即是隨一俱不極成。前似宗中，但說所依無體俱不極成，義准亦有有體猶預俱不極成，不生自他決定智故。或此亦是自語相違，言似烟等，云何可言定有事火？定有事火，云何可言彼似烟等？或此亦是相符極成，他本生疑，符彼疑故。獨法、合法，兩俱、隨一、全分、一分，言相違故，順符彼故。」

Question: "Both this pratijñā and this reason involve doubt; why is the reason called 'doubtful' (saṃdigdha), while the pratijñā has no fault?" Answer: "If the subject (viśeṣya) is determinate, it is the predicate being doubtful and unestablished (viśeṣaṇa-saṃdigdhāsiddha). If the predicate (viśeṣaṇa) is determinate, it is the subject being doubtful and unestablished (viśeṣya-saṃdigdhāsiddha). This is because they mutually generate doubt and are mutually determinate. If both are doubted, it is unestablished for both in both [terms] (ubhaya-saṃdigdhobhayāsiddha); if one is doubted, it is unestablished for one in both [terms]. In the preceding section on fallacious pratijñās, it only spoke of both [terms] being unestablished due to the substratum lacking reality (āśrayāsiddha); by implication, there is also the fault where an existent entity is doubtful and unestablished in both [terms], because it does not produce determinate cognition in oneself or the other. Alternatively, this is also contradiction with one's own words (svavacana-viruddha): saying 'it resembles smoke and the like,' how can one say that manifest fire definitely exists? If manifest fire definitely exists, how can one say that it resembles smoke and the like? Or again, this is proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana): the other originally gave rise to doubt, and this accords with their doubt. Whether taken as isolated terms or as a composite proposition, whether for both or for one party, across the whole or in part, the words contradict each other, or they merely agree with the other's doubt."