因明入正理論疏 2.190

2.190

問：「此諸不定有分有全耶？」答：「無理窮盡故。如前所說五十四種不定之中，自、共比中諸自不定及共不定，是不定過。自、共有過，非真能立，何名破他？他比量中，若他不定及共不定，亦不定過。立他違他及共有過，既非能破，何成能立？自比量中諸他不定，他比量中諸自不定，皆非過攝。立義本欲違害他故，諸立自非他，他不定非，立他非自，自不定非，隨其所應皆如理悉。此論且依兩俱不定過說，立、敵俱許因於二喻，共、不共等說為過故。二喻雖共，若因隨一，因疑之喻同喻無體，隨應即是隨一、猶預、所依不成、不定過攝。五十四種諸不定過既各有四，即成二百一十六種不定過攝。若四不成，有體、無體、全分、一分、自他共許，合二十七，皆准前說。其二十七過，五十四諸不定過，一一皆有，總成一千四百五十八種諸不定過。《理門既》云四種不成，於其同品有非有等亦隨所應，當如是說。故知道理決定如是。然《理門論》攝此頌云：『若法是不共，共決定相違，遍一切法彼，皆是疑因性。』共定攝四不定之因，同、異品中隨其所應，若全、若分皆共有故。不共、相違各唯攝一。此六不定遍一切宗，於彼諸法皆是疑因，不獨於上所說宗中名不定也。」

Question: 'Are these inconclusive [hetus] partial (ekadeśa) or total (sarva)?' Answer: 'Because the principles are inexhaustible. As in the aforementioned fifty-four kinds of inconclusive [hetus], among svānumāna and ubhayānumāna, all svato-anaikāntika and ubhaya-anaikāntika are inconclusive faults. Having a fault for oneself or for both, they are not genuine sādhanas; how could they be refutations of the other? In a parānumāna, if there is parato-anaikāntika or ubhaya-anaikāntika, these are also inconclusive faults. Establishing for the other what contradicts the other and having a common fault, since they are not genuine refutations, how could they become genuine sādhanas? In a svānumāna, parato-anaikāntika faults, and in a parānumāna, svato-anaikāntika faults, are not subsumed under faults. The purpose of establishing a thesis is fundamentally to defeat the other; all establishing for oneself is not for the other, so the other's being inconclusive is not [a fault]; establishing for the other is not for oneself, so one's own being inconclusive is not [a fault]. Understand each of them in accordance with the principle as appropriate. This śāstra merely explains based on the ubhaya-anaikāntika fault, because the hetu is stated to be a fault with respect to both dṛṣṭāntas as common, uncommon, and so forth, as accepted by both proponent and opponent. Although the two dṛṣṭāntas are common, if the hetu is anyatara[-asiddha], or a dṛṣṭānta of a doubtful hetu where the sapakṣa-dṛṣṭānta lacks an entity, as appropriate, it is subsumed under anyatarāsiddha, saṃdigdhāsiddha, āśrayāsiddha, or anaikāntika faults. Since the fifty-four kinds of inconclusive faults each have four, they constitute two hundred and sixteen kinds of inconclusive faults. If the four asiddhas, having entities, lacking entities, total, partial, accepted by self, other, or both, combine into twenty-seven, all should be treated by analogy with what was said before. These twenty-seven faults exist in each and every one of the fifty-four inconclusive faults, forming a total of one thousand four hundred and fifty-eight kinds of inconclusive faults. The Nyāyamukha states: "The four kinds of asiddha, their presence and absence in the sapakṣa, and so forth, should also be spoken of in this manner as appropriate." Therefore, we know that the principle is definitely like this. However, the Nyāyamukha summarizes this in a verse, saying: "If a dharma is uncommon, / Common, or viruddha-avyabhicārin, / Pervading all dharmas, those / Are all of the nature of doubtful causes." "Common" definitely subsumes four inconclusive hetus, because in the sapakṣa and vipakṣa, as appropriate, whether totally or partially, they are all commonly present. "Uncommon" and "viruddha[-avyabhicārin]" each subsume only one. These six inconclusive [hetus] pervade all pratijñās; with respect to all those dharmas, they are causes of doubt, and are not termed inconclusive only in the pratijñās discussed above.'