因明入正理論疏 2.189

2.189

問：「相違決定違法自相亦有法差別，有法自相有法差別耶？」答：「有。若不改前因，違宗四種，是後相違過。若改前因，違宗四種，皆相違決定。若共比量，如勝論師對聲論立聲無常已，聲論若言『聲應非聲，許德攝故，如色香等。』而為有法自相相違決定者，決定彼違自宗。若云：『無常之聲應非無常之聲，所作性故，如瓶。』以為有法自相相違決定，此非過攝。雙牒法、有法為法宗，於諸過中無此相故。其無常言，根本所諍法之自相，非有法上意許差別，不可說為有法差別，是故此量非過所攝。若許為過，即一切量無真量者，皆有此故。但是過類分別相似，由是因明總無此過。如勝論師立自比量云：『所說有性非四大種，許除四大體非無故，如色、聲等。』以除四大及有性外並為同喻，無自不定。他便作有法自相相違難言：『汝有性非有性，非四大故，如色、聲等。』是名有法自相相違決定。即以此因，復作有法差別相違云：『汝之有性應不能作，有有緣性許非四大故，如色、聲等。』彼意說：有能作有性之有能緣性故作。有有緣性、非有有緣性，是意所許有性有法之差別也。其非四大種，是法自相，能有四大非四大種，不能有四大非四大種，是法差別。復作法差別相違決定云：『汝之有性非能有四大非四大種，許非無故，如色、聲等。』彼說色等雖非四大種，不能有四大。然說有性，能有四大，非四大種，故成法差別相違決定。今論但說言之所陳，違宗能別本所諍因，名相違決定。其有法自相雖言所陳，非宗相返。本所諍法，二種差別意之所許，雖意所諍，非言所陳。此三決定相違之因皆略不說，以此准前比量相違亦有四種，論中亦但說法自相比量。」

Question: 'Does viruddha-avyabhicārin contradict the dharma-svarūpa, and also the dharma-viśeṣa, the dharmi-svarūpa, and the dharmi-viśeṣa?' Answer: 'It does. If one does not alter the previous hetu and contradicts the four kinds of pratijñā, that is the subsequent viruddha fault. If one alters the previous hetu and contradicts the four kinds of pratijñā, they are all viruddha-avyabhicārin. In the case of an ubhayānumāna, for instance, when a Vaiśeṣika has established sound to be impermanent against a Śabdavādin, if the Śabdavādin were to say: "Sound should be non-sound; because it is accepted to be subsumed under quality (guṇa); like color, fragrance, and so forth," treating this as a viruddha-avyabhicārin of the dharmi-svarūpa, that definitely contradicts his own school. If he were to say: "Impermanent sound should be non-impermanent-sound; because of being produced; like a pot," treating this as a viruddha-avyabhicārin of the dharmi-svarūpa, this is not subsumed under the fault. Combining both dharma and dharmin as the pratijñā-dharma does not have such a characteristic among the faults. The phrase "impermanent" is the svarūpa of the dharma fundamentally in dispute, not an intended viśeṣa on the dharmin, so it cannot be called a dharmi-viśeṣa; therefore, this anumāna is not subsumed under the fault. If one accepted it as a fault, then among all anumānas there would be no genuine anumāna, for all would have this. It is merely a sophistical objection (jāti) of similar distinction; hence in hetuvidyā this fault does not exist at all. For example, when a Vaiśeṣika establishes a svānumāna, saying: "The stated existence-nature (bhāva) is not the four great elements; because it is accepted that, apart from the four great elements, its essence is not non-existent; like color, sound, and so forth"—taking everything other than the four great elements and the existence-nature as the sapakṣa-dṛṣṭānta, there is no svato-anaikāntika. The opponent then raises a dharmi-svarūpa-viruddha objection, saying: "Your existence-nature is not existence-nature; because of not being the four great elements; like color, sound, and so forth." This is called a viruddha-avyabhicārin of the dharmi-svarūpa. Using this same hetu, he further constructs a dharmi-viśeṣa-viruddha [objection], saying: "Your existence-nature should be incapable of acting; because of having a cognitive-object-nature (ālambana-tva) that has existence and being accepted as not being the four great elements; like color, sound, and so forth." His meaning is: because it has the cognitive-object-nature that can produce existence-nature, it acts. Having a cognitive-object-nature and not having a cognitive-object-nature is the intended viśeṣa of the dharmin 'existence-nature'. That it is not the four great elements is the dharma-svarūpa; being able to possess the four great elements and not being the four great elements, or being unable to possess the four great elements and not being the four great elements, is the dharma-viśeṣa. He further constructs a dharma-viśeṣa-viruddha-avyabhicārin, saying: "Your existence-nature is not capable of possessing the four great elements and not being the four great elements; because it is accepted as not non-existent; like color, sound, and so forth." He says that although color and so forth are not the four great elements, they cannot possess the four great elements. Yet he states that the existence-nature can possess the four great elements and is not the four great elements; therefore, it forms a dharma-viśeṣa-viruddha-avyabhicārin. The present śāstra only states that what is expressed in words and contradicts the predicate of the pratijñā fundamentally in dispute is called viruddha-avyabhicārin. Although the dharmi-svarūpa is expressed in words, it is not the opposite of the pratijñā. The two kinds of viśeṣa of the dharma fundamentally in dispute are what is intended: although disputed in intent, they are not expressed in words. These three viruddha-avyabhicārin hetus are all omitted without being stated. By analogy with this, the aforementioned anumāna-bādhita also has four kinds, and the śāstra only stated the anumāna[-bādhita] of the dharma-svarūpa.'