因明入正理論疏 2.65

2.65

亦有全分、一分四句。全分四句者，有違自比非他，如勝論師立「和合句義非實有體」，彼宗自許比知有故。有違他比非自，如小乘者對大乘立「第七末那定非實有」，大乘除佛，比量知有，如眼根等為六依故。有違共比，即論所陳，彼此比知瓶無常故。一分四句者，有違自一分比非他，如勝論師對佛法云：「我六句義皆非實有。」彼說前五現量所得，和合一句比量知故。有違他一分比非自，如大乘者對一切有說「十色處定非實有」，彼說五根除佛已外皆比得故。有違共一分比，如明論師對佛法者立「一切聲是常」，彼宗自說明論聲常可成宗義，除此餘聲，彼此皆說體是無常，故成一分，或是他全自宗一分。

There are also four alternatives each for the total and partial. In the four total alternatives: There is contradiction of one's own inference and not the other's: as when a Vaiśeṣika posits, "The category of inherence (samavāya) is not a real substantial entity," because their own school admits that its existence is known by inference. There is contradiction of the other's inference and not one's own: as when a Hīnayāna adherent posits against Mahāyāna, "The seventh, manas, is definitely not a real entity," while Mahāyāna, except for the Buddha, knows its existence by inference, as in the visual faculty and the like serving as the basis for the six [consciousnesses]. There is contradiction of common inference: which is what is presented in the treatise, because both parties inferentially know that jars are impermanent. In the four partial alternatives: There is contradiction of one's own partial inference and not the other's: as when a Vaiśeṣika says against Buddhism, "My six categories are all not real entities." They claim that the first five are apprehended by perception, while the single category of inherence is known by inference. There is contradiction of the other's partial inference and not one's own: as when a Mahāyāna proponent says against the Sarvāstivāda, "The ten material sense-bases (āyatana) are definitely not real entities," because they claim that the five sense faculties, except in the case of the Buddha, are all apprehended by inference. There is contradiction of common partial inference: as when an adherent of the Vedas posits against a Buddhist, "All sounds are permanent." Their own school explains that Vedic sound being permanent can establish their thesis, while aside from this, both parties maintain that the substance of all other sounds is impermanent; hence it becomes partial, or it is a total contradiction of the other and a partial one for one's own school.