因明入正理論疏 2.66

2.66

其違比量，同前現量，全及一分皆有俱不違，易故不述，下皆准知。違自及共可此過收，違他非過。若俱不違，或非此過，有相符失，立量本欲違他比故。論中指法，依共全違，餘准知爾。此中但明宗法自相比量相違，准因亦有法之差別，有法自相、有法差別比量相違。因違宗、喻既有四失，宗違因、喻理亦有四，恐文繁憒所以略之，至相違決定，廣當顯示。

Its contradiction with inference, like the perception above, has cases of not contradicting both in the total and the partial; because it is easy, it is not set forth, and the rest should all be understood accordingly. Contradicting oneself and contradicting both can be subsumed under this fallacy; contradicting the other is not a fallacy. If neither is contradicted, it may not be this fallacy, but involves the fault of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana), since establishing a formal inference fundamentally seeks to contradict the other's inference. The pointing to the fallacy in the treatise is based on a total contradiction of both, and the rest should be understood by analogy. Here we have only clarified the contradiction with inference regarding the intrinsic nature of the property of the subject (dharmin). By analogy with the reason, there are also the contradiction with inference regarding the qualification of the property (dharma-viśeṣa), the intrinsic nature of the subject (dharmin-svabhāva), and the qualification of the subject (dharmin-viśeṣa). Just as the reason contradicting the proposition and the example has four faults, the proposition contradicting the reason and the example logically also has four. Fearing that the text would be cumbersome and confused, they are omitted here; when we reach the inconclusive due to contradiction (viruddhāvyabhicārin), they will be extensively demonstrated.