因明入正理論疏 2.94

2.94

此中全分及一分，各有五種四句。初四句者，有自能別不成他所別，如數論者對勝論云：「自性體是和合因緣」，所別他非有，能別自不成。有他能別不成自所別，如數論師對勝論云：「和合因緣體是自性」，所別自非有，能別他不成。有俱能別不成自所別，如數論師對大乘立「阿賴耶識是和合因緣」，所別自不成，能別俱非有。有俱能別不成他所別，如大乘師對數論立「藏識體是和合因緣」，所別他不成，能別俱非有。第二四句者，有自能別不成俱所別，如數論師對勝論立「藏識體是和合因緣」。有他能別不成俱所別，如勝論對數論立「藏識體是和合因緣」。有俱能別不成俱所別，如薩婆多對大乘立「我是和合因緣」。有俱能別不成俱非所別，唯此一句，是前偏句能別不成中全俱非句是，前之七句皆是此過。

Here, for the whole and the partial, there are five kinds of four alternatives each. Among the first four alternatives: There is where the predicate is unestablished for oneself and the subject for the other, such as when a Sāṃkhya says to a Vaiśeṣika: 'The nature of prakṛti is the inherence cause,' where the subject does not exist for the other and the predicate is unestablished for oneself. There is where the predicate is unestablished for the other and the subject for oneself, such as when a Sāṃkhya master says to a Vaiśeṣika: 'The substance of the inherence cause is prakṛti,' where the subject does not exist for oneself and the predicate is unestablished for the other. There is where the predicate is unestablished for both and the subject for oneself, such as when a Sāṃkhya master establishes against Mahāyāna: 'The ālayavijñāna is the inherence cause,' where the subject is unestablished for oneself and the predicate is absent for both. There is where the predicate is unestablished for both and the subject for the other, such as when a Mahāyāna master establishes against Sāṃkhya: 'The substance of the ālayavijñāna is the inherence cause,' where the subject is unestablished for the other and the predicate is absent for both. Among the second four alternatives: There is where the predicate is unestablished for oneself and the subject for both, such as when a Sāṃkhya master establishes against a Vaiśeṣika: 'The substance of the ālayavijñāna is the inherence cause.' There is where the predicate is unestablished for the other and the subject for both, such as when a Vaiśeṣika establishes against a Sāṃkhya: 'The substance of the ālayavijñāna is the inherence cause.' There is where the predicate is unestablished for both and the subject for both, such as when a Sarvāstivādin establishes against Mahāyāna: 'The self is the inherence cause.' There is where the predicate is unestablished for both and the subject is not [unestablished] for both; only this alternative is the alternative of wholly unestablished for both among the one-sided predicate-unestablished cases above; the preceding seven alternatives are all this flaw.