因明入正理論疏 2.99

2.99

述曰：為二科中，今似有二：上三明闕依，此一明義順。若依三科，此顯虛功。對敵申宗，本諍同異，依宗兩順，枉費成功。凡對所敵立聲所聞，必相符故，論不標主。此有全分、一分四句。全四句者，有符他非自，如數論師對勝論者立「業滅壞」。有符自非他，如勝論師對數論立「業滅壞」。有俱相符，如「聲是所聞」。有俱不符，如數論師對佛法立「業滅壞」。一分四句者，有符他一分非自，如薩婆多對數論立「我、意實有」，說意為實兩不相符，立我實有符他一分。有符自一分非他，如薩婆多對大乘立「我及極微二俱實有」，我體實有兩不相符，極微有實符自一分。有俱符一分，如薩婆多對勝論立「自性及聲二俱無常」，自性無常兩不相符，聲是無常兩符一分。有俱不符一分，如薩婆多對大乘立「我體實有」。此諸句中，符他、兩符、全分、一分皆是此過。符自全分，或是真宗。并俱不符，或是所別、能別不成。俱不極成、違教等過，皆如理思。論中但依兩俱全分相符極成以示其法，餘令准悉。

The commentary states: In the division into two sections, here there appear to be two: the preceding three elucidate the deficiency of the support; this one elucidates the agreement in meaning. If based on the three-section division, this reveals wasted effort. Stating a thesis confronting an opponent is originally to dispute identity and difference; if it accords with both sides based on the thesis, one vainly squanders effort. Whenever one posits that sound is audible confronting an opponent, it is bound to agree, hence the treatise does not designate a proponent. Here there are four clauses of total and partial. In the four total clauses: there is agreeing with the other but not with oneself, as when a Sāṃkhya master posits for a Vaiśeṣika that “action is destroyed.” There is agreeing with oneself but not with the other, as when a Vaiśeṣika posits for a Sāṃkhya that “action is destroyed.” There is mutual agreement, as in “sound is audible.” There is mutual disagreement, as when a Sāṃkhya posits for the Buddhist that “action is destroyed.” In the four partial clauses: there is agreeing with the other in one part but not with oneself, as when a Sarvāstivādin posits for a Sāṃkhya that “the self and the mind (manas) are substantially existent”; asserting that the mind is substantial agrees with neither, while positing that the self is substantially existent agrees with a part of the other. There is agreeing with oneself in one part but not with the other, as when a Sarvāstivādin posits for a Mahāyānist that “the self and atoms are both substantially existent”; the self's substance being substantially existent agrees with neither, while atoms having substantial existence agrees with a part of oneself. There is both agreeing in one part, as when a Sarvāstivādin posits for a Vaiśeṣika that “the primordial nature (prakṛti) and sound are both impermanent”; the impermanence of the primordial nature agrees with neither, while sound being impermanent agrees with both in one part. There is both not agreeing in one part, as when a Sarvāstivādin posits for a Mahāyānist that “the substance of the self is substantially existent.” Among these clauses, agreeing with the other, agreeing with both, total, and partial are all this fallacy. Agreeing with oneself totally may perhaps be a true thesis. And both not agreeing may perhaps be the unestablishedness of the qualificand or qualifier. Fallacies such as both being unestablished or contradiction with one's own doctrine should all be reflected upon in accordance with logic. In the treatise, it merely relies on that which is totally already established by consensus for both to illustrate the method, leaving the rest to be understood by analogy.