因明入正理論疏 2.100

2.100

問：「此九過中頗有現量相違，亦比量相違耶？乃至有現量相違亦相符極成耶？如是現量一箇有八四句，如是比量一箇有七，乃至俱不極成一箇有一，合三十六一箇四句。」答：「此九過中有自、他、共、不共，全分、一分，由是綺互各為四句。有是違現非比，如『聲非所聞』。有違比非現，如說『瓶常』。有違現亦比，如小乘師對大乘立『觸處諸色非定心得』。有違現非自教，如違他現非違自教。有違自教非現，如勝論師立『聲是常』。有違現亦自教，諸違自現，必違自教故。有違現非世間，如違自現非非學世間。有違世間非現，如說『懷兔非月』。有違現亦世間，如說『聲非所聞』。有違現非自語，如違他現。有違自語非現，如說『一切言皆是妄』。有違現亦自語，如違自現必違自教、自語。有違現非能別不成，如『聲非所聞』。有能別不成非違現，如對數論立『聲滅壞』。有違現亦能別不成，如唯違自現及他能別不成，若違共現，能別必成故。有違現非所別不成，如『聲非所聞』。有所別不成非違現，如對佛弟子說『我是思』。有違現亦所別不成，如違自現亦所別不成，若違共現，所別必成故。有違現非俱不成，如『聲非所聞』。有俱不成非違現，如對佛法說『我以為和合因緣』。有違現亦俱不成，如違自現他俱不成，若違共現，他俱必成故。有違現非相符，如『聲非所聞』。有相符非違現，如『聲所聞』。有違現亦相符，如違自現有符他義，如勝論立『覺樂等德非我境界』。若違共現，必非相符故。如是乃至有俱不成非相符，如對佛法說『我以為和合因緣』。有相符非俱不成，如『聲是所聞』。有俱不成亦相符，謂自兩俱不成亦相符他故。如是合有三十六四句。」

Question: “Among these nine fallacies, can there be contradiction with perception (pratyakṣa-viruddha) that is also contradiction with inference (anumāna-viruddha)? Up to: being contradiction with perception that is also already established by consensus (siddhasādhana)? Thus, for the single fallacy of perception, there are eight tetralemmas; thus, for the single fallacy of inference, there are seven; up to unestablished for both having one single tetralemma, making a total of thirty-six single tetralemmas.” Answer: “Among these nine fallacies, there are oneself, the other, common, uncommon, total, and partial; through their combinations each forms a tetralemma. There is that which contradicts perception but not inference, such as ‘Sound is not audible.’ There is that which contradicts inference but not perception, as when saying ‘A pot is permanent.’ There is that which contradicts perception and also inference, as when a Hīnayāna master posits for a Mahāyānist that ‘All matter belonging to the sphere of tangible objects cannot be attained by a concentrated mind.’ There is that which contradicts perception but not one's own doctrine, as when contradicting the other's perception is not contradicting one's own doctrine. There is that which contradicts one's own doctrine but not perception, as when a Vaiśeṣika posits that ‘Sound is permanent.’ There is that which contradicts perception and also one's own doctrine, because all that contradicts one's own perception must contradict one's own doctrine. There is that which contradicts perception but not worldly consensus, as when contradicting one's own perception is not contradicting the unlearned world. There is that which contradicts worldly consensus but not perception, as when saying ‘The hare-bearer is not the moon.’ There is that which contradicts perception and also worldly consensus, as when saying ‘Sound is not audible.’ There is that which contradicts perception but not one's own words, as when contradicting the other's perception. There is that which contradicts one's own words but not perception, as when saying ‘All speech is false.’ There is that which contradicts perception and also one's own words, because contradicting one's own perception must contradict one's own doctrine and one's own words. There is that which contradicts perception but is not unestablishedness of the qualifier, such as ‘Sound is not audible.’ There is unestablishedness of the qualifier that does not contradict perception, as when positing for a Sāṃkhya that ‘Sound is destroyed.’ There is that which contradicts perception and is also unestablishedness of the qualifier, such as contradicting only one's own perception and the qualifier being unestablished for the other; for if it contradicts common perception, the qualifier must be established. There is that which contradicts perception but is not unestablishedness of the qualificand, such as ‘Sound is not audible.’ There is unestablishedness of the qualificand that does not contradict perception, as when saying to a Buddhist disciple, ‘The self is thought.’ There is that which contradicts perception and is also unestablishedness of the qualificand, such as contradicting one's own perception while the qualificand is also unestablished; for if it contradicts common perception, the qualificand must be established. There is that which contradicts perception but is not unestablishedness of both, such as ‘Sound is not audible.’ There is unestablishedness of both that does not contradict perception, as when saying to a Buddhist that ‘The self is the cause-and-condition of combination.’ There is that which contradicts perception and is also unestablishedness of both, such as contradicting one's own perception while both are unestablished for the other; for if it contradicts common perception, both must be established for the other. There is that which contradicts perception but is not already established by consensus, such as ‘Sound is not audible.’ There is that which is already established by consensus but does not contradict perception, such as ‘Sound is audible.’ There is that which contradicts perception and is also already established by consensus, as when contradicting one's own perception contains an assertion that agrees with the other, like a Vaiśeṣika positing that ‘Attributes such as cognition and pleasure are not the domain of the self’; for if it contradicts common perception, it definitely cannot be already established by consensus. In this way, up to: there is that which is unestablishedness of both but not already established by consensus, as when saying to a Buddhist that ‘The self is the cause-and-condition of combination.’ There is that which is already established by consensus but not unestablishedness of both, such as ‘Sound is audible.’ There is that which is unestablishedness of both and also already established by consensus, meaning that both are unestablished for oneself while also agreeing with the other. In this way, there are altogether thirty-six tetralemmas.”