因明入正理論疏 3.159

3.159

又傳立云：外道立宗，現、比量外有至教等量，云非比，極成現所有量，非現量攝。極成現量所不攝，量所攝故，猶如比量。言非比量，簡一分相符，以佛法許比量是現所有，非現量攝故。復欲取為同喻，即顯因具足三相故。言極成現量，簡不極成，以佛法許至教亦是現量攝故。言所有者，又簡自語相違，若直言極成現量非現量攝，既言極成現量，復非現量攝，故有相違。又若不言所有，不詮得至教量是現所有，然狹帶說，故云所有量。因中言極成，簡隨一過，以大乘至教量是現量攝故。言量所攝，簡不定過，為如比量，極成現量所不攝故，至教離現別有耶？為如非量所不攝故，非別有體耶？又量所攝，簡非量相符，以大乘許非量現所有量，非現量攝。又成立離比量外更有喻等量者，以大乘許譬喻量等非現量攝，故立量云：非現，極成比所有量，非比量攝。極成比量所不攝，量所攝故，如現量。簡過如前。

Furthermore, it is traditionally said: Non-Buddhists establish the thesis that outside of pratyakṣa and anumāna there are pramāṇas such as authoritative testimony (āptāgama). The [formal] argument states: What is not anumāna and is all of universally recognized pratyakṣa's pramāṇa is not subsumed under pratyakṣa; because it is subsumed under pramāṇa while not being subsumed under universally recognized pratyakṣa; like anumāna. The phrase "what is not anumāna" excludes partial agreement (ekadeśa-siddhasādhana), because the Buddhadharma admits that anumāna is possessed by the present [sensory/valid] yet is not subsumed under pratyakṣa. Further, wishing to take it as a sapakṣa dṛṣṭānta directly reveals that the hetu is endowed with the three characteristics (trairūpya). The phrase "universally recognized pratyakṣa" excludes what is not universally recognized, because the Buddhadharma admits that authoritative testimony is also subsumed under pratyakṣa. The word "all of [...]'s" further excludes self-contradiction: if one were to say straightforwardly that "universally recognized pratyakṣa is not subsumed under pratyakṣa," having said "universally recognized pratyakṣa" and then saying it "is not subsumed under pratyakṣa," there would be a contradiction. Moreover, if one does not say "all of [...]'s," it would not express that the pramāṇa of authoritative testimony is possessed by pratyakṣa; thus, speaking with narrow qualifications, it is called "all of [...]'s pramāṇa." In the hetu, the word "universally recognized" excludes the fallacy of being unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha), because in the Mahāyāna, the pramāṇa of authoritative testimony is subsumed under pratyakṣa. The phrase "subsumed under pramāṇa" excludes the fallacy of being inconclusive (anaikāntika): Is it like anumāna—because it is not subsumed under universally recognized pratyakṣa, does authoritative testimony exist apart from pratyakṣa? Or is it like what is not subsumed under apramāṇa, such that it has no separate ontological status? Furthermore, "subsumed under pramāṇa" excludes agreement with apramāṇa, because the Mahāyāna admits that apramāṇa is a pramāṇa possessed by pratyakṣa and is not subsumed under pratyakṣa. Again, to establish that there are pramāṇas such as comparison (upamāna) apart from anumāna, since the Mahāyāna admits that the pramāṇa of comparison and so forth are not subsumed under pratyakṣa, they establish the argument: What is not pratyakṣa and is all of universally recognized anumāna's pramāṇa is not subsumed under anumāna; because it is subsumed under pramāṇa while not being subsumed under universally recognized anumāna; like pratyakṣa. The exclusions of fallacies are as before.