因明入正理論疏 3.160

3.160

陳那菩薩以此量無過，但與立量為決定相違因量，立現、比量外無至教。量云：非現，極成比所有一分不極成量，是現量攝，比量所不攝，量所攝故，如現量。又成立離比量外無義准等，量云：非比，極成現所有一分不極成量，是比量攝，現量所不攝，量所攝故，如比量。簡過如前。是故陳那依此二相，唯立二量。其二相體，今略明之：一切諸法各附已體，即名自相，不同經中所說自相。以分別心假立一法，貫通諸法，如縷貫花，此名共相，亦與經中共相體別。有說自相如火熱相等，名為自相，若為名言所詮顯者，此名共相。此釋全非，違《佛地論》。若以如火熱等方名自相，定心緣火，不得彼熱，應名緣共，及定心緣教所詮理亦為言顯，亦應名共相。若爾，定心應名比量，不緣自相故。

Because this argument is free from fault, Bodhisattva Diṅnāga merely established a counter-balancing inference (satpratipakṣa / viruddhāvyabhicārin) against it, establishing that outside of pratyakṣa and anumāna there is no authoritative testimony. The argument states: What is not pratyakṣa and is a non-universally-recognized fraction of all of universally recognized anumāna's pramāṇa is subsumed under pratyakṣa; because it is subsumed under pramāṇa while not being subsumed under anumāna; like pratyakṣa. Furthermore, to establish that there is no presumption (arthāpatti) or the like apart from anumāna, the argument states: What is not anumāna and is a non-universally-recognized fraction of all of universally recognized pratyakṣa's pramāṇa is subsumed under anumāna; because it is subsumed under pramāṇa while not being subsumed under pratyakṣa; like anumāna. The exclusions of fallacies are as before. Therefore, based on these two characteristics, Diṅnāga established only two pramāṇas. As for the essence of these two characteristics, we now explain it briefly: All dharmas, each adhering to its own intrinsic entity, are called the svalakṣaṇa; this is not the same as the svalakṣaṇa explained in the sūtras. A single dharma conventionally designated by a conceptual mind that runs through all dharmas, like a thread stringing flowers together, is called the sāmānyalakṣaṇa; this is also ontologically distinct from the sāmānyalakṣaṇa in the sūtras. Some say that svalakṣaṇa refers to things like the heat of fire, which are called svalakṣaṇa, whereas what is expressed and revealed by verbal designation is called sāmānyalakṣaṇa. This interpretation is entirely wrong and contradicts the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra. If only things like the heat of fire are named svalakṣaṇa, then when the meditative mind cognizes fire without apprehending its heat, it would have to be called cognizing a sāmānyalakṣaṇa; and when the meditative mind cognizes the principle expressed by scripture, which is also revealed by words, it would also have to be called a sāmānyalakṣaṇa. If that were so, the meditative mind would have to be called anumāna, because it does not cognize a svalakṣaṇa.