因明入正理論疏 3.16

3.16

述曰：准前亦三，此初二也。凡二差別名相違者，非法、有法上除言所陳，餘一切義皆是差別，要是兩宗各各隨應因所成立，意之所許，所諍別義方名差別，因令相違，名相違因。若不爾者，如立聲無常宗，聲之上可聞、不可聞等義，無常之上作彼緣性、非彼緣性等，如是一切皆謂相違，因令相違名為彼因。若爾，便無相違因義。比量相違等，皆准此釋。此中義說，若數論外道對佛弟子意欲成立我為受者，受用眼等。若我為有法受用眼等，便有宗中所別不成，積聚性因，兩俱不成，如臥具喻，所立不成。若言眼等必為我用，能別不成，闕無同喻。積聚性因，違法自相，臥具喻有所立不成。若成眼等為假他用，相符極成。由此方便矯立宗云：眼等必為他用。眼等有法，指事顯陳。為他用法，方便顯示，意立必為法之差別，不積聚他，實我受用。若顯立云，不積聚他用，能別不成，所立亦不成，亦闕無同喻。因違法自相，故須方便立，積聚性因，積多極微成眼等故，如臥具喻，其床座等是積聚性，彼此俱許為他受用，故得為同喻。因喻之法不應分別，故總建立。

Commentary: Following the preceding, this also has three parts; this is the first two. Whenever two particular properties are termed contradictory, it is not that all meanings apart from what is stated in words upon the property and the subject are particular properties. It must be that which is respectively to be established by the reason according to the two schools, what is intended in thought, the distinct meaning in dispute—only then is it called a particular property; and when the reason causes it to be contradicted, it is called a contradictory reason. Were it not so, then as in establishing the thesis that 'sound is impermanent', meanings such as audible or inaudible upon sound, or being a condition for that or not being a condition for that upon impermanence—if all such were deemed contradictory, and the reason causing contradiction were named that reason, then there would be no meaning to a contradictory reason. Inference-contradiction and the like are all explained following this. The intended meaning here is: if the Sāṃkhya non-Buddhist intends, against a Buddhist disciple, to establish that the self is the experiencer (bhoktṛ) who enjoys the eyes and so forth—if the self were made the subject that enjoys the eyes and so forth, there would be the fallacy of the qualificand being unestablished in the thesis (viśeṣyāsiddha), the reason 'being composite' would be unestablished for both (ubhaya-asiddha), and like the bedding example, what is to be established would be unestablished (sādhyavikala). If he says that 'the eyes and so forth are necessarily for my use,' the qualifier would be unestablished (viśeṣaṇāsiddha), lacking a similar example. The reason 'being composite' would contradict the own-nature of the property, and the bedding example would have the fault of what is to be established being unestablished. If he establishes that 'the eyes and so forth are for the use of a conventional other,' that would be establishing what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). Therefore, through this expedient, he deceitfully establishes the thesis: 'The eyes and so forth are necessarily for the use of another.' The eyes and so forth are the subject (dharmin), explicitly stated by pointing to the facts. 'For the use of another' is the property (dharma), shown through expedient means, intending to establish what is the particular property of the property: enjoyment by a real self that is an incomposite other. If he were to establish explicitly that 'it is for the use of an incomposite other,' the qualifier would be unestablished, what is to be established would also be unestablished, and there would also be a lack of similar examples. Because the reason would contradict the own-nature of the property, he must establish it through expedient means: using the reason 'because of being composite', since the accumulation of many subtle atoms constitutes the eyes and so forth; like the example of bedding, where beds, seats, and the like are composite, and both parties accept that they are used by another; hence it can serve as a similar example. The properties of reason and example should not be differentiated, so they are established in general terms.