因明入正理論疏 3.16

3.16

Commentary: Following the preceding, this also has three parts; this is the first two. Whenever two particular properties are termed contradictory, it is not that all meanings apart from what is stated in words upon the property and the subject are particular properties. It must be that which is respectively to be established by the reason according to the two schools, what is intended in thought, the distinct meaning in dispute—only then is it called a particular property; and when the reason causes it to be contradicted, it is called a contradictory reason. Were it not so, then as in establishing the thesis that 'sound is impermanent', meanings such as audible or inaudible upon sound, or being a condition for that or not being a condition for that upon impermanence—if all such were deemed contradictory, and the reason causing contradiction were named that reason, then there would be no meaning to a contradictory reason. Inference-contradiction and the like are all explained following this. The intended meaning here is: if the Sāṃkhya non-Buddhist intends, against a Buddhist disciple, to establish that the self is the experiencer (bhoktṛ) who enjoys the eyes and so forth—if the self were made the subject that enjoys the eyes and so forth, there would be the fallacy of the qualificand being unestablished in the thesis (viśeṣyāsiddha), the reason 'being composite' would be unestablished for both (ubhaya-asiddha), and like the bedding example, what is to be established would be unestablished (sādhyavikala). If he says that 'the eyes and so forth are necessarily for my use,' the qualifier would be unestablished (viśeṣaṇāsiddha), lacking a similar example. The reason 'being composite' would contradict the own-nature of the property, and the bedding example would have the fault of what is to be established being unestablished. If he establishes that 'the eyes and so forth are for the use of a conventional other,' that would be establishing what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). Therefore, through this expedient, he deceitfully establishes the thesis: 'The eyes and so forth are necessarily for the use of another.' The eyes and so forth are the subject (dharmin), explicitly stated by pointing to the facts. 'For the use of another' is the property (dharma), shown through expedient means, intending to establish what is the particular property of the property: enjoyment by a real self that is an incomposite other. If he were to establish explicitly that 'it is for the use of an incomposite other,' the qualifier would be unestablished, what is to be established would also be unestablished, and there would also be a lack of similar examples. Because the reason would contradict the own-nature of the property, he must establish it through expedient means: using the reason 'because of being composite', since the accumulation of many subtle atoms constitutes the eyes and so forth; like the example of bedding, where beds, seats, and the like are composite, and both parties accept that they are used by another; hence it can serve as a similar example. The properties of reason and example should not be differentiated, so they are established in general terms.