因明入正理論疏 3.227

3.227

述曰：此辨能破境，即他立失，分二：初辯闕支、次明支失。謂初能立缺減過性，此即初辯闕支。或總無言，或言無義，過重先明，故云初也。此之缺減，古師約宗、因、喻，或六、七句。陳那已後約因三相，亦六或七，並如前辯。或且約陳那因三相為七句者，闕一有三者，如數論師對聲論立聲是無常，眼所見故，聲無常宗，瓶盆等為同品，虛空等為異品，此但闕初而有後二。聲論對薩婆多立聲為常，所聞性故，虛空為共同品，瓶盆等為異，闕第二相。所量性因，闕第三相。闕二有三者，如立聲非勤發，眼所見故，虛空等為同，瓶盆等為異，闕初、二相。如立我常對佛法者，因云非勤發，虛空為同，電等為異，因闕所依，故無初相，電等上有，闕第三相。諸四相違因，即闕後二相。如立聲常，眼所見故，虛空為同，盆等為異，三相俱闕。立宗過性等下，別明支過，此等或於能破立所破名，故《理門》云：「能立缺減能破，立宗過性能破等。」

The commentary says: This identifies the domain of refutation, which is the faults in the opponent's proof. It is divided into two: first, determining the deficiency of members; second, explaining the faults of the members. 'Namely, the faulty nature of deficiency in the initial proof' is the first part, determining the deficiency of members. Either speech is completely absent, or the speech is devoid of meaning; since this fault is grave, it is explained first, hence called 'the initial'. This deficiency was explained by ancient masters in terms of the thesis, reason, and example, as having six or seven clauses. From Diṅnāga onward, it is explained in terms of the three characteristics of the reason, also having six or seven clauses, all as explained previously. Or, taking Diṅnāga's three characteristics of the reason as seven clauses: among those lacking one characteristic, there are three. For instance, when a Sāṃkhya states to a Śabdavādin: 'Sound is impermanent, because it is visible to the eye'—with sound being impermanent as the thesis, pots, jars, and the like are the sapakṣa, and empty space and the like are the vipakṣa; this merely lacks the first characteristic but possesses the latter two. When a Śabdavādin states to a Sarvāstivādin: 'Sound is permanent, because it is audible'—with empty space as the common sapakṣa, and pots, jars, and the like as the vipakṣa; this lacks the second characteristic. With the reason 'because it is an object of cognition', it lacks the third characteristic. Among those lacking two characteristics, there are three. For instance, when stating: 'Sound is not produced by effort, because it is visible to the eye'—with empty space and the like as the sapakṣa, and pots, jars, and the like as the vipakṣa; this lacks the first and second characteristics. For example, when stating to a Buddhist: 'The self is permanent, because it is not produced by effort'—with empty space as the sapakṣa and lightning and the like as the vipakṣa; because the reason lacks a locus of support, it lacks the first characteristic, and because it is present upon lightning and the like, it lacks the third characteristic. All four contradictory reasons lack the latter two characteristics. When stating: 'Sound is permanent, because it is visible to the eye'—with empty space as the sapakṣa and jars and the like as the vipakṣa; all three characteristics are lacking. From 'the faulty nature of the proposed thesis' onward, he explains the faults of the specific members. These sometimes apply the name of that which is refuted to the refutation itself; hence the Nyāyamukha states: 'The refutation of deficiency in the proof, the refutation of the faulty nature of the proposed thesis, and so forth.'