因明入正理論疏 3.25

3.25

述曰：准前作三，此即初二，標名舉宗、因。鵂鶹因緣，如前已說。時，彼仙人既悟所證六句義法，謂證菩提，便欣入滅，但嗟所悟未有傳人，傳者必須具七德故：一生中國、二上種姓、三有寂滅因、四身相圓滿、五聰明辯捷、六性行柔和、七具大悲心。經無量時伺無具者，後經多劫，婆羅痆斯國有婆羅門名摩納縛迦，此云儒童。儒童有子名般遮尸棄，此云五頂，頂髮五旋，頭有五角，七德雖具，根熟稍遲，為染妻孥，率難化導。經無量歲，伺其根熟，後三千歲，戲遊園苑，共妻兢花，因相忿恨，鵂鶹引通，化五頂不從。又三千歲，化復不得。更三千歲，兩競尤甚，相厭既切，仰念空仙。仙人應時神力化引，騰空迎往所住山中。徐說先悟六句義法，說實、德、業，彼皆信之，至大有句，彼便生惑。仙言：「有者能有實等，離實、德、業三外別有，體常是一。」弟子不從云：「實、德、業性不無，即是能有，豈離三外別有能有？」仙人便說同異句義，能同異彼實、德、業三。此三之上各各有一總同異性，隨應各各有別同異。如是三中隨其別類復有總、別諸同異性，體常眾多。復有一常能和合性，和合實、德、業令不相離，互相屬著。五頂雖信同異和合，然猶不信別有大有。鵂鶹便立論所陳量，此量有三：實、德、業三各別作故。

Commentary: Following the previous pattern, this is divided into three parts; this comprises the first two, stating the name and adducing the thesis and reason. The background of Ulūka has already been told before. At that time, that ṛṣi, having realized the dharma of the six categories (padārthas) that he had attained, thought he had realized bodhi and gladly wished to enter extinction; but he lamented that there was no successor to transmit what he had realized. For a transmitter must possess seven virtues: 1. born in the Middle Country; 2. of high caste; 3. possessing the cause of quiescence; 4. possessing complete physical marks; 5. intelligent, discerning, and quick-witted; 6. gentle in disposition and conduct; 7. endowed with great compassion. For immeasurable time he watched for one, but none possessed them. Later, after many kalpas, in the country of Vārāṇasī there was a brahmin named Māṇavaka, translated here as "Confucian youth" [young brahmin]. Māṇavaka had a son named Pañcaśikha, translated here as "Five Crests", who had five whorls of hair on his crest and five horns on his head. Though he possessed the seven virtues, the maturation of his faculties was somewhat slow; being attached to wife and children, he was hard to convert quickly. For immeasurable years the ṛṣi waited for his faculties to mature. After three thousand years, when Pañcaśikha was roaming playfully in a park competing with his wife for flowers and came to resent her on that account, Ulūka tried to use supernormal powers to guide and convert Pañcaśikha, but he would not comply. After another three thousand years, conversion was still impossible. After yet another three thousand years, the two competed even more fiercely; having grown utterly sick of her, he looked up and longed for the sky-faring ṛṣi. The ṛṣi immediately used supernormal power to transform and guide him, soaring through the sky to welcome him to the mountain where he dwelt. Slowly he explained the dharma of the six categories he had previously realized. When he spoke of substance, quality, and action, Pañcaśikha believed all of them; but when it came to the category of Great Existence (mahā-bhāva), he became doubtful. The ṛṣi said: 'Existence is that which can have substance and the rest; it exists separately outside the three—substance, quality, and action—and its substance is permanent and one.' The disciple did not comply, saying: 'The fact that substance, quality, and action are not non-existent is precisely their "capacity to have"; how could there be a "capacity to have" that exists separately outside the three?' The ṛṣi then explained the category of commonality-particularity, which can homogenize and differentiate those three—substance, quality, and action. Upon these three there is in each case a universal commonality-particularity, and according to the case, each has specific commonality-particularities. Thus, within the three, corresponding to their distinct classes, there are further universal and specific commonality-particularities, whose substances are permanent and manifold. Furthermore, there is a permanent category of inherence (samavāya), which inheres substance, quality, and action so that they are not separated and mutually pertain to one another. Although Pañcaśikha believed in commonality-particularity and inherence, he still did not believe that there was a separate Great Existence. Ulūka then formulated the inferences presented in the treatise. These inferences are three, because substance, quality, and action are each treated separately.