因明入正理論疏 3.40

3.40

述曰：下文亦三，此即初二，標名舉宗、因。此言意說，彼勝論立大有句義有實、德、業，實、德、業三和合之時同起詮言，詮三為有，同起緣智，緣三為有。實、德、業三為因能起，有詮緣因即是大有，大有能有實、德、業故。《十句論》說：「同句義云何？謂有性。何等為有性？謂與一切實、德、業句義和合，一切根所取，於實、德、業有詮智因，是名有性。」智謂能緣。彼下又說：「如是有性，定非所作，常、無德、無動作，無細分亦爾。有實、德、業，除同、有能、無能、俱分、異所和合，一有，同詮緣因。」彼鵂鶹仙以五頂不信離實、德、業別有有故，即以前因成立前宗，言陳有性有法自相，意許差別為有緣性。有性、同異有緣性同，詮言各別，故彼不取。心、心所法是能緣性，有緣謂境，有能緣故。謂境有體為因，能起有緣之性。若無體者，心如何生？以無因故，緣無不生。如同異性，有一實故，作有緣性，體非實等。有性有一實，亦作有緣性，故知體亦非實、德、業。此言有者，有無之有，非作境因有能緣性，故非大有也。若作大有緣性，能別不成，闕無同喻。同異為喻，所立不成。有性言陳有法自相，作有緣性、非有緣性，是自相上意許差別。是故前因亦是有法差別之因，是本成故。

The Commentary says: The text below also has three [parts]; this is the first two, indicating the name and presenting the thesis and reason. The meaning of this statement is: that Vaiśeṣika posits that the category of the Great Existence possesses substance, quality, and action; when the three—substance, quality, and action—combine, they jointly give rise to the expressing word that designates the three as existent, and jointly give rise to the cognitive apprehension that cognizes the three as existent. Substance, quality, and action act as causes capable of producing [them]; the cause of the designation and cognition of existence is precisely the Great Existence, because the Great Existence can possess substance, quality, and action. The Daśapadārthī states: "What is the category of commonality? It refers to existence-ness. What is existence-ness? It refers to that which inheres in all categories of substance, quality, and action, is apprehended by all sense faculties, and is the cause of the designation and cognition of existence in regard to substance, quality, and action; this is called existence-ness." Cognition refers to cognitive apprehension. It further states below: "Such existence-ness is definitely not produced, is eternal, lacks qualities, lacks action, and likewise lacks subtle parts. Possessing substance, quality, and action, excluding inherence in commonality, potentiality, non-potentiality, commonality-particularity, and particularity, it is single existence, the cause of common designation and cognition." Because Pañcaśikha did not believe that there is an existence separate from substance, quality, and action, that sage Ulūka used the previous reason to establish the previous thesis: the explicitly uttered existence-ness is the own-character of the subject, and the intended qualification is "acting as the object of cognitive apprehension." Existence-ness and commonality-particularity are identical in acting as objects of cognitive apprehension, but their expressing words are distinct, so he did not adopt them. The mind and mental factors are that which cognizes; "having an object of cognition" refers to the cognitive object, because there is that which cognizes. That is, the entity of the cognitive object serves as the cause, capable of producing the property of having an object of cognition. If it had no entity, how could the mind arise? Because without a cause, there is no arising when cognizing non-existence. Like commonality-particularity, because it possesses one substance, it acts as an object of cognitive apprehension, while its entity is not substance and so forth. Existence-ness possesses one substance and also acts as an object of cognitive apprehension; therefore we know its entity is also not substance, quality, or action. The "existence" spoken of here is the existence of existence-and-non-existence; it does not act as the cause of an objective domain having cognitive apprehension, so it is not the Great Existence. If it acted as the object of cognitive apprehension of the Great Existence, the predicate would be unestablished, lacking a similar example. Taking commonality-particularity as an example, the probandum would be unestablished. Existence-ness is the explicitly uttered own-character of the subject; "acting as the object of cognitive apprehension" or "not acting as the object of cognitive apprehension" is an intended qualification upon the own-character. Therefore, the previous reason is also a reason [contradictory to] the qualification of the subject, because it originally established it.