因明入正理論疏 3.40

3.40

The Commentary says: The text below also has three [parts]; this is the first two, indicating the name and presenting the thesis and reason. The meaning of this statement is: that Vaiśeṣika posits that the category of the Great Existence possesses substance, quality, and action; when the three—substance, quality, and action—combine, they jointly give rise to the expressing word that designates the three as existent, and jointly give rise to the cognitive apprehension that cognizes the three as existent. Substance, quality, and action act as causes capable of producing [them]; the cause of the designation and cognition of existence is precisely the Great Existence, because the Great Existence can possess substance, quality, and action. The Daśapadārthī states: "What is the category of commonality? It refers to existence-ness. What is existence-ness? It refers to that which inheres in all categories of substance, quality, and action, is apprehended by all sense faculties, and is the cause of the designation and cognition of existence in regard to substance, quality, and action; this is called existence-ness." Cognition refers to cognitive apprehension. It further states below: "Such existence-ness is definitely not produced, is eternal, lacks qualities, lacks action, and likewise lacks subtle parts. Possessing substance, quality, and action, excluding inherence in commonality, potentiality, non-potentiality, commonality-particularity, and particularity, it is single existence, the cause of common designation and cognition." Because Pañcaśikha did not believe that there is an existence separate from substance, quality, and action, that sage Ulūka used the previous reason to establish the previous thesis: the explicitly uttered existence-ness is the own-character of the subject, and the intended qualification is "acting as the object of cognitive apprehension." Existence-ness and commonality-particularity are identical in acting as objects of cognitive apprehension, but their expressing words are distinct, so he did not adopt them. The mind and mental factors are that which cognizes; "having an object of cognition" refers to the cognitive object, because there is that which cognizes. That is, the entity of the cognitive object serves as the cause, capable of producing the property of having an object of cognition. If it had no entity, how could the mind arise? Because without a cause, there is no arising when cognizing non-existence. Like commonality-particularity, because it possesses one substance, it acts as an object of cognitive apprehension, while its entity is not substance and so forth. Existence-ness possesses one substance and also acts as an object of cognitive apprehension; therefore we know its entity is also not substance, quality, or action. The "existence" spoken of here is the existence of existence-and-non-existence; it does not act as the cause of an objective domain having cognitive apprehension, so it is not the Great Existence. If it acted as the object of cognitive apprehension of the Great Existence, the predicate would be unestablished, lacking a similar example. Taking commonality-particularity as an example, the probandum would be unestablished. Existence-ness is the explicitly uttered own-character of the subject; "acting as the object of cognitive apprehension" or "not acting as the object of cognitive apprehension" is an intended qualification upon the own-character. Therefore, the previous reason is also a reason [contradictory to] the qualification of the subject, because it originally established it.